Archival sources for Sir Godfrey Hilton Thomson.

Sir Godfrey Hilton Thomson was Bell Professor of Education at the University of Edinburgh from 1925 until 1951. He was a prominent theorist of intelligence, statistician and psychometrician, educational researcher, deviser and distributor of intelligence tests, and worked on the issue of intelligence and family size as it affected the population. Despite his previous eminence, he has become an obscure figure. That is, partly, because there are few remaining archive materials from which he can be studied, and these are scattered. Here, we describe sources that contain useful information on Thomson’s life and work. These include specific sources in the University of Edinburgh, some archives beyond Edinburgh that include items related to Thomson, and new materials that we have gathered in a project to improve the availability of historical materials on Thomson’s work and life. The latter are large in extent and have come to light only recently. (PsycINFO Database Record (c) 2010 APA, all rights reserved)     

"Integrating neural networks into decision-making and motivational theory: Rethinking VIE theory": Erratum.

Reports an error in "Integrating neural networks into decision-making and motivational theory: Rethinking VIE theory" by Robert G. Lord, Paul J. Hanges and Ellen G. Godfrey (Canadian Psychology/Psychologie Canadienne, 2003[Feb], Vol 44[1], 21-38). The paper by Lord, Henges and Godfrey, referred to in some of the commentaries (this issue), was accepted as part of the Special Section on psychology without boundaries. However, it was inadvertently published in a previous issue. The full reference is: Lord, R. G., Hanges, P. J., & Godfrey, E. G. (2003). Integrating neural networks into decision-making and motivational theory: Rethinking VIE theory. Canadian Psychology, 44 (1), 21-38. (The following abstract of the original article appeared in record 2003-01537-005.) Uses a reformulation of V. H. Vroom's (1964) VIE (Valence-Instrumentality-Expectancy) theory to illustrate the potential value of neuropsychologically based models of cognitive processes. Vroom's theory posits that people's decisions are determined by their affective reactions to certain outcomes (valences), beliefs about the relationship between actions and outcomes (expectancies), and perceptions of the association between primary and secondary outcomes (instrumentalities). One of the major criticisms of this type of theory is that the computations it requires are unrealistically time-consuming and often exceed working memory capacity. In this paper, the authors maintain that if an individual has extensive experience with a problem situation, he or she can process decisions about that situation using neural networks that operate implicitly so that cognitive resources are not exhausted by simple computations; instead, the computations are performed implicitly by neural networks. By thinking about VIE from a neural network standpoint, at least one of its problems is eliminated, and several new insights into decision-making are provided. The authors use simulation methodology to show that such a model is both viable and can reflect the effects of current goals on choice processes. (PsycINFO Database Record (c) 2010 APA, all rights reserved)     

Joseph B. Strauss, Charles A. Ellis, and the Golden Gate Bridge: Justice at Last

The Golden Gate Bridge is one of the best-known engineering structures in the world and was the longest suspension bridge in the world for many years. Its design has generally been attributed to Joseph Strauss, but recent evidence proves that Charles Ellis was the prime designer of the bridge between 1929 and 1931. Strauss fired Ellis in late 1931 and systematically removed any mention of Ellis’ name in his final report on the bridge issued in 1938. It remained for John van der Zee in his book The Gate to set the record straight. This paper makes the case that Strauss violated one of the fundamental ethical canons—that of giving credit where credit is due.     

"Confidence intervals for gamma-family measures of ordinal association": Correction.

