Expert testimony in historical perspective

The ethical problems surrounding expert testimony depend directly on the historically specific relationship between science and scientists, on the one hand, and society on the other. In the seventeenth century, when modern experimental science was beginning to emerge, it drew upon legal experience to bolster its methodological arguments. In the eighteenth century, after the successes of Sir Isaac Newton, science gained in authority, and even in law courts the epistemological authority of science went unchallenged. In the nineteenth century, the more empirical sciences, such as chemistry and physics, entered the courts, and juries found the testimony of experimental chemists and physicists useful for their decisions. In the twentieth century, experimental psychology entered the courts. Pushed by Hugo Munsterburg, who saw in legal recognition a way of advancing psychology as a scientific profession, experimental psychology in the courtroom raised ethical problems at the beginning of the century that are still matters of controversy.     

直面全球化的主体性中国——谈“中国法学的主体性建构”

直面全球化,中国法学首要的问题便是对“全球化问题”本身问题化而非将之视为当然的事实与前设。经由对“全球化问题”的理论建构中国法学才能进一步洞见到全球化的深层内核以及其背后的话语争夺、建构与视角转换问题,才能对作为特定时空的“中国”在全球化下所面对的问题的复杂性与多样性有更清晰的认知。本着这种问题化的理路,经由把“世界结构”作为重新定义“中国”、建构“中国”的历史性条件,中国法学就建构起了一种“关系性视角”与“共时性视角”,通过视角的建构与转换,中国法学才能够洞察“世界结构”对中国的双重强制性并在建构“主体性中国”的过程中据以建构起中国自己的法律理想图景。同时这种“主体性中国”的建构本身就是一种开放的进程。它既要对既有的“世界结构”本身的正当性保持批判与反思,更要对地方性中国对“世界结构”本身的意义与贡献充满想象。“主体性中国”的建构既是直面全球化的中国法学所秉持的一种“中国观”,更是一种“世界观”。     

From Text to Image: The Sacred Foundation of Western Institutional Order: Legal-Semiotic Perspectives

The paper analyzes the sacred foundations of Western institutional order, moving from an epistemological, historical and legal–aesthetic perspective. Firstly, it identifies an epistemological theory of complexity which, pursuing Hayek’s theory of complexity, Robilant’s notion of informative–normative systems, Popper’s theory of the Worlds, and Dupuy’s theory of endogenous fixed point, will conclusively lead to presenting the hypothesis of World 0 as the World of the foundation of legal thinking, the home of the sacred and the aesthetic. Secondly, it identifies the axiological character of the legal aesthetic as a discipline, a topic that will be taken up in relation to the work of the French historian of canonical law and psychoanalyst Legendre, starting from the analysis of a legal/historiographical context (Corpus Iuris Civilis, Corpus Iuris Canonici, Hobbesian Leviathan, Kelsenian Grundnorm). Thirdly, following Ellul’s thought on secularization, the idea that we now live in a secularized, lay society, lacking in the sacred is revealed as a sort of illusion, the creation of a myth of modernity, only apparently rational. Finally the paper proposes as the task of legal theory the identification of the system of “nomograms” in which the normative message is organized, according to a nonreductionistic approach that forces legal theory to recognize the plurality of the iconic forms of the normative message. The “nomograms” respond to the need of extending the field of legal science to phenomena that the positivist theory of law does not consider important, but which the process of evolution of contemporary society imposes.     

Interdisciplinarity and the Authority Paradigm: Should Law Be Taken Seriously by Scientists and Social Scientists?

This article questions whether those outside law should take law seriously as an intellectual discipline capable of contributing to the development of epistemological thinking in the natural and social sciences. The discipline is approached from a diachronic and synchronic position with emphasis on the civil law tradition. It will be shown that the governing paradigm in legal studies has always been the 'authority paradigm', which results in law being closer to theology than to the social sciences. Its principal actors (judges) make assertions free from the normal constraints of scientific method; accordingly, the idea of a 'legal science' (imported into the common law tradition after 1846) must be treated with great caution. It is not a science dedicated to enquiring about the nature of the physical world, society or social relations. Its epistemological development remains trapped in the seventeenth and eighteenth centuries: thus, as a discipline, law has little to offer other social sciences.     

