碳关税:新的绿色贸易壁垒抑或WTO环境保护豁免

有鉴于国际气候变化谈判和条约制定屡遭挫折这一事实,WTO现行法律规则和争端解决机制能够成为判断并纠正单边环境立法行使贸易保护主义之实的有力救济。在判定碳关税是否构成隐形的"绿色壁垒"时,GATT第20条(g)款以及前言部分的规定最有可能成为争端解决机构运用的根本性指标。要获得WTO环境保护条款的豁免,碳关税在设置和实施过程中需符合一系列严格的法律要求。同时,中国出口产品在遭遇发达国家碳关税壁垒时,亦可根据该条款有针对性的质证该措施的立法动机和具体实施环节。归根结底,中国应积极运用WTO法律规则和争端解决机制,保障本国出口产品市场的稳定性和可预期性。     

论环境税在GATT第3条中的法律地位——基于“平等对待条款”解释的视角

由于环境税会影响一国的产业竞争力,所以采取环境税的国家通常会在相关立法中制定涉外条款来保护本国产业。从GATT/WTO争端解决机制对GATT第3条"平等对待条款"的解释来看,GATT/WTO争端解决机制倾向于限制各国的环境规制自由,环境保护作为"平等对待条款"免除对象的可能性不大,环境税在GATT第3条中难以获得合法性地位。     

碳关税合法性研究与应对

当前全球气候变暖的趋势不容忽视,控制碳排放量逐渐成为国际社会普遍重视的问题。碳关税虽于法理上有一定的依据,但并非完全相符于WTO宗旨。在涉及GATT和TBT条款中,在GATT项下,违反了GATT第1.1条的最惠国待遇和第3.4条的国民待遇,是否可援引GATT第20条(b)(g)款的例外规定还有讨论的空间;在TBT项下,碳关税有违反TBT第2.1条和TBT第2.2条的可能,还可能因各国检测技术存在不同,相互承认存在困难而违反TBT第5.1.1条、第5.2.1条、第6.1条。我国在面对其他国家实施的碳关税政策以及未来可能出现的新纠纷时,主动积极地面对问题,解决问题。在考虑到自身利益与国际形势的前提下,合理利用WTO规则和争端解决机制,形成自己的主张。     

《巴黎协定》生效后碳关税法律制度设计及对策

《巴黎协定》生效后,欧盟、美国等可能通过对进口产品实施碳关税或碳边境调节税,协调环境、气候贸易壁垒将成为国际贸易法领域新的焦点。但是目前国际贸易法框架下碳关税是否具有合法性尚无定论。未来碳关税的法律制度设计将由不符合WTO规则的"过程税"到符合WTO规则的"产品税"转变,遵循诚信磋商、公平和正当程序、设计灵活等原则,可能符合GATT第20条环境例外规则。为此,中国应坚持"区别责任"原则,积极推动建立多边碳减排机制,抵制单边贸易保护主义,合理利用WTO规则解决争端。     

论“共同但有区别的责任”对碳关税贸易措施的约束北大核心CSSCISSCI

碳关税源于碳减排国家维持竞争力和减少碳泄漏的需要。作为气候贸易措施,碳关税应符合WTO涵盖协定及气候公约"共同但有区别责任"原则,从而减少多边贸易治理和气候治理的分歧,维护南北国家在贸易体制下的权利义务平衡。该原则在碳关税争端中适用是可行的,它为WTO可持续发展原则一定程度地反映,亦可为TBT协定、GATT第20条引言所兼容,DSU对司法解释的规定和争端解决实践亦证实外部国际法原则可被纳入环境贸易争端中予以解释。     

