Drivers and Enablers That Foster Environmental Management Capabilities in Small‐ and Medium‐Sized Suppliers in Supply Chains

The limited capabilities and resources available within many small‐ and medium‐sized enterprises frequently hamper an effective response to environmental pressures, which in turn hurts large buying firms (i.e., customers). Using a case study method with multiple suppliers of two large buying firms, we mapped factors that initiated and improved environmental capabilities in small‐ and medium‐sized enterprises over time. Through several specific mechanisms, buyers' green supply chain management initiated and then enabled the improvement of suppliers' environmental capabilities. Independent of buyers, internal championing of environmental concerns also provided an impetus for small‐ and medium‐sized enterprise suppliers to acquire resources outside the supply chain. Thus, synergistic linkages emerged in supportive buyer‐supplier relationships, resource acquisition, and capability development. When these findings are combined with earlier research on larger suppliers, an integrative framework emerges that provides direction for suppliers, buyers, and public agencies seeking to improve environmental performance.     

Toward a Typology of Buyer–Supplier Relationships: A Study of the Computer Industry*

Buyer–supplier relationship typologies are useful analytical tools for purchasing managers in managing exchange relationships with suppliers and monitoring their purchasing portfolios. Existing buyer–supplier relationship typologies are mainly focused on either relational contents or power‐dependence and have limited empirical support for their performance implications. In this study, we developed an alternative buyer–supplier relationship typology that integrates both relational content and power‐dependence dimensions, resulting in four generic relationship types: market, power, autonomous‐link, and constrained‐link relationships. We then performed a longitudinal exploratory investigation of eight leading firms in the U.S. computer industry to explore the performance implications of the typology, using a combinatorial qualitative approach that leverages the strengths of case study research, content analysis, and quasi‐experimental design. The results suggest three theoretical propositions. First, the association between the type of buyer–supplier relationships and buyer firm performance varies such that constrained‐link relationships are superior in terms of operational efficiency while autonomous‐link relationships are superior in terms of product innovation. Second, the positive association between buyer–supplier relational contents (i.e., relationalism) and buyer firm operational efficiency is strengthened as the suppliers' dependence on the buyer firm increases. And finally, the positive association between buyer–supplier relationalism and buyer firm product innovation is weakened as the suppliers' dependence on the buyer firm increases.     

The role of supplier innovation performance and strategies on the smartphone supply market

The paper analyses the supplier-side of buyer-supplier relationships examining the linkage of innovation performance and strategies with suppliers' market performances. The research has been conducted on the smartphone industry. A patent-based framework allows the investigation at the product level using techniques deriving from content analysis. The methodology is tested on a sample of 100 couples' component supplier gathered from the Nomura report. Results confirm the positive relationship between suppliers’ market shares and innovation elements. First, the market performance of suppliers depends on the performance of R&D activities carried out to develop smartphone-related technologies. Second, when companies adopt specialization strategies, concentrating on the end product the development of component technologies, the market shares are higher. From the methodological point of view, the work suggests how to operationalize patent data to perform analyses at the product level. The suggested framework can be employed by companies as a managerial tool.     

The effect of supplier development on outsourcing performance: the mediating roles of opportunism and flexibility

Abstract

In this increasingly competitive business environment, firms utilise outsourcing as a strategic tool to leverage globally dispersed resources so that they may focus on their core competencies and improve efficiency. The more firms rely on outsourcing, the more they depend on their suppliers, and the more important it is to manage and develop suppliers in order to achieve and maximise the benefits of outsourcing. This paper explores the impact of supplier development on outsourcing performance. Structural equation modelling was used to analyse data collected from 213 manufacturing firms in China. The results indicate that supplier development has a strong direct positive impact on outsourcing performance, and that supplier development also leads to enhanced outsourcing performance through reducing outsourcing opportunism risk and improving outsourcing flexibility. In addition to making a contribution to current theories of outsourcing, our findings also provide outsourcing managers with practical understanding and insights about the role of supplier development in enhancing outsourcing performance.     

