一种激励相容的发电市场竞价机制

寡头竞争的电力市场在信息不对称性，在按统一市场出清价支付或按报价支付的发电竞价机制环境下，发电商会操纵报价以追求最大收益，这会危及系统的安全经济运行，基于机制设计理论和边际成本定价理论，发展了一种具有激励相容特性的发电市场竞价机制，该机制能引导理性发电商披露其真实运行成本，并能实现发电商固定容量成本的合理回收，特别是给予边际发电商相对较大的固定成本补偿，有助于那些风险回避的峰机组投资商的投资激励，基于Monte Carlo模拟方法的算例仿真表明了该机制的特性。     

发电市场的迭代竞价机制

建立了发电市场迭代竞价模型。该模型在竞价过程中给出了充分的市场信息，发电商可以合理、经济地组织生产,确定竞标策略。电力购买者赋予了议价能力，协调各厂商竞价，促使市场高效地运作。实例模拟表明，在完全竞争的市场环境下，各厂商的发电资源可以得到充分利用，市场处于Nash均衡，出清价收敛于传统的系统边际成本附近，发电系统接近于经济运行状态。比较了迭代竞价机制与单轮投标机制的市场效率。模拟了发电商串通行为的形成，为此有必要制定有效的规则对市场竞价加以约束。     

考虑中长期交易的水电站电转气容量双层优化配置

为改善水电站调节的灵活性和提升风电在中长期规划中的消纳比例,提出了一种考虑中长期交易的水电站电转气容量双层优化配置方法。采用风电品质分段思想,将风电出力分为确定部分和不确定部分,风电确定部分参与上层中长期电能市场交易,风、水、火发电商根据自身情况上报电量电价,以系统购电成本最小为目标建立中长期竞价出清模型,得到各发电商中标电量以及电价;风电不确定部分参与下层合约转让交易,分析电转气的能量转换和大规模储能特点对弃水、风电消纳的积极作用,考虑环境成本和发电商利益诉求,建立基于合约转让交易机制的水电站电转气优化配置模型。最后通过修改的IEEE 30节点算例分析进行验证,结果表明,所提模型能够有效提升风电中长期消纳能力,水电调节灵活性得到改善。     

发电市场的失代竞价机制

建立了发电市场迭代竞价模型。该模型在竞价过程中给出了充分的市场信息，发电商可以合理、经济地组织生产，确定竞标策略。电力购买者赋予了议价能力，协调各厂商竞价，促使市场高效地运作。实例模拟表明，在完全竞争的市场环境下，各厂商的发电资源可以得到充分利用，市场处于Nash均衡，出清价收敛于传统的系统边际成本附近，发电系统接近于经济运行状态。比较了迭代竞价机制与单轮投标机制的市场效率。模拟了发电商串通行为的形成，为此有必要制定有效的规则对市场竞价加以约束。     

基于多智能体强化学习的电力现货市场定价机制研究(一):不同定价机制下发电商报价双层优化模型

电力现货市场定价机制是市场设计的重点问题之一,与发电商交易行为相互影响。定价机制设计需要考虑发电商可能的交易行为,而不同定价机制下发电商报价策略不同,为系统性地解决这一嵌套难题,形成2篇不同侧重点的论文。作为首篇,该文探讨强化学习在发电商报价决策中的适用性,完整考虑系统和分区边际电价的两阶段过程,构建节点、系统、分区3种边际电价定价机制下的发电商报价双层优化模型,并基于可变学习速率和策略爬山算法相结合的多智能体强化学习方法对模型进行迭代求解。该双层模型中,上层为发电商报价决策层,下层为市场出清层,以决策层优化的发电商报价信息和出清层计算的发电商中标信息作为上下层之间的交互数据,不断优化发电商报价策略。最后,以IEEE 39系统为例,选择4个典型负荷场景,优化3种定价机制下的发电商报价,结果表明:所提模型和算法可有效求解发电商最优报价策略,获取市场均衡结果。     