Reports an error in "Confidence intervals for gamma-family measures of ordinal association" by Carol M. Woods (Psychological Methods, 2007[Jun], Vol 12[2], 185-204). The note corrects simulation results presented in the article concerning the performance of confidence intervals (CIs) for Spearman's rs. An error in the author's C++ code affected all simulation results for Spearman's rs (but none of the results for gamma-family indices). (The following abstract of the original article appeared in record 2007-07830-005.) This research focused on confidence intervals (CIs) for 10 measures of monotonic association between ordinal variables. Standard errors (SEs) were also reviewed because more than 1 formula was available per index. For 5 indices, an element of the formula used to compute an SE is given that is apparently new. CIs computed with different SEs were compared in simulations with small samples (N = 25, 50, 75, or 100) for variables with 4 or 5 categories. With N > 25, many CIs performed well. Performance was best for consistent CIs due to N. Cliff and colleagues (N. Cliff, 1996; N. Cliff & V. Charlin, 1991; J. D. Long & N. Cliff, 1997). CIs for Spearman's rank correlation were also examined: Parameter coverage was erratic and sometimes egregiously underestimated. (PsycINFO Database Record (c) 2010 APA, all rights reserved)     

"An historical note on Darwin and nonhuman drug self-administration": Clarification to Higgins (2003).

Reports a clarification in "An historical note on Darwin and nonhuman drug self-administration" by Stephen T. Higgins (Experimental and Clinical Psychopharmacology, 2003[Nov], Vol 11[4], 317). It is noted that Charles R. Schuster served as the Action Editor for this article. (The following abstract of the original article appeared in record 2003-09137-009.) This note brings to the attention of readers a quote from Charles Darwin on the scientific implications of nonhuman drug self-administration. The quote is from The descent of man; and Selection in relation to sex (2nd ed.; C. Darwin, 1874/1998). Consistent with Darwin's prescience in many areas of science, he discerned potential scientific importance in voluntary nonhuman drug self-administration almost a century before that potential was realized in any substantive or systematic manner. (PsycINFO Database Record (c) 2010 APA, all rights reserved)     

"Two-stage dynamic signal detection: A theory of choice, decision time, and confidence": Erratum.

Reports an error in "Two-stage dynamic signal detection: A theory of choice, decision time, and confidence" by Timothy J. Pleskac and Jerome R. Busemeyer (Psychological Review, 2010[Jul], Vol 117[3], 864-901). The name of the philosopher Charles Peirce was misspelled throughout as Charles Pierce. (The following abstract of the original article appeared in record 2010-14834-006.) The 3 most often-used performance measures in the cognitive and decision sciences are choice, response or decision time, and confidence. We develop a random walk/diffusion theory—2-stage dynamic signal detection (2DSD) theory—that accounts for all 3 measures using a common underlying process. The model uses a drift diffusion process to account for choice and decision time. To estimate confidence, we assume that evidence continues to accumulate after the choice. Judges then interrupt the process to categorize the accumulated evidence into a confidence rating. The model explains all known interrelationships between the 3 indices of performance. Furthermore, the model also accounts for the distributions of each variable in both a perceptual and general knowledge task. The dynamic nature of the model also reveals the moderating effects of time pressure on the accuracy of choice and confidence. Finally, the model specifies the optimal solution for giving the fastest choice and confidence rating for a given level of choice and confidence accuracy. Judges are found to act in a manner consistent with the optimal solution when making confidence judgments. (PsycINFO Database Record (c) 2010 APA, all rights reserved)     

Introduction to the Special Section on Cognitive Abilities: 100 Years After Spearman's (1904) "'General Intelligence,' Objectively Determined and Measured".

The study of individual differences in cognitive abilities is one of the few branches of psychological science to amass a coherent body of empirical knowledge withstanding the test of time. There is wide consensus that cognitive abilities are organized hierarchically, and C. Spearman's (1904) general intelligence occupies the vertex of this hierarchy. In addition, specific abilities beyond general intelligence refine longitudinal forecasts of important social phenomena and paint a rich portrait of this important domain of psychological diversity. This opening article identifies and then reviews 5 major areas concerning the personological significance of cognitive abilities and the methods used to study them. In models of human behavior and important life outcomes, cognitive abilities are critical in more ways than social scientists realize. (PsycINFO Database Record (c) 2011 APA, all rights reserved)     

"How automatic are social judgments?" Correction to Winter, Uleman, and Cunniff.

