Interpreting the Basic Law and the Adjudication of Politically Sensitive Questions

In this paper, I shall essentially lay out five interpretiveprinciples that the Hong Kong judiciary should observe. First,the Hong Kong judiciary can disable themselves from giving effectto National People's Congress (NPC) Acts that are inconsistentwith the Basic Law. Second, the Court of Final Appeal has aduty to make a reference to the NPC's Standing Committee (NPCSC)when it needs to adjudicate over two conflicting Basic Law provisions,one whose affairs fall within the Central Government's concernsand the other which falls within the limits of Hong Kong's autonomy.Third, in reading the text of the NPCSC Interpretation narrowlywhile observing its central tenor, the Court would be respectingthe plenary interpretive mandate conferred on the NPCSC whileretaining its role as the primary interpreter of the Basic Law.Fourth, so far as a Mainland National Law has been formallyincorporated into the Basic Law, it cannot be deemed in violationof another constitutional clause. Finally, I would argue thatnot all constitutional affairs falling within the limits ofHong Kong's autonomy are automatically justiciable; where thereis a textual commitment to a coordinate branch of government,the Court may only interfere with the decisions made by thepolitical branches on traditional grounds of judicial review,i.e. illegality, irrationality or procedural impropriety.     

香港基本法解释权的法律思考

香港回归祖国，体现“一国两制”精神的香港基本法在香港施行。以“居留权案”为开端，全国人大常委会共对基本法进行了三次释法活动。每次的释法都会引起内地与香港法律界的巨大争议。内地与香港法律解释制度的巨大差异性是基本法解释权问题产生的根本原因，以此提出协调方法，以保持香港高度自治的同时，维护基本法的权威。     

《香港基本法》解释的权限和程序问题探析

《香港基本法》是全国的宪法性法律,是香港特区的根本法。为了落实"一国两制"的精神,《香港基本法》的规定其解释权属于全国人大常委会,同时《香港基本法》规定全国人大常委会可以授予香港各级法院附条件的《香港基本法》解释权,由于二者的立场、视角、法律传统和利益存在着一定的分歧,因而在立法解释模式和司法解释模式之间存在一定的冲突与碰撞。《香港基本法》在解释主体、权限和程序设定方面存在一些问题,在实践中也引发了宪法危机,因此,应该针对存在的问题,逐步加以完善。     

全面正确认识全国人大常委会有关政制发展的决定

2004年4月6日全国人大常委会对香港基本法附件一第7条和附件二第3条作出解释；当月26日又作出关於2007年行政长官和2008年立法会产生办法有关问题的决定；2007年12月29日再作出关於2012年两个产生办法及有关普选问题的决定。用最近吴邦国委员长的工作报告上的话，就是“全国人大常委会根据香港基本法的立法原意，对基本法及其附件有关条款作出解释并通过相关决定，对保障基本法正确实施、推进香港民主健康发展、维护香港长期繁荣稳定发挥了不可替代的作用。”     

最高人民法院在合宪性审查中的现状、困境与出路——兼对我国《立法法》第99条第1款解释

我国《立法法》预设了最高人民法院提请全国人大常委会进行合宪性审查的路径。从现有裁判文书来看,最高人民法院在实践中并未遵循我国《立法法》所预设的路径,而是在绝大多数案件中回避了合宪性审查诉求,同时又在个别案件中进行了合宪性审查,陷入了完全回避与直接审查的两难困境。造成这种困境的原因在于,我国《立法法》对最高人民法院在合宪性审查中的权力基础、权力行使程序缺乏清晰的规定。对此,亟待通过法律解释进行明确和细化,否则最高人民法院将无章可循,无法贸然提请全国人大常委会进行合宪性审查。为了化解最高人民法院面对的这一困境,有必要对我国《立法法》第99条第1款进行解释,推导出该条款在授予最高人民法院提请审查权时,还隐含着另一项未被释明的权力即预审权,其共同构成最高人民法院在合宪性审查中的权力基础;同时,为了使预审权与提请审查权的行使制度化,有必要对其行使程序进行细化,建立起预审-提请审查机制。     

香港特别行政区的宪制基础

我国宪法和香港特别行政区基本法共同构成香港特别行政区的宪制基础。宪法规范彼此间的形式冲突不足以否认宪法在香港特别行政区的适用,香港特别行政区基本法不足以结构性取代宪法在香港特别行政区的适用。宪法中关涉社会主义制度的内容不适用于香港特别行政区,凝聚和承载着"一国"精神的内容在香港特别行政区具有适用性。厘定宪法适用于香港特别行政区的内容时应秉持"一国"的原则。"占中公投"既违反香港特别行政区基本法,也违反宪法。     

香港特区法院的违基审查权兼与董立坤、张淑钿二位教授商榷

特区立法机关应根据基本法制定法律,特区法院审查特区立法机关制定的法律是否违反基本法的权力被称为"违基审查权"。香港的普通法传统为特区法院的违基审查权提供了法理依据,特区的新法治秩序激活了普通法中法院的司法审查权,而全国人大常委会审查权的不完整性使特区法院的违基审查成为必要。司法实践表明,特区法院的违基审查权无法挑战全国人大常委会的审查权,对基本法的实施总体上是有利的;损害特区行政主导体制的主要因素并非是法院的违基审查,而是立法会的强势地位。作为植根于普通法传统、已有十多年运行实践的权力,特区法院的违基审查权无须再通过全国人大常委会释法确认。当然,基于其在特区法治秩序中的地位,特区法院违基审查权应受到特区外部与内部两方面的制约。     

