ATWS事故应对要求及在研究堆中的应用研究

ATWS事故作为核电厂运行经验反馈所暴露的事故,核工业界对它的认识经历了一个长期的过程。对于商用压水堆核电厂,ATWS事故应对已形成一套完整的方法,而对于高功率研究堆,由于结构及特性与普通压水堆的差异,其ATWS事故要求也有所差异。本文回顾了ATWS事故的演变历程,分析了压水堆相关的标准规范,针对高功率研究堆,提出了ATWS事故分析的一般要求,对相关堆型安全分析工作的开展提供了条件。     

Modelica仿真技术在气冷式微型反应堆中的应用

相比传统大型核电厂,微型反应堆各系统功能间紧密耦合且相互制约,传统的分专业解耦设计模式难以应对,需开展全范围的系统仿真。采用Modelica语言建立了气冷式微型反应堆的系统仿真模型,以未能紧急停堆的预期瞬态（ATWS）事故为例开展事故分析计算,并与专业堆芯安全分析结果对比,结果表明反应堆功率变化趋势较为一致,且ATWS事故后仅依靠堆芯温度升高引入的负反应性可实现停堆。本文研究方法为气冷式微型反应堆的全系统建模仿真打下了坚实基础,也为其他类型反应堆的系统建模仿真提供了很好的借鉴作用。      

用于支持PSA成功准则的ATWS敏感性研究

极限的未能紧急停堆的预期瞬态（ATWS）是核电厂二次侧热移出能力减小引起的升温瞬态。为评价AP1000核电厂在发生ATWS事故后的响应,采用LOFTRAN程序对极限的丧失主给水ATWS进行计算分析。对影响电厂系统响应的一些关键因素,如蒸汽旁排的容量、堆芯补水箱（CMT）特性和硼反应性系数、反应堆冷却剂泵（RCP）可用性、启动给水系统（STS）可用性和蒸汽发生器（SG）传热等作了一系列敏感性分析。分析结果表明：为缓解ATWS事故,应隔离蒸汽旁排,并在触发CMT的同时停运RCP。     

国内外部分小型压水堆安全特性比较分析

随着核电行业的发展,尤其是福岛事故之后,小型反应堆因具有放射性源项小、结构简化与大型压水堆相比有独特优势的特点,引起了人们的关注。美国、日本、俄罗斯和韩国等相继开发了小型堆技术,我国也相继开发了低温供热堆和高温气冷堆等小型堆技术。目前小型压水堆是各国优先开发的目标。针对世界上众多的小型压水堆技术,我国选取了m Power、Nu Scale、ACP100和NHR-I 4种反应堆技术为代表进行总结并对比其设计特点和设计参数,尤其对四种堆型的安全特性进行比较分析,为后续的堆型发展提供思路。     

基于网络的压水堆核电厂瞬态实时仿真软件NUSOLSIM的开发

为满足核工程与核技术专业相关课程不限时间和空间的仿真教学需求，采用C/S架构开发了基于网络的压水堆核电厂瞬态实时仿真软件(NUSOLSIM)。针对大型压水堆核电厂堆芯、一回路、二回路等系统设备进行建模，此软件具有实时仿真模拟典型核电厂事故的能力，具备暂停、保存和图形输出功能。最后利用NUSOLSIM软件分析了2个典型的预期运行事件，结果表明本软件具有较好的事故进程分析能力。      

压水堆核电厂高压熔堆严重事故序列分析

压水堆核电厂的高压熔堆事故覆盖了大部分的严重事故序列,且具有很大的潜在威胁。根据我国900MW压水堆核电厂的概率安全分析（PSA）结果选取了丧失厂外电、未能紧急停堆的预期瞬态、二回路管道破口、一回路小破口和蒸汽发生器传热管破裂5种典型的高压熔堆严重事故序列,并使用SCDAP/RELAP5程序对这些事故序列的进程和后果进行了计算分析。计算结果表明：5种典型高压熔堆事故序列可能导致高压熔喷和安全壳直接加热风险,可能引起安全壳早期失效,很有必要采取相应的一回路卸压措施。     

秦山一期核电站未能紧急停堆的预期瞬变导致堆芯熔化的进程及事故缓解措施研究

选择失去主给水、失去厂外电和正常运行情况下控制棒失控提升3个典型的导致未能紧急停堆的预期瞬变(ATWS)的初因事故,采用自行研制的基于SCDAP／RELAP5／MOD3．1的核反应堆严重事故分析平台,对秦山一期核电站ATWS初因导致堆芯熔化严重事故进程进行了分析研究,对防止ATWS导致堆芯熔化进程的缓解措施的有效性进行了验证。计算分析结果表明,二回路补水和一回路卸压的事故缓解措施能有效地阻止堆芯熔化进程。     

ATWS事故工况下的应急初始条件和应急行动水平在核电厂的应用

本文描述了在未能紧急停堆的预期瞬变(ATWS)事故工况下应急初始条件及应急行动水平在PWR核电厂和CANDU核电厂的应用,并对这两种类型核电厂在ATWS事故工况下相同应急初始条件的应急行动水平的不同进行了比较.     

