Why Federalism Does Not Always Take Shape: the Cases of Italy and Nepal

Federalism has been discussed as a potential system of governance in many countries, but in some it has failed to take shape. This has been the case in Nepal and, to a certain extent, in Italy. In fact, in Italy the federal option was rejected at the time of Risorgimento, and constitutional reforms in the 2000s never transformed the country into a federation as desired by political actors such as the Northern League despite some decentralization. In Nepal, the 2007 interim constitution specified that the country would be federal, but the first Constituent Assembly elected to write a new constitution was unable to produce a federal map acceptable to the major political parties and the second is wrestling with the same issue. In both cases, federal structuring was attacked by political actors who argued that it could promote disunity, undermine solidarity, and possibly lead to disintegration. This article argues that the idea of federalism held by prominent political actors as promoting division and conflict played strongly against its implementation.     

宪政视野中的公民政治参与

宪政是以民主为基础,以法治为保障,以人权为终极目标的政治过程与政治状态。政治参与是公民通过一定途径与方式介入政治过程从而影响政治决策的政治行为。公民的政治参与是宪政实践的一项重要内容,对于建设社会主义法治国家,推动社会主义民主进程,最终促成社会主义政治文明有着深远的意义。     

走向多元：宪政时代司法的复合功能

定分止争是原始社会司法功能之核心。但进入阶级社会后,国家的出现使得司法功能逐渐朝着维护特权阶层之政权的角度发展。到了近现代社会,随着身份特权被打破,法治成为国家治理的主要方式,宪政原则被确定为司法功能的逻辑原点,司法功能在逻辑自主性支配下呈现出了多元化的趋势。宪政时代司法的多元化功能具体体现为服务功能、统治功能、保障功能、法治功能和治理功能五个方面。     

Making Referendums Safe for Democracy: A Call for More and Better Deliberation

In this essay I argue that when thinking about the design of referendums we should pay particular attention to the quality, substance, and inclusiveness of the debate and deliberation that precedes the vote. This is especially true for constitutional referendums that affect fundamental laws. I suggest that drawing out the procedure over time and including citizens’ mini‐publics might be helpful additions to our design tools box.     

宪政视野下的《刑事诉讼法·总则》

通过重构《刑事诉讼法·总则》,可以将其分为三部分,涉及权力分配问题、权力主体从事刑事诉讼行为时可能受到的限制、诉讼主体可以凭借的工具。第一部分是在宪政视野下的分析,其得出了一个值得注意的结论,中国刑事诉讼程序现代性因素非常多,权力分配的基本框架已经确立;第二部分,涉及对权力主体的各种限制本身可以增加司法机关判决的可接受性,可以提高司法权威;第三部分,分析了刑事程序参与者可以凭借的各种工具。在此基础上,进一步揭示出其暗含的一些瑕疵、甚至缺陷,如不赋予法官独立权,仅仅赋予法院作为整体的独立权。     

Experimentalism in the EU: Common ground and persistent differences

Our central claim in this rejoinder is that experimentalist forms of organization in making regulatory rules, organizing social services, and articulating constitutional norms arise and diffuse as the problem that the actors and the state face shifts from ignorance to uncertainty. We argue that this has consequences for forms of accountability and for the conception and organization of democracy and constitutionalism. The EU, founded by diverse states in a period of continuing uncertainty, intensified by growing interdependence, proves to be a natural laboratory for observing urgent efforts to adjust to this new situation, and the symposium focuses on developments there. The symposium has brought us to see that there is more common ground in these debates than prior exchanges may have suggested. We therefore emphasize convergence on large points, while underscoring and, we hope, clarifying persistent differences, with the aim of encouraging the joint exploration of them already underway, in part explicitly, in part implicitly.     

Evolution of subnational foreign economic relations in Nigeria

ABSTRACT

In the current dispensation of civilian rule in Nigeria (1999–present), her subnational governments (SNGs) have increasingly been engaging in economic activities which impact on how Nigeria conducts her international economic interactions. This emerging trend is at variance with the existing legal provisions under the 1999 Nigerian Constitution, which preclude SNGs from this policy space. This article examines the evolution of the constitutional framework for SNG involvement in Nigeria’s foreign economic relations since independence. It is the argument in this article that the exclusion of SNGs from foreign affairs under the 1999 Constitution is a departure from the original configuration at independence. It is further argued that the recent episodes of SNG involvement in international economic activities are occurring despite the constitutional restrictions owing to external factors such as globalisation and internal factors such the growing need among SNGs to find alternative ways to fund their economic development objectives.     

诉权的宪政之维

目前我国的诉权研究视野比较狭窄、法理根基的探讨比较单薄,基于诉权与宪政之间的内在逻辑联系,从宪政的维度更能够厘清诉权的来源、属性与价值,这有助于拓宽诉权的思考空间,深化对诉权的理论研究,凸显加强诉权的宪法保障之重要意义。     

Reforming the United Kingdom Constitution: Law,Convention, Soft Law

The Governance of Britain Green Paper continues the programme of constitutional reform begun in 1997, and appears to reinforce the juridification of the UK's constitution. Nevertheless, several key reforms will be implemented not by legislation, but by creating new conventions. This article argues that such ‘declared’ conventions are best understood as a form of constitutional ‘soft law’, which attempt to influence constitutional behaviour rather than generating binding norms. Applying a regulatory analysis, it then argues that the case for a soft, rather than hard law approach to constitutional reform is weaker than its widespread use in the UK suggests. Finally, the article challenges the thesis that the political constitution is being replaced by a legal constitution, arguing that the government's attitude to constitutional reform still exhibits basic characteristics of political constitutionalism. Moreover, there is more to contemporary constitutional developments than a bipolar contest between political and legal constitutionalism.     

Smoke but No Fire? The Politics of a ‘British’ Bill of Rights

This article systematically explores the political context behind Labour and the Conservatives' new commitment to a British Bill of Rights. This is linked to conflicting incentives to resist the current trajectory towards rights constitutionalism (‘Constitutional Freeze’), to further encourage further rights constitutionalism (‘Constitutional Fire’) and to engage in largely cosmetic change (‘Constitutional Smoke’). Ultimately, the latter has proved dominant for both parties. This demonstrates the difficulty of building political momentum behind significant revision of institutional responsibility for protecting human rights in stable, democratic settings. It specifically illustrates the strong barriers which both a hegemonic policy preserving and an ‘aversive’ constitutionalising dynamic must overcome to succeed.