Genealogy and Jurisprudence: Nietzsche, Nihilism, and the Social Scientification of Law

In Twilight of the Idols, Nietzsche presents a history of metaphysics that can also be read as a history of jurisprudence. Nietzsche shows how—via Platonism, Christendom, Kantianism, and utilitarianism—the “real” or “true” world of ideals gives way to an “apparent” phenomenal world that is itself ultimately brought into question. This article shows how 20th-century legal thought, broadly construed, also moves away from “ideals” of law toward an understanding of law as observable social phenomena. It suggests that the move to the “apparent” world in legal thought raises questions similar to those raised by Nietzsche's work: Does sociological law point to a nihilistic destruction of the legal tradition or to a joyous possibility of overcoming that tradition?     

Islamic Law,Women's Rights,and Popular Legal Consciousness in Malaysia

Drawing on original survey research, this study examines how lay Muslims in Malaysia understand foundational concepts in Islamic law. The survey finds a substantial disjuncture between popular legal consciousness and core epistemological commitments in Islamic legal theory. In its classic form, Islamic legal theory was marked by its commitment to pluralism and the centrality of human agency in Islamic jurisprudence. Yet in contemporary Malaysia, lay Muslims tend to understand Islamic law as being purely divine, with a single “correct” answer to any given question. The practical implications of these findings are demonstrated through examples of efforts by women's rights activists to reform family law provisions in Malaysia. The examples illustrate how popular misconceptions of Islamic law hinder the efforts of those working to reform family law codes while strengthening the hand of conservative actors wishing to maintain the status quo.     

Turning the Tables on Legal History: Parker's Common Law,History, and Democracy in America

Parker's Common Law, History, and Democracy in America joins an ongoing effort to turn the tables on “law and …” by replacing the familiar question “What can history, sociology, and cultural studies tell us about law?” with a new line of inquiry asking “What can law teach us about the reach and limits of disciplinary thinking?” In his study of the reception of common law into nineteenth‐century American jurisprudence, Parker unearths a notion of time based on stability and repetition that challenges the dominant modernist and historicist approach to the writing of law and history. Parker, however, shies away from drawing the full implications of this move and it remains unclear whether, in the final analysis, he escapes the spell of legal historicism.     

需要何种法律信任

"法律信任"对"法律信仰"概念的修正,实质走向了一个韦伯式概念,其理论本身在很大程度上也是韦伯命题的理论映照。这一韦伯式的"法律信任"概念,无论是在理论上还是在现实上都面临着巨大的困难,这种双重困难指向同一问题:"法律信任"如何可能?由此,立基于韦伯式的形式法律理论之上,不可能产生真正的"法律信任"。"法律信任"概念要想有意义,就必须建立在一种更具实质性的法律理论之上。     

中华法系的百年历史叙事

回顾中国现代法学的世纪历程,中华法系的历史叙事主要在进化论、民族论和法治论三种语境中展开。不同语境中的法史学者,通过将中华法系与其他法系相比较,揭示出了彼此有别的中华法系之历史面貌。在进化论语境中,中华法系因其古.老而落后,丧失了型构现实生活秩序的生命力,需整体性地予以批判和否定。在民族论语境中,中华法系因其系统性、连续性和民族性而独具特色,整理、发掘、重述其历史谱系,既有助于增强民族文化自信力,也为重建“新中华法系”提供了重要的精神前提。在法治论语境中,中华法系以其“治乱之道”和“良法善治”的血缘伦理身份内涵表明,在前现代社会中法律不可能获得型构社会生活秩序的权威地位。法制现代化是不同语境下中华法系之历史叙事的共同追求,中华法系研究的百年学术史,实质上是一部追求法治文明的中国现代精神史。     

对行政法学基础理论的思考

我们究竟需要构建一门什么样的行政法学科?当今我国行政法学界对这个命题的回答形成了不同的观点。笔者认为,行政法的基本价值取向应当是“控权”和“服务”。行政法是一部“控权法”加“服务法”,是控制行政权的法,是服务于社会、服务于民的法。控权和服务是双向的,共同构成了行政法学理论基础的两个支点。     

The New Legal Realism and The Realist View of Law

New legal realism (NLR) furthers the legal realist legacy by focusing attention on both the pertinent social science and the craft that typifies legal discourse and legal institutions. NLR's globalized ambitions also highlight the potential of a nonstatist view of law. The realist view of law raises three challenges facing NLR: identifying the “lingua franca” of law as an academic discipline within which NLR insights on translation and synthesis should be situated; conceptualizing NLR's focus on bottom‐up investigation, so that it does not defy the rule of law; and recognizing the normative underpinning for NLR's reformist impulse.     