Supplier Behavior in Capacity Investment Competition: An Experimental Study

Many manufacturers ensure supply capacity by using more than one supplier and sharing their capacity investment costs via supplier development programs. Their suppliers face competitive pressure from peers despite the reduced capacity investment cost. Although standard game theory makes clear prediction that cost sharing increases the suppliers' capacity choice and supply chain profit, the complex decision environment of capacity competition makes it interesting to test whether the theory predictions are robust and, if not, whether systematic deviations occur. We present a laboratory experiment study. The experiment data show that supplier subjects invested in higher capacities than what our theoretical analysis predicted, resulting in profit loss for the supply chain. Our econometric analysis indicates that the subjects are bounded rational and their concern for relative standing may be the potential driver of capacity over‐investment. Based on the experimental findings, we study a modified cost‐sharing mechanism that adapts to the behavioral biases. Its performance is validated in a second experiment.     

Investment in Shared Suppliers: Effect of Learning,Spillover, and Competition

We investigate the optimal strategies for firms to invest in their suppliers when the benefits of such investments can spillover to other firms who also source from the same suppliers. We consider two Bayesian firms that can invest in improving the quality of their shared supplier; the firms do not have complete information on the true quality of the supplier, but they update their beliefs based on the supplier's performance. We formulate the problem as an investment game and obtain Markov perfect equilibria characterized by the investment thresholds of both firms. The equilibrium investment strategies of the two firms are characterized by a region of preemption and a region of war of attrition. We also examine how the interplay between spillover, competition, and returns from the investment at shared suppliers affect the investment threshold and the time to the leader's investment, and identify the conditions under which competition delays or hastens the first investment in a shared supplier.     

Outsourcing Competition and Information Sharing with Asymmetrically Informed Suppliers

This paper studies an outsourcing problem where two service providers (suppliers) compete for the service contract from a client. The suppliers face uncertain cost for providing the service because they do not have perfect information about the client's type. The suppliers receive differential private signals about the client type and thus compete under asymmetric information. We first characterize the equilibrium of the supplier competition. Then we investigate two of the client's information sharing decisions. It is shown that less information asymmetry between the suppliers may dampen their competition. Therefore, the client does not necessarily have the incentive to reduce information asymmetry between the suppliers. We characterize the conditions under which leveling the informational ground is beneficial to the client. We also find that under the presence of information asymmetry (e.g., when the suppliers have different learning abilities), sharing more information with both suppliers may enhance the advantage of one supplier over the other and at the same time increase the upper bound of the suppliers' quotes in equilibrium. Consequently, the suppliers compete less aggressively and the client's payoff decreases in the amount of shared information. The findings from this study provide useful managerial implications on information management for outsourcing firms.     

Sourcing Decisions with Competitive Suppliers and Imperfect Information

Manufacturers often must choose between outsourcing and producing internally. This choice is complex and influenced by a variety of factors, including the costs and capabilities of the potential suppliers. In addition, if the manufacturer outsources, he must design the sourcing process. We study the manufacturer's outsourcing decision, with a focus on the impact of the sourcing process on that decision. We consider a setting in which the manufacturer has imperfect information regarding the suppliers' costs and capabilities, and we assume that the manufacturer uses a two‐stage sourcing process. The first stage is the qualification stage, in which the manufacturer seeks to reduce the uncertainty regarding the suppliers' capabilities. The second stage is the supplier selection stage, in which the manufacturer selects among the qualified suppliers on the basis of price. We first characterize the optimal design of the two‐stage process, and then consider the outsourcing decision. We demonstrate several trade‐offs. Vertical integration enables the manufacturer to reduce uncertainty and extract all of the profits of production. However, outsourcing enables the manufacturer to take advantage of the (potentially) lower costs and higher capabilities of the suppliers, particularly if competition between suppliers can be encouraged. We find that the manufacturer is more likely to vertically integrate when the warranty cost and the cost of exerting effort during qualification are large, and when there is significant uncertainty regarding the suppliers' capabilities. The manufacturer is more likely to outsource when the suppliers' costs (capabilities) are low (high), and when the number of suppliers is large.     