小型模块堆的人因工程审评——以高温气冷堆示范工程为例

核电厂的人因工程审评涵盖了设计的全过程,涉及人与机器、环境和运行管理间的交互。由于小型模块堆在系统、功能和运行等方面与传统大型压水堆核电厂有差异,在相应的人因工程核安全审评中应给予特殊的考虑。本文综述了小型模块堆的发展情况,以高温气冷堆示范工程为例,介绍了相关的设计和审评中关注的主要内容;在此基础上探讨了小型模块堆的设计和运行特征,总结了在计划、分析和设计阶段与之相关的人因工程问题,为今后的审评工作提供参考和支持。     

次临界或低功率启动工况下控制棒组失控抽出事故DNBR裕量分析

次临界或低功率启动工况下控制棒组失控抽出事故定义为RCC-P Ⅱ类事故,它一直是核电厂安全分析的极限事故之一。本文以典型三环路压水堆为对象,分析了热停堆状态下不同停堆棒组组合对该事故DNBR裕量的影响。研究表明,通过优化热停堆状态下停堆棒组组合,在保证足够的停堆深度下,可进一步提高典型三环路压水堆核电厂在该事故下的DNBR裕量。     

ATWS缓解系统可靠性分析

未能紧急停堆的预期瞬态（ATWS）缓解系统是保证中国先进研究堆（CARR）安全的重要系统之一。当发生预期运行瞬态,反应堆未能紧急停堆时,通过ATWS缓解系统动作实现停堆,从而保护反应堆安全。ATWS缓解系统的高可靠性是保证其完成预期功能的重要条件,因此对该系统的可靠性给予了高度重视。本文以ATWS缓解系统为研究对象,利用故障模式及影响分析和故障树等可靠性分析方法,建立相应模型,对ATWS缓解系统进行了定性和定量的分析,得到了ATWS缓解系统发生故障的概率和最小割集,找出了薄弱环节,提出了改进措施和建议,其可靠性水平已达到CARR工程的设计要求,验证了设计,为CARR其他系统分析和验证奠定了基础。     

Performance evaluation of an advanced integral reactor against an anticipated transient without scram

Performance evaluation of KAERI’s advanced integral reactor against an anticipated transient without scram has been carried out with the transients and setpoint simulation/small and medium reactor code, by considering a decrease in the heat removal by the secondary system, a loss of offsite power and an inadvertent control rod withdrawal event as an initiating event. In a decrease in the heat transfer by the secondary system and a loss of offsite power, the reactor coolant system pressures can be maintained below 110% of the design pressure during the transition period due to the effect of the large negative moderator temperature coefficient. On the other hand, in an inadvertent control rod withdrawal event, the pressure of the reactor coolant system increases up to the ASME service level C stress limit due to a high reactivity insertion into a reactor core by the adoption of a boron free core concept. Therefore, a hardware installation against an anticipated transient without scram is essential to mitigate the consequences resulting from an inadvertent control rod withdrawal event. A diverse protection system, which is an independent and diverse reactor shutdown system that is initiated by the signals of a high core power or a high pressurizer pressure, is adopted in the advanced integral reactor. According to the reassessment results by considering the diverse protection system for a reactor shutdown, the diverse protection system is helpful in mitigating the consequences of an anticipated transient without scram.     

Post-test analysis of helium circulator trip without scram at 3 MW power level on the HTR-10

Safety demonstration tests were conducted on the 10 MW High Temperature Gas-cooled Reactor-Test Module (HTR-10) to verify the inherent safety characteristics of modular High Temperature Gas-cooled Reactors (HTGRs) as well as to obtain the transient data of reactor core and primary cooling system for validation of HTGR safety analysis models and codes. As one of these safety demonstration tests, a simulated anticipated transient without scram (ATWS) test called loss of forced cooling by tripping the helium circulator without reactor scram was carried out at 3 MW power level on October 15, 2003. This paper simulates and analyzes the power transient and the thermal response of the reactor during the test by using the THERMIX code. The analytical results are compared with the test data for validation of the code.Owing to the negative temperature coefficient of reactivity, the reactor undergoes a self-shut down after the stop of the helium circulator; the subsequent phenomena such as the recriticality and power oscillations are also studied. During the test a natural circulation loop of helium is established in the core and the other coolant channels and its consequent thermal response such as the temperature redistribution is investigated. In addition, temperatures of the measuring points in the reactor internals are calculated and compared with the measured values. Satisfactory agreements obtained from the comparison demonstrate the basic applicability and reasonability of the THERMIX code for simulating and analyzing the helium circulator trip ATWS test. With respect to the safety features of the HTR-10, it is of most importance that the maximum fuel center temperature during the test is always lower than 1600 °C which is the limited value for the HTGR.     