迭代竞价机制下发电商的贝叶斯学习模型

采用迭代思想设计电力市场的竞价机制可以促进发电商之间的竞争,促使其调整成本,降低报价,提高电能交易效率,但其应用可能由于迭代时间太长而受到限制。为此,研究了如何利用动态市场信息来缩短迭代时间,建立了发电商在迭代竞价机制下的贝叶斯学习报价模型。以系统边际出清价格的分布区间为学习对象,发电商在每轮报价结束后,根据所获取的新交易信息修改其对系统边际出清价格分布区间的先验认识,不断缩小学习范围,以更精确的预期修改报价,从而减少不必要的时间浪费。结合算例证明,发电商运用贝叶斯学习结果进行报价可以有效减少迭代次数,缩短迭代时间,提高竞价效率。     

考虑碳交易的发电商和电力用户竞价博弈

在电力市场中,策略竞价对于发电商和电力用户来说是一项重要的决策行为,对市场参与者策略竞价行为的研究能给市场参与者提供决策参考。基于策略竞价的市场均衡点的特征分析对于市场机制的探究与设计也具有重要意义。在新一轮电力改革和低碳电力的大背景下,本文基于电力市场双边竞价模式,引入碳交易机制,对考虑碳交易的发电商和电力用户的策略竞争价博弈进行了研究。建立了发电商和电力用户的策略竞价双层优化模型,采用对角化迭代算法对博弈均衡点进行求解。最后,基于5节点算例仿真系统,对发电商和电力用户的策略行为以及博弈均衡点的市场特征进行深入分析。     

电力市场中激励性发电商竞价机制设计研究

利用机制设计和边际成本定价理论，首次将发电商报价曲线的斜率和截距分别作为策略变量设计了一种具有激励相容特性的发电市场竞价机制并推导了相关公式．模型中发电成本考虑了更为通用的二次函数形式，发电报价按线性函数考虑．仿真结果表明，在所考虑的条件及相应设计的竞价机制下，各发电商均有动力按照真实成本报价，所设计的竞价机制是有效的．     

含储能参与的日前市场价值公平分配机制

现有的节点边际电价机制中,由于传统发电商具有市场操控力,当储能独立参与市场出清时,各发电商采取策略性报价,打压并挤占储能电站的市场份额,阻碍了储能电站参与市场出清,间接导致市场出清总成本增大。为此,文中提出一种包含传统机组以及储能电站参与的市场竞争机制。首先,分析现有市场结算机制的弊端以及阻碍储能参与市场出清的原因;其次,建立含储能参与的市场出清模型,采用样本均值近似求解二阶段随机规划模型;接着,基于VCG结算机制,提出适应储能参与的日前市场价值分配机制;最后,提出解决激励相容而造成的系统收支不平衡问题的策略。文中采用修改后的IEEE30节点为例,证明该机制满足激励相容、收支平衡以及削弱传统发电商的市场操控力等性质,同时储能的参与将会减小系统出清总成本,降低市场价格剧烈波动的风险。     

计及网络约束的激励性电力市场竞价机制设计

根据机制设计理论,设计了一种具有激励相容特性的电力竞价机制.该机制考虑了网络约束的影响,解决了在实际应用时难以计算的问题,并能有效地激励发电商上报真实成本,实现社会资源的合理配置.文章以IEEE-14节点列络为算例进行仿真分析,结果表明该机制可抑制发电商的市场力,节约购电成本,稳定电价,有利于实现社会资源的优化配置.     