Supply Diversification with Responsive Pricing

We study sourcing and pricing decisions of a firm with correlated suppliers and a price‐dependent demand. With two suppliers, the insight—cost is the order qualifier while reliability is the order winner—derived in the literature for the case of exogenously determined price and independent suppliers, continues to hold when the suppliers' capacities are correlated. Moreover, a firm orders only from one supplier if the effective purchase cost from him, which includes the imputed cost of his unreliability, is lower than the wholesale price charged by his rival. Otherwise, the firm orders from both. Furthermore, the firm's diversification decision does not depend on the correlation between the two suppliers' random capacities. However, its order quantities do depend on the capacity correlation, and, if the firm's objective function is unimodal, the total order quantity decreases as the capacity correlation increases in the sense of the supermodular order. With more than two suppliers, the insight no longer holds. That is, when ordering from two or more suppliers, one is the lowest‐cost supplier and the others are not selected on the basis of their costs. We conclude the paper by developing a solution algorithm for the firm's optimal diversification problem.     

Reverse Auctions to Innovate Procurement Processes: Effects of Bid Information Presentation Design on a Supplier's Bidding Outcome

Information technologies (ITs) are being used to innovate various procurement processes. This research study focuses on the supplier‐side effects of IT design choices to conduct reverse auctions, which are increasingly used to procure a wide range of products and services. IT–enabled reverse auctions enhance supplier participation across geographical boundaries, leading to more efficient pricing. However, there are growing concerns about the adverse effects of IT–enabled reverse auctions on a supplier's performance. Supplier‐side issues are gaining prominence in the reverse auction literature and are critical for the long‐term success of reverse auctions. Therefore, we focus on suppliers’ bidding outcomes and assess how the design of an IT–enabled reverse auction facilitates the auction bidding outcomes of participating suppliers. Specifically, we examine the effects of two types of bid information presentation design—full price visibility and partial price visibility—on supplier's auction bidding outcomes, across auctions with different cost certainty and suppliers bargaining power vis‐à‐vis the buyer. The results of this study contribute new knowledge about the ways to use IT for creating effective auction designs and innovating procurement through auctions to enhance both the buyer's and suppliers’ performance. We present the detailed theoretical contributions of our study and discuss the managerial implications for designers of reverse auctions.      

Complexity as a Contract Design Factor: A Human‐to‐Human Experimental Study

Despite being theoretically suboptimal, simpler contracts (such as price‐only contracts and quantity discount contracts with limited number of price blocks) are commonly preferred in practice. Thus, exploring the tension between theory and practice regarding complexity and performance in contract design is especially relevant. Using human subject experiments, Kalkancı et al. (2011) showed that such simpler contracts perform effectively for a supplier interacting with a computerized buyer under asymmetric demand information. We use a similar set of experiments with the modification that a human supplier interacts with a human buyer. We show that human interactions strengthen the supplier's preference for simpler contracts. We find that suppliers have fairness concerns even when they interact with computerized buyers. These fairness concerns tend to be even stronger when suppliers interact with human buyers, particularly when the complexity of the contract is low. We also find that suppliers are more prone to random decision errors (i.e., bounded rationality) when interacting with human buyers. In the absence of social preferences, Kalkancı et al. identified reinforcement and bounded rationality as key biases that impact suppliers' decisions. In human‐to‐human experiments, we find evidence for social preference effects. However, these effects may be secondary to bounded rationality.     

Supplier Opportunism in Buyer–Supplier New Product Development: A China‐U.S. Study of Antecedents,Consequences, and Cultural/Institutional Contexts

Collaborating with a supplier in a buying firm's new product development (NPD) project is commonly advocated and adopted, but does not always improve project performance. Some pre‐existing collaboration contexts, such as buyer–supplier NPD projects, are especially exposed to supplier opportunism due to the uncertain nature of the collaboration process. Adopting agency theory and transaction cost theory perspectives, we examine: (i) contextual antecedents and project consequences of supplier opportunism and (ii) if these causal influences vary in different cultural and institutional contexts. Using a survey sample of 214 United States (U.S.) and 212 Chinese buying firms’ responses about buyer–supplier NPD projects, we find that supplier opportunism is significantly influenced by the task and relational contexts. We also show that supplier opportunism damages both design quality and efficiency, two aspects of project performance. When comparing U.S. to China, we find that task and relational contexts have a greater impact on supplier opportunism in the U.S., but design efficiency is less hurt by supplier opportunism there. Finally, we show challenges of preventing supplier opportunism in certain NPD collaboration contexts, and offer solutions for overcoming these challenges.     