Reports an error in "How automatic are social judgments" by Laraine Winter, James S. Uleman and Cathryn Cunniff (Journal of Personality and Social Psychology, 1985[Oct], Vol 49[4], 904-917). There are errors in the labeling of the ordinates of the figures. The correct labeling is provided in the erratum. (The following abstract of the original article appeared in record 1986-03720-001.) Adapted the encoding-specificity paradigm developed by D. Thomson and E. Tulving (see record 1971-03487-001) to test 3 operational indicants of automatism (absence of intention, of interference from other mental activity, and of awareness). Recruited for a digit-recall study, 95 undergraduate students read sentences describing actions during the retention interval of either an easy or a difficult digit-recall task. Later, sentence recall was cued by (a) disposition cues, (b) strong semantic associates to the sentence actor, or (c) words representing the gist of the sentence, or (d) sentence recall was not cued. Awareness was measured immediately after the last sentence was read. Disposition-cued recall was higher than (b) or (d) and was unaffected by digit recall difficulty. Awareness of making dispositional inferences was only weakly correlated with disposition-cued recall. Results suggest that disposition inferences occurred at encoding, without intention, without interference by differential drain on processing capacity, and with little awareness. Thus, making dispositional inferences seems to be largely, but not entirely, automatic. (50 ref) (PsycINFO Database Record (c) 2010 APA, all rights reserved)     

Psychology, history, and the press: The case of William McDougall and The New York Times..

A number of reasons have been suggested for the rapid decline in influence and credibility experienced by William McDougall after his arrival in America. To obtain some evidence on this issue, all articles appearing in The New York Times between 1906 and 1940 in which McDougall was mentioned were coded for the nature of the image conveyed. Articles mentioning the two authors most similar to McDougall in terms of number of citations, Joseph Jastrow and Edward L. Thorndike, were also coded for the nature of the image conveyed. In contrast to the images of Jastrow and Thorndike, the image McDougall conveyed was significantly more negative. McDougall was more often satirized, and references to McDougall were significantly less likely to be simple reporting of something he had said or done. Results are discussed in terms of the role of the press in "deciding" controversies in which the scientific community has lost interest. (PsycINFO Database Record (c) 2010 APA, all rights reserved)     

Correction to Duncan et al. (2008).

Reports an error in "Goal neglect and Spearman's g: Competing parts of a complex task" by John Duncan, Alice Parr, Alexandra Woolgar, Russell Thompson, Peter Bright, Sally Cox, Sonia Bishop and Ian Nimmo-Smith (Journal of Experimental Psychology: General, 2008[Feb], Vol 137[1], 131-148). The DOI for the supplemental materials was printed incorrectly. The correct DOI is as follows: http://dx.doi.org/10.1037/0096-3445.137.1.131.supp (The following abstract of the original article appeared in record 2008-01081-009.) In goal neglect, a person ignores some task requirement though being able to describe it. Goal neglect is closely related to general intelligence or C. Spearman's (1904) g (J. Duncan, H. Emslie, P. Williams, R. Johnson, & C. Freer, 1996). The authors tested the role of task complexity in neglect and the hypothesis that different task components in some sense compete for attention. In contrast to many kinds of attentional limits, increasing the real-time demands of one task component does not promote neglect of another. Neither does neglect depend on preparation for different possible events in a block of trials. Instead, the key factor is complexity in the whole body of knowledge specified in task instructions. The authors suggest that as novel activity is constructed, relevant facts, rules, and requirements must be organized into a "task model." As this model increases in complexity, different task components compete for representation, and vulnerable components may be lost. Construction of effective task models is closely linked to g. (PsycINFO Database Record (c) 2010 APA, all rights reserved)     

"Is Sigmund Freud's Psychoanalytic Edifice Relevant in the 21st Century?": Correction.

