International Working Group for Sabotage Concerns of Transport and Storage Casks

Abstract

The International Working Group for Sabotage Concerns of Transport and Storage Casks (IWGSTSC), gathers multiple organisations from different countries (for US party Department of Energy, Nuclear Regulatory Commission, and Sandia National Laboratories; for German party Gesellschaft für Anlagen- und Reaktorsicherheit and Fraunhofer Institut; for the French party Institut de Radioprotection et de Sûreté Nucléaire). The goal of the IWGSTSC is to continue cooperation to improve the analytic capabilities, through information sharing and collaborative research and development plus modelling, to understand the potential adverse public health effects and environmental impacts of radiological sabotage directed at or associated with the transport and storage of civilian nuclear material or other civilian radioactive materials. The Parties may also undertake collaborative research and development in other areas of the physical protection of civilian nuclear materials or other radioactive materials. Since 2000, the IWGSTSC has conducted an extensive test programme for the assessment of the aerosol source term produced in the case of spent fuel transport sabotage by a high energy density device, after having examined several scenarios. The major goal of this programme is to produce an accurate estimate of the so called spent fuel ratio in the domain of respirable, aerosol particles produced. All the reports prepared by Sandia National Laboratories have precisely emphasised the important efforts they have made from the beginning and the amount of work already accomplished. In parallel, the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA), assisted by technical experts from different countries, has provided a draft document promised to become guidance for the security of radioactive or nuclear materials during transport. The IAEA document contains general guidance addressed to anyone who intends to implement or improve the security of material transports, but the text is, as of today, limited to rather general recommendations. Based on all the knowledge accumulated from past experiments and also based on the work carried out in Vienna at the IAEA, the IWGSTSC members have decided to work on the development of a method for the evaluation of the vulnerability and the source term. So for doing that, joint projects for the research, development, testing and evaluation of the consequences of the malevolent actions during transport are being pursued and are described in this paper.     

移动IPv6中IPSec的优化方案

移动IPv6是新一代互联网移动通信协议,一经定义便被3G标准技术框架所采纳和推广。但因其移动性、无线链路接入及协议自身的复杂性等特点,移动IPv6也带来了一系列新的安全问题。从其工作机制出发揭示了移动IPv6的安全漏洞,总结了其自身提供的安全措施。其中IPSec是作为一种安全机制被引入IPv6并强制实施。重点分析了IPSec和移动IPv6融合时存在的问题,有针对性地给出了在移动IPv6中应用IPSec的两种优化方案。     

Half-Tone Reproduction on Diazo Materials

A simplified screening method providing an easy means of producing good quality screened masters. A general consideration of half-tone diazo printing.     

Radioactive and nuclear material transport security: awareness and application of new recommendations

Abstract

Transport of radioactive and nuclear material is highly regulated and transport safety regulations have been in effect for decades. International nuclear material transport security has been governed for many years on the basis of a binding international convention, the 'Convention for the physical protection of nuclear material', and its supporting document 'The physical protection of nuclear material and nuclear facilities' INFCIRC/225, revision 4 (corrected). On the other hand, transport security guidance for the radioactive material was published in 2008 by the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) as an implementing guide, 'Security in the transport of radioactive material', nuclear security series no. 9, and is just now being implemented in many countries. Experience in implementing the radioactive material transport security guidance is being gained by countries as they make decisions on which specific security provisions to require, provide training to their regulatory staff and licensees, and begin reviewing and approving transport security plans. This experience has led to the development of practical approaches that minimise impacts as the guidance is put into practice. The nuclear material transport security recommendations in INFCIRC/225 are in the process of being revised to update them to address the current threat environment and to incorporate recommendations based on the recent amendments made to the Convention. INFCIRC/225, revision 5 will be a recommendation level document in the IAEA nuclear security series of documents. The interface between the nuclear and radioactive material transport security documents is important in order to ensure that appropriate security measures, based on both the nuclear and radioactive properties of the material being transported, are defined and implemented. This paper provides up to date information on the development of the IAEA transport security documents and presents information on implementation of the radioactive material transport security recommendations. It explains how the documents interface with each other and provides examples of how they should both be used in defining transport security requirements for shipments.     