Supply Management Under High Goal Incongruence: An Empirical Examination of Disintermediation in the Aerospace Supply Chain

Aftermarket sales and profits are becoming an increasingly important part of an original equipment manufacturer's (OEM) business model. Because replacement parts often do not require further manufacturing, OEMs act as intermediaries in the aftermarket. As with any intermediary, the OEM must concern itself with suppliers disintermediating its supply chain selling replacement parts directly to the OEM's customers. We frame supply chain disintermediation (SCD) as a principal–agent contracting problem between an OEM buyer and a supplier. Hypotheses relate contract conditions, goal incongruence, supplier capabilities and contract enforcement to SCD. The data are collected from the aerospace industry using a multimethod study, combining an Internet‐based survey with archival data. Causal modeling with structural equation modeling (SEM) shows general support for the hypotheses. Particularly, SCD is positively related to buyer–supplier goal incongruence. The agency model offers insights that differ from previous transaction‐cost‐based models of buyer–supplier relationships. OEM buyers with a lucrative aftermarket should consider aligning goals through incentives rather than relying entirely on economic hostages associated with specific assets.     

Cooperation in the Face of Conflict: Effects of Top Managers’ Trust Beliefs in their Firms’ Major Suppliers

As with any relationships, those between buying firms and their major suppliers are likely to experience situations of conflict. When facing such situations, top managers tend to approach conflict either cooperatively or competitively. However, when and why top managers tend towards cooperation or competition is far from clear. This study proposes a novel link between the theory of cooperation and competition and the discounting principle of attribution theory to argue that it is top managers’ trust beliefs in their firms’ major suppliers that influences their intended approach to conflict. Using survey data from 140 C‐level managers and business owners, the authors develop and test a model that differentiates between two attributional dimensions of trust (competence and goodwill) and the specific relational conditions that influence how these attributions operate. The results indicate that top managers’ trust in their suppliers’ competence and goodwill is, in fact, decisive in determining how they intend to approach conflict. Further, the authors demonstrate that a top manager's trust belief in the supplier's goodwill is of particular relevance in driving the top manager to cooperate in the face of conflict. However, this link seems to be contingent on the specific conditions of the buyer–supplier relationship in question.     

Does a Supplier's Operational Competence Translate into Financial Performance? An Empirical Analysis of Supplier–Customer Relationships

We conduct an empirical investigation of how a supplier's operational competence, as reflected by outcomes in the areas of quality, cost, delivery, flexibility, and new product development, translates into financial gains from a key customer. In contrast to previous research directed at the firm level, this study focuses on the supplier–customer relationship level. Using survey data from 158 suppliers in the manufacturing industry, we perform structural equation modeling to map out the paths from operational competence to financial performance—via dependencies and cooperative behaviors between suppliers and their customers. This study is the first scholarly attempt to examine the link between suppliers’ operational competencies and financial performance in interorganizational relationships. It is also an early investigation into operational competence as a source of bi‐lateral dependence. Our findings show that the supplier's operational competences increase its customer's dependence by enhancing the value of its products/services. However, the resulting increase in the supplier's power is not leveraged to shape relationship behaviors or capture value from its customer. In contrast, the customer's existing power as a major buyer plays an important role in shaping cooperative behaviors and affecting the supplier's financial performance from the customer relationship.     

Role of Random Capacity Risk and the Retailer in Decentralized Supply Chains with Competing Suppliers

This research considers a supply chain under the following conditions: (i) two heterogeneous suppliers are in competition, (ii) supply capacity is random and pricing is endogenous, (iii) consumer demand, with and without an intermediate retailer, is price dependent. Specifically, we examine how uncertainty in supply capacity affects optimal ordering and pricing decisions, supplier and retailer profits, and the incentives to reduce such uncertainty. When two suppliers sell through a monopolistic retailer, supply uncertainty not only affects the retailer's diversification strategy for replenishment, but also changes the suppliers’ wholesale price competition and the incentive for reducing capacity uncertainty. In this dual‐sourcing model, we show that the benefit of reducing capacity uncertainty depends on the cost heterogeneity between the suppliers. In addition, we show that a supplier does not necessarily benefit from capacity variability reduction. We contrast this incentive misalignment with findings from the single‐supplier case and a supplier‐duopoly case where both suppliers sell directly to market without the monopolistic retailer. In the latter single‐supplier and duopoly cases, we prove that the unreliable supplier always benefits from reducing capacity variability. These results highlight the role of the retailer's diversification strategy in distorting a supplier's incentive for reducing capacity uncertainty under supplier price competition.     