A study on the boron injection initiation temperature curve of BWR

Boron injection initiation temperature (BIIT) provides important information for the safe shutdown of the reactor using boron injection system during anticipated transient without scram (ATWS). The purpose of this paper is to study BIIT curve of boiling water reactor owners’ group (BWROG). The unreasonable and non-conservative parts of BIIT are pointed out and suggested modifications are made. The starting reactor power of BIIT is increased in order to meet the actual application. The lower limit of suppression pool temperature of BIIT is revised for conservative operation during ATWS conditions. Analysis of the effects of maximum temperature capacity of the suppression chamber and concentration of boron in standby liquid control tank shows that BIIT is decreased by adopting a more conservative value of maximum temperature capacity of the suppression chamber. Consequently, early boron injection is anticipated. For system with automatic boron injection system, BIIT is not required.     

Thermal behavior of the HTR-10 under combined PLOFC and ATWS condition initiated by unscrammed control rod withdrawal

Two tests initiated by unscrammed control rod withdrawal were performed on the High Temperature GasCooled Reactor-Test Module(HTR-10) in November 2003 after the reactor achieved its full power, and the test conditions represented a typical transient scenario of modular high-temperature reactors(HTRs), called pressurized loss of forced cooling, and anticipated transient without scram.Based on the test parameters, the HTR-10 thermal behaviors under the test conditions were studied with the help of the system analysis code THERMIX. The combination of the test results and the investigation results makes the HTR-10 safety potential better understood. Key phenomena, such as the helium natural circulation and the temperature redistribution in the reactor, were revealed. As the safety feature of most significance, there is a large margin between the maximum fuel temperature and its safety limit in each test. Temperatures of thermocouples in different components were calculated by THERMIX and compared with the test values. The applicability of the code was verified by good agreement obtained from the comparison.     

Transient tests on blower trip and rod removal at the HTR-10

Safety demonstration tests on the 10 MW high temperature gas-cooled reactor test module (HTR-10) were conducted to verify the inherent safety features of MHTGRs and to obtain the core and primary cooling system transient data for validation of safety analysis codes.Two simulated anticipated transients without scram (ATWS) tests, lose of forced cooling by trip of the helium blower and reactivity insertion via control rod withdrawal were performed. This paper describes the tests with detailed test method, condition and results.Calculated results show that the strongly negative temperature coefficient causes reactor power to closely follow heat removal levels. Maximum fuel temperature changes are limited by the large core heat capacity to below 1230 °C during two tests.The test of tripping the helium circulator ATWS test was conducted on October 15, 2003. Although none of 10 control rods was moved, the reactor power immediately decreased due to the negative temperature coefficient. After about 50 min, the reactor became criticality again. Finally, the reactor power went to a stable level with about 200 kW.The test of reactivity insertion ATWS test was conducted two times. Following the control rod withdrawal, the reactor power increased rapidly, the maximum power level reached to 5037 and 7230 kW from the initial power of 3000 kW in accordance with reactivity insertion of $ 0.136 and 0.689, respectively. After the reactivity introduced was compensated by means of the strong negative reactivity feedback effect, the reactor went to subcritical and the power decreased.     

Quantitative modeling of digital reactor protection system using Markov state-transition model

Recently, digital instrumentation and control systems have been increasingly installed for important safety functions in nuclear power plants such as the reactor protection system (RPS) and the actuation system of the engineered safety features. Since digital devices consist of not only electronic hardware but also software that can control microprocessors, the functions specific to digital equipment such as self-diagnostic functions have been becoming available. These functions were not realized with conventional electric components. On the other hand, it has been found that it is difficult to model the digital equipment reliability in probabilistic risk assessment (PRA) using conventional fault tree analysis technique. OECD/NEA CSNI Working Group of Risk Assessment (WGRisk) set up the task group DIGREL to develop the basis of reliability analysis method of the digital safety system and is now discussing about several issues including quantitative dynamic modeling. This paper shows that, taking account of the relationship among the RPS failures, demand after the initiating event, detection of the RPS fault by self-diagnostic or surveillance tests, repair of the RPS components and plant shutdown operation by the plant operators as a stochastic process, the anticipated transient without scram (ATWS) event can be modeled by the event logic fault tree and Markov state-transition diagrams assuming the hypothetical 1-out-of-2 digital RPS.     

Demonstration of Control Rod Holding Stability of the Self Actuated Shutdown System in Joyo for Enhancement of Fast Reactor Inherent Safety

Self actuated shutdown system (SASS) with a Curie point electromagnet (CPEM) has been developed for use in a large-scale liquid metal cooled fast breeder reactor (LMFBR) in order to establish the passive shutdown capability against anticipated transient without scram (ATWS) events. The basic characteristics of SASS have already been investigated by various out-of-pile tests for material elements. As the final stage of the development, the stability of SASS needs to be confirmed under the actual reactor-operational environment with high temperature, high neutron flux, and flowing sodium to ensure the high plant availability factor. For this purpose, the demonstration test of holding stability using the reduced-scale experimental equipment of SASS was conducted in the 1st and 2nd operational cycles of the experimental fast reactor Joyo MK-III. The rod-holding stability and the rod-recovering functions of the driving system to re-connect and pull out the separated control rod were fully confirmed. The results also indicate there is no essential problem for the practical use of SASS about its operational trouble involving the unexpected drop during reactor operation.