Reports an error in the original article by A. Grünbaum (Psychoanalytic Psychology, 2006[Spring], Vol 23[2], 257-284). Information was omitted from the footnotes. On page 259, the following footnote should have been included: Copyright (2002) from the Freud Encyclopedia: Theory, Therapy, and Culture (pp. 117-136) edited by Edward Erwin. Reproduced by permission of Routledge/Taylor & Francis Books, Inc. (The following abstract of this article originally appeared in record 2006-05420-004.) To warrant the relevance, if any, of Freud's psychoanalytic edifice to the 21st century, its supporters must endeavor, if at all possible, to find genuine evidence for its major pillars or to modify them significantly in response to emerging new evidence. Such a quest must begin with a clear understanding of the range and depth of the failure of Freud's cardinal clinical arguments. I endeavor below to provide such comprehension by laying bare the epistemological gravamen in the case of each of his principal tenets. And I argue that neither the post-Freudian formulations of psychoanalysis nor its so-called "hermeneutic" reconstruction has succeeded in vindicating the psychoanalytic enterprise (PsycINFO Database Record (c) 2010 APA, all rights reserved)     

"Bobo revisited: What the research says": Correction to Drewes (2008).

Reports an error in "Bobo revisited: What the research says" by Athena A. Drewes (International Journal of Play Therapy, 2008[Sum], Vol 17[1], 52-65). A reference was incomplete. The correct reference is Trotter, K., Eshelman, D., & Landreth, G. (2003). A place for Bobo in play therapy. International Journal of Play Therapy, 12, 117-139. (The following abstract of the original article appeared in record 2008-04333-005.) There has been some discussion in the play therapy literature regarding whether to use a Bobo doll (bop bag) in the play therapy room. The following article reviews research studies from the fields of personality, learning, and social psychology, and underlying theories to help inform and assist play therapists in their decision-making regarding Bobo. Suggestions are offered regarding future empirical research in play therapy outcomes and the choices of play materials in the playroom. (PsycINFO Database Record (c) 2010 APA, all rights reserved)     

"Team negotiation: An examination of integrative and distributive bargaining": Correction.

Reports an error in "Team negotiation: An examination of integrative and distributive bargaining" by Leigh Thompson, Erika Peterson and Susan E. Brodt (Journal of Personality and Social Psychology, 1996[Jan], Vol 70[1], 66-78). Susan E. Brodt's department affiliation was listed incorrectly on p. 66. Her correct affiliation is The Fuqua School of Business, Duke University. (The following abstract of the original article appeared in record 1996-01707-006.) Two experiments compared the effectiveness of team and solo negotiators in integrative and distributive bargaining. When at least 1 party to a negotiation was a team, joint profit increased. Teams, more than solos, developed mutually beneficial trade-offs among issues and discovered compatible interests. The presence of at least 1 team increased information exchange and accuracy in judgments about the other party's interests in comparison with solo negotiations. The belief by both teams and solos that teams have a relative advantage over solo opponents was not supported by actual outcomes. Unexpectedly, neither private meetings nor friendships among team members improved the team's advantage. Teams of friends made less accurate judgments and reached fewer integrative agreements compared to teams of nonfriends. (PsycINFO Database Record (c) 2010 APA, all rights reserved)     

Early interactions between animal psychologists and animal activists and the founding of the APA Committee on Precautions in Animal Experimentation.

The current conflict between animal psychologists and animal rights activists often is presented as a recent and unique phenomenon. Although its scope may be unprecedented, the fundamental issues are long-standing. Early criticisms of animal psychologists are viewed in the context of the broader Victorian antivivisectionist movement and are seen as similar to those of the present time. Various attitudes toward animals and research were expressed by individuals such as Charles Darwin, George John Ramones, William James, and John Dewey. Media attacks on animal research were directed at psychologists such as G. Stanley Hall, John B. Watson, Ivan P. Pavlov, and Edward L. Thorndike. The American Psychological Association Committee on Precautions in Animal Experimentation was founded in 1925 at the instigation of Walter B. Cannon, with Robert M. Yerkes as the first chair. (PsycINFO Database Record (c) 2010 APA, all rights reserved)     

Edward Thorndike: Revolutionary psychologist, ambiguous biologist.