Search for Alternatives and Collaboration with Incumbents: Two-Sided Sourcing Behavior in Business Markets*

Sourcing strategies in business markets have been considered separately and the practice of two-sided sourcing behavior—engaging in search for alternative suppliers and collaboration with an incumbent supplier—has not been examined. To fill that gap, we first identify boundary conditions under which the poor performance of an incumbent supplier intensifies an original equipment manufacturer's (OEM) search and collaboration. Then, we examine how an OEM's two-sided sourcing behavior influences one of the critical elements of sourcing performance: the responsiveness of the incumbent supplier. Our proposed hypotheses were tested with data from a national survey of 539 OEM purchasing managers in the Japanese electronics industry. The analysis results indicate three main findings. First, two environmental conditions—pace of technological change and volume uncertainty—have contrasting influences on the link between incumbent supplier performance and an OEM's search and collaboration. While uncertainty from the upstream channel (pace of technological change) enhances an OEM's search and collaboration, uncertainty from the downstream channel (volume uncertainty) lowers an OEM's search and collaboration. Second, an OEM's dependence on its incumbent supplier has differential effects: an OEM reduces search as its dependence on incumbent supplier increases, while it enhances collaboration as its dependence on incumbent supplier increases. Third, while search alone has a negative effect on responsiveness of an incumbent supplier, engaging in two-sided sourcing behavior (i.e., combining search with collaboration) has a positive effect on responsiveness of the incumbent supplier.     

Supplier Selection via Tournaments

In this paper, we study the performance of a sourcing mechanism gaining popularity in industrial procurement environments; a tournament. Under a tournament, a buyer initially procures her parts from two suppliers with possibly different quality levels, for T time periods, i.e., she parallel sources. During this time, the buyer is able to observe noisy signals about the suppliers' quality. At time T, she selects the supplier with the highest observed performance and awards it the remainder of her business. We characterize the optimal duration of the tournament as a function of various market parameters, including information and investment costs. Furthermore, we demonstrate that a tournament can be more profitable for the buyer than selecting the highest quality supplier at time T = 0 and sole sourcing entirely.     

The Role of Contract Negotiation and Industry Structure in Production Outsourcing

Despite the spread of cost‐driven outsourcing practices, academic research cautions that suppliers' cost advantage may weaken manufacturers' bargaining positions in negotiating outsourcing agreements, thereby hurting their profitability. In this study, we attempt to further understand the strategic impact of low‐cost outsourcing on manufacturers' profitability by investigating the contractual form of outsourcing agreements and the industry structure of the upstream supply market. We consider a two‐tier supply chain system, consisting of two competing manufacturers, who have the option to produce in‐house or to outsource to an upstream supplier with lower cost. To reach an outsourcing agreement, each manufacturer engages in bilateral negotiation with her supplier, who may be an exclusive supplier or a common supplier serving both manufacturers. Our analysis shows that wholesale‐price contracts always mitigate the competition between manufacturers regardless of whether they compete with price or quantity. In contrast, two‐part tariffs intensify the competition when the manufacturers compete with quantity, but soften it when they compete with price. As a result, when outsourcing with two‐part tariffs, the manufacturers may earn lower profits than they would from in‐house production, although the suppliers are more cost efficient. This suggests that managers have to be wary about the downside of using coordinating contracts such as two‐part tariffs when pursuing low‐cost outsourcing strategies. Our analysis also sheds some light on the profitability of using an exclusive supplier for outsourcing. When outsourcing with wholesale‐price contracts, the competing manufacturers are better off outsourcing to an exclusive supplier. However, when outsourcing with two‐part tariffs, the manufacturers may earn higher profits by outsourcing to a common supplier than to an exclusive one when the manufacturers' bargaining power is sufficiently strong (weak) under quantity (price) competition.