Security in transport of radioactive material

Abstract

The basis of safety regulation and practice in the handling (including transport) of radioactive materials has been the premise that any mishaps or accidents occur unintentionally, with a desire among all parties involved to avoid such incidents and to minimise their effects. The strategic importance of nuclear materials for military purposes has made these materials a potential target for unauthorised acquisition, however, and international conventions have been in place for many years to ensure the security of nuclear materials from theft and from interception during transport. Until recently, only nuclear materials were subject to such security measures, but concern over the consequences of incidents involving radioactive sources has led to a review of security measures for non-nuclear radioactive materials. The IAEA has encouraged governments to institute effective systems of control to ensure the security of radioactive materials and has published its 'Code of conduct on the safety and security of radioactive sources' and other guidance material. Three principal stages are recommended for the maintenance of security. The first and most important is the prevention of malevolent acts through the fostering of a security culture, the effective management of material within a regulated legal framework, the appropriate design of sources and the use of secure vehicles and physical means to deter unauthorised access. The second line of defence is the detection of any breach of security, by means of radiation monitoring, accounting checks and reports of unusual occurrences. The third stage, response, includes means to ensure that the effect of a breach of security on public safety is minimised, and to take steps to recover any material that has fallen outside secure control. Specific provisions for security have been added to the UN Model Regulations for the Transport of Dangerous Goods (the Orange Book) and these have been incorporated in the international modal regulations and enacted in the domestic legislation of individual states. The regulations include general provisions applicable to all dangerous goods including radioactive materials and additional provisions for 'high consequence dangerous goods', which include radioactive materials in quantities above 3000 A ₁ (special form radioactive material) or 3000 A ₂, in Type B(U), Type B(M) or Type C packages. Training in security, including the nature of risks and methods to address them is also required. The Department for Transport in the United Kingdom has produced guidance material in support of the regulatory security requirements for transport by rail and road. The rail transport guidance follows the structure of the regulations and the road transport guidance is grouped into three main aspects of security, namely people, procedures and assets. Therefore, the importance of ensuring a reliable and trustworthy workforce and the use of known and trusted contractors is stressed, together with assurance of adequate and verifiable standards of education and training. Procedural matters include the establishment of standards of responsibility, the supervision of contractors, the maintenance of contacts and risk assessment. The control of assets includes surveillance and access control of premises, and the secure storage of vehicles, which should be fitted with appropriate alarms and immobilisers. The guidance material is available from the Department for Transport and may be viewed on its website www.dft.gov.uk/security/dangerousgoods.     

Terrorism and maritime shipment of nuclear material

Abstract

Opponents of the nuclear industry often claim that material in transit is vulnerable to attack by terrorist groups who might seek to take the cargo and make a bomb, or otherwise cause a radiological incident. This paper lays out a range of conceivable objectives or attack scenarios in the context of maritime transportation and examines these in the light of what is known of the relevant security arrangements. It concludes that these arrangements provide a very substantial deterrent to any attempt at diversion or sabotage and that any such attempt would have little prospect of success, beyond the immediate media impact of whatever might have occurred.     

An Open Secure Mobile Agent Framework for Systems Management

The Mobile Agent (MA) technology is gainingimportance in the distributed management of networks andservices for heterogeneous environments. MA-basedmanagement systems could represent an interestingalternative to traditional tools built upon theclient/server model, either SNMP- or CMIP-based. Twomain requirements currently limit the acceptance of MAsolutions for management: the need of interoperabilityand the request for security. Without security,management systems cannot suit global untrustedenvironments, such as the Internet; withoutinteroperability, they cannot interact with existingtools and legacy systems. The paper describes an MA-basedmanagement system with security and interoperability asthe two main design objectives. It is an open managementframework that grants interoperability by providing compliance with CORBA, the most diffusedstandard in the area of object-oriented components. Inaddition, it is based on a thorough security model andprovides a wide range of tools and mechanisms to build and enforce flexible securitypolicies.     

The French Nuclear Safety Authority's Experience with Radioactive Transport Inspection

Abstract

About 300,000 radioactive material packages are transported annually in France. Most consist of radioisotopes for medical, pharmaceutical or industrial use, but the nuclear industry deals with the transport of fuel cycle materials (uranium, fuel assemblies, etc.) andwaste from power plants, reprocessing plants and research centres. France is also a transit country for shipments such as spent fuel packages from Switzerland or Germany, which are bound for Sellafield in the United Kingdom. The French nuclear safety authority(DGSNR, Directorate General for Nuclear Safety and Radioprotection) has since 1997 been responsible for the safety of radioactive material transport. This paper presents DGNSR's experience with transport inspection: a feedback of key points based on 300 inspections achieved during the past 5 years is given.     

Optical Character Generation for a High-Speed Non-Impact Printer

The requirements for optical character generation for a commercial electrophotographic high-speed printer—more than 10,000 1pm—are given. They lead to the conclusion that the principal elements of a character generator will he a laser, an acousto-optic deflector and a polygon mirror.

The arrangement of a character generator which has been realized in a commercial printer is described in detail. Its performance characteristics are calculated and compared to experimental results.     

Assessment of safety distances to be implemented in case of an accident during radioactive material transport in France

Abstract

Transport accidents sufficiently severe to involve release or suspected release of radioactive material or a fault in radiological shields may occur. Populations need to be protected to limit the associated dose intake. Two important protection measures are sheltering and evacuating the population within a certain distance of the scene of the accident. For current radioactive material transport these safety distances need to be fixed for a certain number of scenarios representative of possible accidents. In order to improve the organisation of the emergency response to incidents involving radioactive material transport, the guide for French local authorities drafting their transport emergency response plans has been reviewed. This guide includes instructions to the first teams acting at the site of an accident to set up a safety perimeter matching the hazards. The shape and amplitude of this perimeter has been evaluated by IRSN using the following pattern: first the applicable dose criteria are noted, in accordance with the existing regulations, so that the doses delivered to members of the public do not exceed the reference thresholds; secondly the bounding accident scenarios are selected to represent the most severe accidents. Nine scenarios were selected for calculating the safety distances. These scenarios cover the following situations: atmospheric release of radionuclides, involving fire or not, increased radiation levels following damage to radiation shielding and the greatest 'reasonably credible' accident severities. Thirdly the calculation of safety distances associated with the selected scenarios. For each selected scenario, the safety distances to be implemented as a result of the assumptions and calculation methods which are mentioned are described. Finally there is an explanation of how the results are grouped to define a set of three standard safety distances: 100 m, 500 m and 1000 m.