论“共同但有区别的责任”对碳关税贸易措施的约束

碳关税源于碳减排国家维持竞争力和减少碳泄漏的需要。作为气候贸易措施,碳关税应符合WTO涵盖协定及气候公约"共同但有区别责任"原则,从而减少多边贸易治理和气候治理的分歧,维护南北国家在贸易体制下的权利义务平衡。该原则在碳关税争端中适用是可行的,它为WTO可持续发展原则一定程度地反映,亦可为TBT协定、GATT第20条引言所兼容,DSU对司法解释的规定和争端解决实践亦证实外部国际法原则可被纳入环境贸易争端中予以解释。     

从GATT第3条的解释看环境税的合法性——基于“平等对待条款”解释的视角

由于环境税会影响一国的产业竞争力,所以采取环境税的国家通常会在相关立法中制定涉外条款来保护本国产业。从GATT/WTO争端解决机制对GATT第3条平等对待条款的解释来看,GATT/WTO争端解决机制倾向于限制各国的环境规制自由,环境保护作为平等对待条款免除对象的可能性不大,环境税涉外在GATT第3条中难以获得合法性地位。     

WTO专家组有关中国原材料出口限制措施案中 GATT第20条例外援引评析

"中国原材料出口限制措施案"是涉及中国WTO争端解决的一个值得关注的新近案例。该案涉及《中国加入议定书》的法律适用、GATT第20条例外援引、司法经济原则、透明度等法律问题。本文在概述基本案情和主要裁定结论的基础上,就专家组对中国是否可就《中国加入议定书》条款援引GATT第20条例外,以及如何适用该例外进行分析。本文认为,尽管总体上援引GATT第20条例外的成功率非常低,但中国应该在上诉中争取澄清《中国加入议定书》第11.3条援引GATT第20条的法理依据。     

从产品标准的解释看环境税在WTO体制下的法律地位

从GATT/WTO争端解决机制对环境与贸易案件的解释来看,GATT/WTO争端解决机制对"相同产品"概念的解释和"直接竞争或替代产品"概念的解释都朝着扩大解释的方向迈进,这有利于人们将环境保护议题纳入WTO规制之内。GATT/WTO争端解决机制通过对GATT第3条产品标准的扩张解释,逐渐认可了环境保护在多边贸易体制中的合法地位,承认了作为国内税收措施和政府规制措施的环境税在WTO规则中的合法性地位。     

“碳关税”措施在GATT/WTO体制中的合法性研究

碳关税措施的规定是针对国内产品征收的碳税所进行的边境税调整,但国内碳税并不在WTO的边境税调整范围之内。碳关税不符合非歧视待遇原则中的国民待遇原则;由于各国环境政策和环保措施不同,碳关税也违反最惠国待遇原则。碳关税措施不符合GATT第20条(b)款与(g)款的规定,但专家组和上诉机构的解释可能对于碳关税措施符合GATT/WTO的相关规则具有积极的意义。考虑到碳关税对我国部分产业和对外贸易的影响,应该依据上述理由予以反对,驳斥欧美部分国家对于碳关税措施在GATT/WTO中具有合法性的观点。     

The GATT and gradualism

This paper shows how the institutional rules imposed on its signatories by the GATT created a strategic incentive for countries to liberalize gradually. Trade liberalization must be gradual, and free trade can never be achieved, if punishment for deviation from an agreement is limited to a ‘withdrawal of equivalent concessions’ and if initial deviation from an agreement is also limited. The paper shows how (sufficiently patient) countries have an incentive to deviate in a limited way when operating under GATT dispute settlement procedures.     

试析WTO争端解决机制

WTO自建立以来,其争端解决机制为多边贸易体制的有效运转提供了重要保障,对国际贸易争端的顺利解决起到了积极的作用。WTO争端解决机制是在GATT争端解决机制的基础上产生和发展起来,有着诸多不可比拟的优点,但同时不可避免地继承和包含GATT争端解决机制"先天性"的不足,其在实践中也暴露出不少问题,从具体的规则程序到实际运行的效果和作用都还存在不足之处。     