表达自由的理念与限度——香港特别行政区终审法院国旗案与美国最高法院焚烧国旗案比较研究

表达自由权是《香港特别行政区基本法》所确认的公民基本权利之一。该权利在香港特别行政区的司法实践中表现出与美国宪法上的表达自由权很强的可比性:香港特别行政区终审法院与美国联邦最高法院所秉承的表达自由基本理论以及所适用的法律解释方法和司法审查标准等都极为相似;与此同时,在个案处理上,两个法院又结合各自不同的社会背景保持了必要的差异性。香港特别行政区终审法院在基本法的框架下已经初步形成了比较鲜明和稳固的表达自由权的法理。     

The High Court of the People: Popular Constitutionalism in Hong Kong under Chinese Sovereignty

Popular constitutionalism rarely arises in authoritarian polities. In the absence of genuine elections and referenda, aggrieved and disenfranchised citizens are more likely to resort to extraconstitutional action to defend themselves, to which the regime may respond with decisive suppression. Systemic popular constitutionalism did emerge in Hong Kong, currently under Chinese sovereignty, however. Through coordinated mass resistance based on shared constitutional understandings, large numbers of residents have succeeded in restraining the appointed Hong Kong chief executive from deploying his full range of powers, obliged China to make concessions on electoral reform it would not have made otherwise, and enabled the Basic Law, an imposed constitution, to remain relevant. This article specifies three preconditions under which the residents of Hong Kong have, in the teeth of authoritarianism, managed to adjudge the constitutionality of the acts of the ruling elite with their feet. These preconditions, nevertheless, are idiosyncratic, and may not endure the recent mounting tensions between Hong Kong and China [Correction added on 5 June 2014, after first online publication: the phrase “to authoritarian politic” has been removed from the last statement in the abstract.].     

“一国两制”下的若干宪政问题浅析

“一国两制”的理论和实践,给我国宪政理论提出了许多新课题。如“一国两制”的宪政涵义,“一国两制”与宪法的关系、“一国两制”与港澳基本法的关系、宪法与港澳基本法的关系等,用“一国两制”解决香港问题和澳门问题,不仅对解决台湾问题具有率先垂范的作用,而且能够证明“一国两制”是解决台湾问题的最佳模式。     

香港与中央的“违宪审查”协调

在香港基本法的设计中 ,中央与香港均拥有基本法解释权及审查权。如果两者不能在权限、管辖、程序及释义方面达成一定的默契 ,就会引发宪制危机。本文在分析两地法治传统和宪制模式的差异以及香港基本法对“违宪审查权”的制度设计后 ,提出中央和香港应本着相互理解和宽容的原则 ,按照中国宪法体制与英美法制传统相结合的思路 ,在基本法所设计的中央与特区分权的制度框架内进行协调 ,以避免和化解这种冲突。     

On the constitutional foundations of Hong Kong

Hong Kong law is characterized by a mixture of legal sources and traditions, originating from the constitutional government-based structure in the mid-1800s to the new laws, which were promulgated at the beginning of the 20th century. Since Hong Kong’s return into the People’s Republic of China in 1997, the development and forms of the Hong Kong Special Administrative Region Laws have been influenced by the Constitution of the People’s Republic of China of 1982, the Sino-British Joint Declaration of Hong Kong issues of 1984 as well as the Basic Law of the Hong Kong Special Administrative Region of 1990. The government of China continues to undertake measures, promoting a high degree of autonomy within the Hong Kong as well as its political stability and economic prosperity. All these measures contribute to the promotion of the rule of law and unification of China.     

中国宪法司法化路径探索

宪法实施中的违宪审查机制与宪法诉讼方式是两种不同机制的区别。在分析西方国家宪法实施的路径,以及中国实行宪法监督走违宪审查之路面临的困难后,根据违宪审查与宪法诉讼相别的理论,提出中国的宪法司法化方案,即违宪审查权仍由全国人大常委会行使,而由最高法院承担宪法诉讼的任务。     

“基本法律”与“基本法律以外的其他法律”划分之反思

从法律文本和立宪意图分析,全国人大只能制定和修改"基本法律"、"基本法律以外的其他法律"由全国人大常委会制定和修改。弥补全国人大立法不足是现行《宪法》赋予全国人大常委会国家立法权的首要目标,而防范全国人大常委会侵夺全国人大立法权则是其附带的要求,这二者之间并非平行的目标关系;"基本法律"和"基本法律以外的其他法律"的划分,正是这种附带要求的产物。实践中,全国人大与全国人大常委会立法权限的错位以及两种不同的"法律"在效力上的混同,根源于人民代表大会制度下人大与其常委会之间权力关系在制度层面与实践层面存在的张力。     