Legalist Fictions and the Problem of Scientific Legitimation

The author analyzes fictions of legal positivist philosophy and their role in the scientific legitimation of modern law and political domination. The original function of legalist fictions was the establishment of legal science, which would be autonomous and independent of other social sciences and public morality. In the second half of the 20th century, legal positivist philosophy has nevertheless adopted the fiction of the just law as its scientific legitimation fiction and incorporated moral and political discourse into legal science, again.
Legal positivism and its critiques within the discourse of the sociology of law and critical legal science keep the image of a hierarchical and centralized legitimation of law. Paradoxically, current legal philosophy and theory searching for a universally valid legitimation scheme is full of many different legitimations and reveals their growing plurality and the impossibility of establishing one sovereign legitimation scheme in the current social, theoretical and political condition.     

The Diffusion of Rights: From Law on the Books to Organizational Rights Practices

How does law change society? To gain new leverage on this long‐standing question, this article draws on two lines of research that often ignore each other: political science research on the mobilization of law, and sociological research on the diffusion of organizational practices. Our insights stem from six case studies of diverse organizations' responses to the accommodation provisions in the Americans with Disabilities Act and related state laws. We found that different modes of exposure to the law combined with organizational attributes to produce distinct “rights practices”—styles of standard operating procedures and informal routines that reflect the understanding of legal requirements within an organization. The diversity of the organizational responses challenges simple dichotomies between compliance/noncompliance, change through deterrence/change through norms, and mobilization/nonmobilization, and it underscores the importance of combining political science and sociological perspectives on law and social change.     

One Myth of the Classical Natural Law Theory: Reflecting on the “Thin” View of Legal Positivism

Much controversy has emerged on the demarcation between legal positivism and non‐legal positivism with some authors calling for a ban on the ‐as they see it‐ nonsensical labelling of legal philosophical debates. We agree with these critics; simplistic labelling cannot replace the work of sophisticated and sound argumentation. In this paper we do not use the term ‘legal positivism’ as a simplistic label but identify a specific position which we consider to be the most appealing and plausible view on legal positivism. This is the view advocated by Gardner in his paper 'Legal Positivism: 5½ Myths’ (Gardner 2001 , 199), where he carefully scrutinises the most convincing and unifying postulates of legal positivism, which he calls “the thin view”. The study shows that this thin view presupposes an empirical conception of action that is untenable and implausible since it makes acts of engagement with the law unintelligible to an observer of such acts.     

Can You Talk Like a Lawyer and Still Think Like a Human Being? Mertz's The Language of Law School

The last thirty years in anthropology, as well as in linguistics and in many of the other social sciences, have been characterized by a shift in theoretical focus from structure to practice. In The Language of Law School: Learning to “Think Like a Lawyer” (2007), linguistic anthropologist and law professor Elizabeth Mertz has brought this practice perspective to bear on the extraordinary linguistic and cultural venue that is the first‐year law school classroom. In revealing the linguistic realities of teaching new students to “think like a lawyer,” she raises fascinating questions about the relationship between language and thought, the subtle effects of legal education, and the nature of law itself.     