论WTO安全例外对单边贸易制裁的有限治理——基于“俄罗斯过境限制案”的分析

对成员方援引GATT1994第21条安全例外条款采取的单边贸易制裁,DS512案专家组除了明确争端解决机构的管辖权外,还提出善意解释基本安全利益和最低限度合理性两项要求,一定程度上肯定了争端解决机构在该条款具体适用问题上的审查权。然而,从专家组对条款的解读来看,其审查明显具有弹性,基于安全例外问题的双重属性,基本安全利益和最低限度合理性的定性模糊以及制度供给的不足,实际意味着争端解决机构对援引安全例外条款的介入审查有限,即有限治理。在应对美国以安全例外之名施加钢铝关税制裁时,理性看待WTO规则治理的效果,并在规则治理之外,设置WTO改革议题,以宏观制度层面的对话磋商促进具体争议的解决,无疑是一条更为合理的路径。     

Developing Countries as Plaintiffs and Defendants in GATT/WTO Trade Disputes

Developing countries have been increasing their participation in the formal institutions and proceedings of the multilateral trading system. A prominent example is their more frequent involvement as defendants and plaintiffs in GATT/WTO trade disputes. This paper provides an initial economic appraisal of developing country performance in the GATT/WTO dispute settlement system. We measure the economic resolution of these disputes through trade liberalisation gains, and our results suggest that developing country plaintiffs have had more success under WTO disputes than was the case under the GATT. We also document evidence on potential determinants of this success: the capacity for plaintiffs to make credible retaliatory threats and the guilty determinations by GATT/WTO panels. Finally, there is also some evidence that developing countries have recognised the importance of retaliatory threats and have responded by changing their pattern of dispute initiation under the WTO to better take advantage of the instances in which they have sufficient leverage to threaten retaliation and induce compliance with GATT/WTO obligations.     

Trade skirmishes safeguards: A theory of the WTO dispute settlement process

I propose a framework within which to interpret and evaluate the major reforms introduced to the GATT system in its transition to the WTO. In particular, I examine the WTO Agreement on Safeguards that has amended the GATT escape clause (Article XIX), and the Dispute Settlement Body (DSB) that resembles a court of law under the WTO. Using this framework, I interpret the weakening of the reciprocity principle under the Agreement on Safeguards as an attempt to reduce efficiency-reducing trade skirmishes. The DSB is interpreted as an impartial arbitrator that announces its opinion about the state of the world when a dispute arises among member countries. I demonstrate that the reforms in the GATT escape clause should be bundled with the introduction of the DSB, in order to maintain the incentive compatibility of trade agreements. The model implies that trade agreements under the WTO lead to fewer trade skirmishes but this effect does not necessarily result in higher payoffs to the governments. The model also implies that the introduction of the WTO court, which has no enforcement power, can improve the self-enforceability of trade agreements.     

日本与WTO争端解决机制

在GATT时代,日本在争端解决机制中比较被动,败诉相对较多。到了WTO时代,日本开始积极参与WTO争端解决机制,积极运用这一机制维护日本的国际贸易利益,并取得了较大的成功,出现了胜多败少的局面。日本这一变化的内在动力来自日本以入世为契机成功实现了贸易政策从以往的保护主义向自由贸易转换,可以在WTO争端解决机制舞台上以自由贸易的形象示人,并为此进行了WTO争端解决机构上诉机构大法官的人事布局,一直保持了日本人的上诉机构大法官的席位。日本的这一成果可以为我国所借鉴。     

Tariff retaliation versus financial compensation in the enforcement of international trade agreements

We analyze whether financial compensation is preferable to the WTO's current dispute settlement system that permits injured member countries to impose retaliatory tariffs. We show that, ex-post, monetary fines are more efficient than tariffs in terms of granting compensation to injured parties but fines suffer from an enforcement problem since they must be paid by the violating country. If fines must ultimately be supported by the threat of tariffs, they fail to yield a more cooperative outcome than the use of tariffs alone. Furthermore, the exchange of bonds between symmetric countries also does not improve enforcement relative to retaliatory tariffs.