Support Structures and Constitutional Change: Teles,Southworth, and the Conservative Legal Movement

This essay reviews two recent works in political science on the American conservative legal movement: Steven M. Teles's The Rise of the Conservative Legal Movement: The Battle for Control of the Law (2008) and Ann Southworth's Lawyers of the Right: Professionalizing the Conservative Coalition (2008). It examines these books in the context of a larger debate over the variables that best explain constitutional change in general and the recent “conservative counterrevolution” in Supreme Court jurisprudence in particular. It shows how these studies build on the scholarship of Charles Epp, who argued in The Rights Revolution (1998) that serious constitutional change requires not only the right cast of characters on the court, but also a strong “support structure” in the legal profession and civil society. Finally, it draws on the author's own research on the Federalist Society for Law and Public Policy to illustrate some important avenues for further inquiry.     

香港特别行政区基本法解读：中央与香港关系法治化之实现

在宪法话语下，香港特别行政区基本法是中国第一部实现中央与其组成部分——香港关系法治化的法律文件。它规定了中央与香港各自专有职权、共有职权及双方职权冲突解决机制，使二者关系走上法治化轨道。中央与香港关系法治化的实现，是由香港特殊的历史地位、香港特别行政区基本法制定方式及香港法治传统等因素决定的。在二者关系法治化进程中还有一些地方需要追一步完善，例如，特别行政区行政长官与中央关系、权力冲突协调机制及有关组织机构的性质地位等。香港特别行政区基本法确立的中央与香港关系法治化模式，对整个国家范围内中央与地方关系法治化有重要启示意义。     

从合宪性推定到权力谦抑主义——香港“郑家纯等诉立法会”案中的解释方法与司法哲学

香港"郑家纯等诉立法会"案的判决涉及"香港立法会的调查委员会是否有权传召当事人"这一颇具争议的问题。针对当事人提出的"立法会调查委员会越权"的主张,在进入司法审查后,法院面对的是如何选择具体的方法来进行审查。虽然从文本来看,香港《基本法》并没有明确赋予立法会的调查委员会以传召当事人的权力,但法院采取合宪性推定方法,认为《基本法》没有禁止立法会通过调查委员会来行使证人传召权,并判决立法会的调查委员会不存在越权情形。这种对立法机关持谦抑姿态的方法论在一定程度上超越了形式文本,在本质上建基于《基本法》架构下国家不同权力间的关系维度,具有宪法上的正当性,并且对当下中国宪法方法的建构具有启示意义。当然,香港立法会调查权的行使必须以《基本法》为依据,以香港特殊的行政主导制为基础,这又从另一面体现了立法权对行政权的谦抑。     

All Bark and No Bite: Notes on the Federal Constitutional Court's 'Banana Decision'

The Federal Constitutional Court's banana decision of 7 June 2000 continues the complex theme of national fundamental‐rights control over Community law. Whereas in the ‘Solange II’ decision (BVerfGE 73, 339) the Federal Constitutional Court had lowered its standard of review to the general guarantee of the constitutionally mandatorily required minimum, the Maastricht judgment (BVerfGE 89, 155) had raised doubts as to the continued validity of this case law. In the banana decision, which was based on the submission of the EC banana market regulation by the Frankfurt‐am‐Main administrative court for constitutional review, the Federal Constitutional Court has now confirmed the ‘Solange II’decision and restrictively specified the admissibility conditions for constitutional review of Community law as follows. Constitutional complaints and judicial applications for review of European legislation alleging fundamental‐rights infringements are inadmissible unless they show that the development of European law including Court of Justice case law has since the ‘Solange II’ decision generally fallen below the mandatorily required fundamental‐rights standard of the Basic Law in a given field. This would require a comprehensive comparison of European and national fundamental‐rights protection. This paper criticises this formula as being logically problematic and scarcely compatible with the Basic Law. Starting from the position that national constitutional courts active even in European matters should be among the essential vertical ‘checks and balances’ in the European multi‐level system, a practical alternative to the Federal Constitutional Court's retreat is developed. This involves at the first stage a submission by the Federal Constitutional Court to the Court of Justice, something that in the banana case might have taken up questions on the method of fundamental‐rights review and the internal Community effect of WTO dispute settlement decisions. Should national constitutional identity not be upheld even by this, then at a second stage, as ultima ratio taking recourse to general international law, the call is made for the decision of constitutional conflicts by an independent mediating body.     

《基本法》：中国法与普通法的结晶（下）

剩余权力的争议 如果《基本法》被看成是香港的宪法，香港就会在实际上成为联邦的一个州。相应地，不管什么权力和权利在《基本法》中没有被规定（剩余权力）仍然属于香港而不属于中国。因为“剩余权力”这个词的含义涉及到以下几个方面：     

基本法之下立法、司法与行政的制衡

在香港基本法下,立法会和行政长官之间的"制约和平衡"是互相联系的,附件二还为立法会规定了一个独特的投票机制。除了立法和行政分支的平衡之外,基本法第七十三条还规定了立法会对政府的其它制约。香港现时的三权制衡体制较像英式,而不等同于美式的三权分立,它与香港的行政主导体制并没有矛盾。