RE-EXAMINATION OF ABOLISHING CONSULAR JURISDICTION AS THE START OF LAW MODIFICATION IN LATE QING

In recent years, the proposition that the abolition of consular jurisdiction was the start of the late Qing legal reforms was challenged. According to the arguments of scholars engaged in subverting the traditional mainstream view, the “Mackay Treaty” was signed on September 5, 1902, but Empress Cixi issued the “Law Reform Decree” on her way back from Xi’an after the Gengzi Event, then the Qing government’s decision for law reform was not a consequence of Article 12 of the “Mackay Treaty.” This article argues that methodology of historical textual research requires a comprehensive view of the whence and whither. The traditional view that the abolition of consular jurisdiction served as an urgent cause for the modernization of Chinese law cannot be rejected imprudently by a superficial approach to pounce on one point and ignore all others; our vision should be broadened by taking the overall situation into consideration. Otherwise over-corrections will result in an incomplete view of the whole scenario. The relation between the law modifications in late Qing and the reclamation of consular jurisdiction is extremely intricate and complex. Previously this had to be discussed by Robert Hart and others in detail.     

Positivism,Legal Validity,and the Separation of Law and Morals

The essay discusses the import of the separability thesis both for legal positivism and for contemporary legal practice. First, the place of the separability thesis in legal positivism will be explored, distinguishing between “standard positivism” and “post‐Hartian positivism.” Then I will consider various kinds of relations between law and morality that are worthy of jurisprudential interest, and explore, from a positivist point of view, what kind of relations between law and morality must be rejected, what kind of such relations should be taken into account, and what kind of such relations are indeed of no import at all. The upshot of this analysis consists in highlighting the distinction between two different dimensions of legal validity (formal validity and material validity respectively), and in pointing out that the positivist separability thesis can apply to formal validity only. On the other hand, when the ascertainment of material validity is at stake, some form of moral reasoning may well be involved (here and now, it is necessarily involved). The essay concludes with some brief remarks on the persisting importance of the positivist jurisprudential project.     

论商法通则的立法定位及其逻辑展开

立法定位既是商法通则立法的基点和逻辑起点,亦是指导商法通则司法适用的线索和指南。从商法通则和《民法总则》的关系、自身属性、适用对象三方面考虑,商法通则应当是“补充法”“权利法”和“裁判法”。制定商法通则不是对民法典“民商合一”立法体制的否定,恰恰是对民法典的必要“补充”和有益“完善”;商法通则的内容设计应当以商事权利为主轴和核心;其规范逻辑结构与构成要素应当符合构成要件—法律后果之要求,以便于法适用和司法裁判。在三者关系上,“补充法”和“裁判法”的商法通则是从“外部”关系进行考虑的;“权利法”是从商法通则“内部”属性来认识的;“权利法”和“补充法”的商法通则是从“静态”视角看待的,“裁判法”是从“动态”适用视角考虑的。     

Law and the Evolutionary Turn: The Relevance of Evolutionary Psychology for Legal Positivism

In the present essay, I consider the relevance of evolutionary psychology (EP) for legal positivism, addressing the two main traditions in the legal positivist family: (1) the tradition I identify with the works of Hart and Kelsen and characterize as “normativist,” as it tries to describe law as a purely or, at least, as an essentially normative phenomenon, while remaining true to the ideal of scientific objectivity and value‐neutrality; (2) the tradition I broadly refer to as “legal realism,” which equates law with adjudication and “legal science” with the task of explaining judicial behaviour.     

DEVELOPMENT AND FRACTURE OF A DISCIPLINE: LEGACIES OF THE SCHOOL OF CRIMINOLOGY AT BERKELEY

In the early twentieth century, the University of California—Berkeley opened its doors to police professionals for instruction in “police science.” This program ultimately developed into the full‐fledged School of Criminology, whose graduates helped shape American criminology and criminal justice until well into the 1970s. Scholarship at the School of Criminology eventually fractured into three distinct traditions: “Administrative criminology” applied scientific methods in pursuit of refining law enforcement practices, “law and society” coupled legal scholarship with social scientific methods, and “radical criminology” combined Marxist critiques of the state with community activism. Those scientific traditions relied on competing epistemic premises and normative aspirations, and they drew legitimacy from different sources. Drawing on oral histories and archival data permits a neo‐institutional analysis of how each of these criminological traditions emerged, acquired stability, and subsided. The Berkeley School of Criminology provides fertile ground to examine trends in the development of criminal justice as a profession, criminology as a discipline and its place in elite universities, the uncoupling of criminology from law and society scholarship, and criminal justice policy's disenchantment with the academy. These legacies highlight how the development of modern criminology and the professionalization of American law enforcement find precedent in events that originate at Berkeley.