Edward Thorndike's thesis can be considered the foundation document of modern comparative psychology. In it, Thorndike both rejected earlier anecdotal, anthropomorphic and introspectionist approaches to the study of animal behavior and provided novel methods for studying comparative psychology that, 100 years later, are still the basis of the field. Thorndike also introduced ways of thinking about the relationship between evolutionary biology and comparative psychology that were to bedevil comparative psychologists for decades to come. Here the author discusses, from a contemporary perspective, both Thorndike's lasting methodological and empirical contributions and his more problematic approach to the relationship between the study of phylogeny and comparative psychology. (PsycINFO Database Record (c) 2010 APA, all rights reserved)     

"Massive IQ gains in 14 nations: What IQ tests really measure": Correction to Flynn.

Reports an error in "Massive IQ gains in 14 nations: What IQ tests really measure" by James R. Flynn (Psychological Bulletin, 1987[Mar], Vol 101[2], 171-191). In this article, it was wrongly stated that that U. Schallberger put forward a hypothesis or hypotheses concerning the magnitude of Swiss IQ gains; in fact, he did not. Flynn wishes to acknowledge this error and stress that his critique of these hypotheses does not apply to Schallberger. Schallberger had earlier come to the same conclusion as Flynn, namely, that the Swiss have probably made sizable IQ gains, but all estimates of magnitude would have only speculative status. (The following abstract of the original article appeared in record 1987-17534-001.) Data from 14 nations reveal IQ gains ranging from 5 to 25 points in a single generation. Some of the largest gains occur on culturally reduced tests and tests of fluid intelligence. The Norwegian data show that a nation can make significant gains on a culturally reduced test while suffering losses on other tests. The Dutch data proved the existence of unknown environmental factors so potent that they account for 15 of the 20 points gained. The hypothesis that best fits the results is that IQ tests do not measure intelligence but rather a correlate with a weak causal link to intelligence. This hypothesis can also explain difficult trends on various mental tests, such as the combination of IQ gains and Scholastic Aptitude Test losses in the United States. (PsycINFO Database Record (c) 2010 APA, all rights reserved)     

"Interactive use of lexical information in speech perception": Correction to Connine and Clifton.

Reports an error in "Interactive use of lexical information in speech perception" by Cynthia M. Connine and Charles Clifton (Journal of Experimental Psychology: Human Perception and Performance, 1987[May], Vol 13[2], 291-299). In the aforementioned article, Figures 1 and 2 were inadvertently transposed. The figure on p. 294 is actually Figure 2, and the figure on p. 296 is actually Figure 1. The captions are correct as they stand. (The following abstract of the original article appeared in record 1987-23984-001.) Two experiments are reported that demonstrate contextual effects on identification of speech voicing continua. Experiment 1 demonstrated the infuence of lexical knowledge on identification of ambiguous tokens from word–nonword and nonword–word continua. Reaction times for word and nonword responses showed a word advantage only for ambiguous stimulus tokens (at the category boundary); no word advantage was found for clear stimuli (at the continua endpoints). Experiment 2 demonstrated an effect of a postperceptual variable, monetary payoff, on nonword–nonword continua. Identification responses were influenced by monetary payoff, but reaction times for bias-consistent and bias-inconsistent responses did not differ at the category boundary. An advantage for bias-consistent responses was evident at the continua endpoints. (PsycINFO Database Record (c) 2010 APA, all rights reserved)     

Editor's note: "Journals relevant to Health Psychology".

Presents additions and corrections proposed in correspondence to the "Journals relevant to Health Psychology" by Charles Swencionis (see case 2008-08794-001). (PsycINFO Database Record (c) 2010 APA, all rights reserved)