激励性含柔性负荷日前市场出清电价机制的建模

对于电力市场而言,发电竞争只是电力改革的初级阶段,进一步让柔性负荷参与市场竞价是电力市场化的必经之路。传统上采用节点边际电价的日前市场出清电价机制,理论与实践均证明,该机制难以同时实现个体理性、激励相容和社会福利最大化等要求。考虑到电力市场成员之间的信息不对称性,为克服电力市场中市场成员的策略性报价行为,实现市场的高效运行及社会福利最大化,基于VCG的机制设计理论,给出了一种考虑发电机组和柔性负荷参与日前市场出清的电价机制,该机制同时满足激励相容、个体理性以及社会福利最大化要求。最后,采用某2节点系统和修改的IEEE14节点系统为例说明了该日前市场出清电价机制的基本特征。     

基于企业经营决策的发电商最优竞价策略

在电力市场环境下，发电商的策略性投标行为关系到电价风险、市场稳定、市场力滥用行为及发电商自身利润等诸多问题。文中在对发电机组成本／需求的微观经济分析基础上，建立了机组面对需求曲线的公式及求解方法，提出了机组市场价格控制区的新概念。基于经济学中企业经营决策的最大利润原理，阐述了“边际发电成本等于边际发电收入”的机组最优竞价准则，提出了拥有不同市场力的发电商最优竞价策略及算法。     

计及可中断负荷的电力系统可用输电能力计算

为分析需求响应对系统可用输电能力的影响,提出一种开放电力市场环境下可用输电能力的计算方法。以可中断负荷这一典型的需求响应资源作为研究对象,构建考虑负荷服务实体和独立系统运营商不同利益需求的双层优化模型:上层模型以负荷服务实体的成本最小为目标,确定参与需求响应的用户;下层模型以发电总报价最小为目标确定节点边际电价,同时实现经济调度。将根据需求响应和发电机组报价分配的有功功率作为基态,在此基础上计算区域间可用输电能力。求解双层模型时,运用下层经济调度模型的KKT条件可将双层优化问题转化为均衡约束数学规划问题,根据强对偶理论消除约束中的非线性项,将原模型转化成混合整数线性规划模型。最后,在GAMS环境下调用CPLEX求解化简后的数学模型。通过对PJM-5节点、IEEE 30节点、IEEE118节点和IEEE 300节点系统的仿真计算,验证了所提方法的可行性和有效性,以及在可用输电能力计算中计及需求响应的必要性。     

The Demand Elasticity Impacts on the Strategic Bidding Behavior of the Electricity Producers

Due to the oligopoly structure of the electricity markets and to the constraints imposed by the transmission network, the producers may exert market power by strategically bidding higher than their marginal costs. This brings market performance far from the perfect competition equilibrium, with higher market clearing price and extra surpluses obtained by the producers. Demand elasticity can significantly affect the market performance contributing to mitigate the strategic bidding behavior of the producers. Compared to other commodity markets, demand elasticity in the electricity markets is low, but even a small increase can result in appreciable improvement of the market performance. The network constraints of the power system play a specific role in determining the oligopoly equilibrium of the gaming behavior of the electricity producers. The model of supply function equilibrium is first applied to a simple three-bus test system for a conceptual analysis and then to a standard IEEE 30-bus test system. The effects of an increase of demand elasticity are assessed, resorting to a set of proper quantitative indexes     

浙江电网发电市场竞价上网辅助决策系统的设计

发电厂竞价上网辅助决策系统是一个集发电竞价上网、生产经营活动管理分析和决策等功能的应用系统。本文针对浙江电网发电市场的特点，对发电厂竞价上网辅助决策系统进行了设计，提出了电厂竞价上网决策的新模式。系统主要包括了数据采集、查询；生产经营活动管理分析；竞价上网决策等三部分。该系统的设计为发电企业提高决策水平，降低决策成本，增强用户的市场竞争力和竞争意识，等起到了积极的作用。     

Bi-level optimization based two-stage market clearing model considering guaranteed accommodation of renewable energy generation

