Motivating Management: Corporate Compliance in Environmental Protection*

Based on interviews with facility managers in the electroplating and chemical industries, this study examines regulated firms’ perceptions of how various instrumental, normative, and social factors motivated their firms’ environmental actions. We found that “implicit general deterrence” (the overall effect of sustained inspection and enforcement activity) was far more important than either specific or general deterrence, and that deterrence in any form was of far greater concern to small and medium‐sized enterprises than it was to large ones. Most reputation‐sensitive firms in the environmentally sensitive chemical industry chose to go substantially beyond compliance for reasons that related to risk management and to the perceived need to protect their social license to operate. Almost half our respondents also provided normative explanations for why they complied. Overall, we conclude that there are various, often interwoven, strands that must be taken into account in understanding what motivates corporate environmental behavior, and how they play out depends very much on the size and sophistication of companies themselves and on the characteristics of the industry sector within which they are located.     

General Deterrence and Corporate Environmental Behavior*

This research addresses the assumption that “general deterrence” is an important key to enhanced compliance with regulatory laws. Through a survey of 233 firms in several industries in the United States, we sought to answer the following questions: (1) When severe legal penalties are imposed against a violator of environmental laws, do other companies in the same industry actually learn about such “signal cases”? (2) Does knowing about “signal cases” change firms’ compliance‐related behavior? It was found that only 42 percent of respondents could identify the “signal case,” but 89 percent could identify some enforcement actions against other firms, and 63 percent of firms reported having taken some compliance‐related actions in response to learning about such cases. Overall, it is concluded that because most firms are in compliance already (for a variety of other reasons), this form of “explicit general deterrence” knowledge usually serves not to enhance the perceived threat of legal punishment, but as reassurance that compliance is not foolish and as a reminder to check on the reliability of existing compliance routines.     

THE SOCIAL FUND AS AN EXERCISE IN RESOURCE ALLOCATION

The social fund is the latest attempt to cope with the exceptional needs sometimes experienced by people in receipt of social assistance. It is also the first occasion when resource allocation decisions have been located centre-stage in a policy area that, hitherto, has been primarily demand-led. The social fund, which is eventually to be cash-limited, is allocated between over 400 Department of Social Security ( dss ; formerly Department of Health and Social Security, dhss ) local offices. The article describes how the 1988/9 budget was fixed and allocated between local offices, considers some of the problems that policymakers faced when devising the allocation criteria and examines the territorial redistribution inherent in the chosen strategy and which may or may not have been intended.     

EVALUATION OF POLICE SERVICES IN MEDIUM-SIZED CITIES

Citizen evaluations of police services in four medium-sized cities are investigated in this article. Socioeconomic characteristics as well as police attitudes and political attitudes were found not to be good predictors of citizen evaluation. Complaint efficacy was found to be the best predictor of citizen satisfaction with police services.