The existing electricity market mechanisms designed to promote the consumption of renewable energy generation complicate network participation in market transactions owing to an unfair market competition environment, where the low cost renewable energy generation is not reflected in the high bidding price of high cost conventional energy generation. This study addresses this issue by proposing a bi-level optimization based two-stage market clearing model that considers the bidding strategies of market players, and guarantees the accommodation of renewable energy generation. The first stage implements a dual-market clearing mechanism that includes a unified market for trading the power generations of both renewable energy and conventional energy units, and a subsidy market reserved exclusively for conventional generation units. A re-adjustment clearing mechanism is then proposed in the second stage to accommodate the power generation of remaining renewable energy units after first stage energy allocations. Each stage of the proposed model is further described as a bi-level market equilibrium problem and is solved using a co-evolutionary algorithm. Finally, numerical results involving an improved IEEE 39-bus system demonstrate that the proposed two-stage model meets the basic requirements of incentive compatibility and individual rationality. It can facilitate the rational allocation of resources, promote the economical operation of electric power grids, and enhance social welfare.     

Bi-level optimization based two-stage market clearing model considering guaranteed accommodation of renewable energy generation

Outage recovery is important for reducing the economic cost and improving the reliability of a distribution system (DS) in extreme weather and with equipment faults. Previous studies have separately considered network reconfiguration (NR) and dispatching mobile power sources (MPS) to restore the outage load. However, NR cannot deal with the scenario of an electrical island, while dispatching MPS results in a long power outage. In this paper, a resilient outage recovery method based on co-optimizing MPS and NR is proposed, where the DS and traffic network (TN) are considered simultaneously. In the DS, the switch action cost and power losses are minimized, and the access points of MPSs are changed by carrying out the NR process. In the TN, an MPS dispatching model with the objective of minimizing power outage time, routing and power generation cost is developed to optimize the MPSs’ schedule. A solution algorithm based on iteration and relaxation methods is proposed to simplify the solving process and obtain the optimal recovery strategy. Finally, numerical case studies on the IEEE 33 and 119-bus systems validate the proposed resilient outage recovery method. It is shown that the access point of MPS can be changed by NR to decrease the power outage time and dispatching cost of MPS. The results also show that the system operation cost can be reduced by considering power losses in the objective function.     

电力市场交易计划中的发电调度规约研究

在电力市场中，机组的出力计划需要根据有关交易计赳和市场规则中的发电调发规约来测定。机组的发电调度规约主要包括机组开停机规约、发电公司(厂)内部各机组间合同电量的分配就约、边际机组间的出力分配规约、机组发电计划调整规约等，结合我国电力市场建设的实际，分别针对全电量竟价模式和部分电量竞价模式分析了竞价开机、合同开机2种机组开停机规约；为协调发、购电双方的利益要求。提出了根据竞价机组可用发电量的比例或竞价上网电量的比例等2种在发电公司(厂)内部分配各竞价机组合同电量的方法；为协调边际机组间的边际负荷分配问题，提出了比例分配法、依次分配法2种分配边际负荷的基本方法；根据机组发电计划的组成特点．提出并分析了日合同计划不可调、日合同计划可调2种机组发电计划调整规约。     

Electricity market equilibrium of nonlinear power systems with reactive power control

The impact of reactive power control on the electricity market equilibrium is investigated. The effects of limitations on the reactive power generation and absorption, and load power factor adjustments, are examined using a novel electricity market equilibrium model that solves large-scale nonlinear power systems with asymmetric strategic firms. The algorithm implemented employs the linear supply function theory for bid-based pool markets. AC power flow analysis is used to represent the electricity network, incorporating variable price-responsive active and reactive load demands. The significance of the reactive power modeling in the electricity market equilibrium is demonstrated using the IEEE 14-bus and IEEE 118-bus systems. It is shown that variations on the reactive power in the system result in different market outcomes, as incentives are given to the strategic generating firms to alter their bidding strategies. The convergence characteristics of the IEEE 118-bus system are graphically presented and discussed to demonstrate the superior computational performance of the proposed algorithm in producing results under strict binding constraints and heavy transmission congestion conditions.