民法诚信原则与劳动法适用之博弈论纲——以“奋斗者协议”和“自愿弃保”为例

"奋斗者协议"与"自愿弃保"案件背后隐含的法理可简概为民法诚信原则与劳动法适用问题。实践中的误读和误判、《民法典》缺失劳动权(益)之基本民事权利设置、共享经济下新型劳动用工和疫情与后疫情时代之多重叠加效应,导致了劳动法之"衰"与"殇"。民法诚信原则同样适用劳动法含社会保障法,所谓劳动法不能适用该原则或者民法思维模式都是不严谨之"伪"命题。劳动法适用诚信原则应当考量其特殊性,惩戒权适用时,应当遵循比例原则和有利原则,并不得涉及劳动者非职业行为即私人行为和排除社会保障权。任何排除或剥夺劳动者社会保障权的约定或规章都是无效的。后劳动合同义务适用诚信原则不能"选择性""遗漏"抗辩权,如果当事人依法行使抗辩权,则不能裁定其违反了诚信原则,否则就是"伪"民法思维模式。实习关系属于特殊的劳动关系,在实习法律规范严重缺失下,用具有弥补法律不足之价值与功能的诚信原则治理"虚假实习"完全必要而且可行。     

司法决策中的“父爱主义”管制逻辑

在包括赵春华案在内的诸多引发舆论关注的争议案件中,法官或许并非不是不懂得如何利用社科法学的判断能力与法教义学的裁判技术去弥合司法标准与公众认知之间的巨大断裂,而更可能是基于其“父爱”式的社会“管制”取向而对司法后果的实质合理性问题做出了“爱之深,责之切”的价值决断。在中国特色社会主义法律体系已经形成的历史背景下,为了保证良法的颁行能够导向预期的善治,法律必须以其作为“社会交往机制”的系统潜力而彰显其公理性与司法的合理性。只有首先确立基于交往原则和承认社会自主性的权力逻辑与法律决策结构,那种体现“人性化”“人文化”和“人权化”的方法论逻辑才有可能在法律的运作中获得国家体制官僚无法武断拒斥的实效。     

论已决事实的预决效力

大陆法系的主流观点和通行制度不承认判决理由具有既判力,说明已决事实不具有预决效力。我国民诉法未明确已决事实是否具有预决效力,不同的司法解释对此问题虽有规定但存在冲突,且都与民诉法基本原则相悖。当前司法实践中解决这一问题应当坚持现行民诉法奉行的“实事求是”原则,实行“再审前置”,即在后诉当事人提出足以推翻前诉已决事实的证据情况下,中止后诉审理,待通过再审纠正前诉已决事实后,恢复后诉审理。未来修改后的我国民诉法则应当否定已决事实具有预决效力。     

The impact of “empirical facts” on legal scholarship and legal research training

Lawyers have traditionally viewed law as a closed system, and doctrinal research has been the research methodology used most widely in the profession. This reflects traditional concepts of legal reasoning. There is a wealth of reliable and valid social science data available to lawyers and judges. Judges in fact often refer to general facts about the world, society, institutions and human behaviour (“empirical facts”). Legal education needs to prepare our students for this broader legal context. This paper examines how “empirical facts” are used in Australian and other common law courts. Specifically, the paper argues that there is a need for enhanced training in non-doctrinal research methodologies across the law school curriculum. This should encompass a broad introduction to social science methods, with more attention being paid to a cross-section of methodologies such as content analysis, comparative law and surveys that are best applied to law.     

On the Concept and the Nature of Law

Abstract. The central argument of this article turns on the dual‐nature thesis. This thesis sets out the claim that law necessarily comprises both a real or factual dimension and an ideal or critical dimension. The dual‐nature thesis is incompatible with both exclusive legal positivism and inclusive legal positivism. It is also incompatible with variants of non‐positivism according to which legal validity is lost in all cases of moral defect or demerit (exclusive legal non‐positivism) or, alternatively, is affected in no way at all by moral defects or demerits (super‐inclusive legal non‐positivism). The dual nature of law is expressed, on the one hand, by the Radbruch formula, which says that extreme injustice is not law, and, on the other, by the correctness argument, which says that law's claim to correctness necessarily includes a claim to moral correctness. Thus, what the law is depends not only on social facts, but also on what the law ought to be.     

“法律不知有害”质疑

我国大多数学者认为对事实的不知无害,对法律的不知有害,因而实务中对法律错误一般不予以救济。但事实上,不管是在罗马法上,还是在当代的大陆法系和英美法系,大部分国家都会对部分法律错误予以救济。而在确定何种法律错误可予以救济时,应充分考量在特定情况下对表意人"知法推定"的合理性以及表意人与第三人之间的利益衡量。     

The Special Case Thesis. An Assessment of R. Alexy's Discursive Theory of Law

Legal Argumentation Theories seek mainly to develop procedures, criteria and principles which can guarantee a proper justification of legal propositions within modern legal systems. In doing this, those theories solicit in general an interconnection between practical reasoning and legal reasoning. This paper refers mainly to what seems currently to be the most elaborate theory of legal argumentation, that is R. Alexy's Theorie der juristischen Argumentation. Although the discussion is mainly concentrated on critical points of R. Alexy's theory, this paper's scope is slightly broader; it attempts to present an overall view of the current discursive theory of law. This is mainly performed through the critical examination of R. Alexy's Special Case Thesis, which seems to raise a handful of counter arguments on behalf of the other proponents of Legal Argumentation. In the first part the special case thesis is presented, as well as the main objections to it. In the second part the validity of the special case thesis is checked against K. Günther's model of practical discourse, which proves to be more elaborate in certain points, when compared with the corresponding model of R. Alexy. In the third part it is shown that the special case thesis can be accepted consistently only if it is combined with a normative theory of law that advocates the interconnection of the concept of law with the idea of right morality. It is further suggested that legal discourse has to be perceived as a special case of a broader moral-political discourse that “explains” or “justifies” (morally) the various restrictions that the positive legal systems impose on the legal discourse.     

论比例原则在经济法中的适用

被誉为“公法皇冠”的比例原则在经济法中的适用具有可行性和必要性。比例原则的“相对普适性”为其在经济法中的适用提供了法理基础,引入比例原则不仅可以回应经济法现代性的内在诉求,还是贯彻经济法理念和基本原则的必然要求。比例原则在经济法中的适用范围涵盖“权力—权利”和“权利—权利”二元法律关系结构,但是,特殊紧急状态和合意行为应排除比例原则的适用。囿于比例原则的抽象性,有必要构建其在经济法中的类型化适用路径:以法律关系结构为划分依据,通过“目的正当性—适当性—必要性—均衡性”的差异化认定标准,塑造“宽松”和“相对严格”的审查基准模型。     

The Dual Nature of Law

The argument of this article is that the dual‐nature thesis is not only capable of solving the problem of legal positivism, but also addresses all fundamental questions of law. Examples are the relation between deliberative democracy and democracy qua decision‐making procedure along the lines of the majority principle, the connection between human rights as moral rights and constitutional rights as positive rights, the relation between constitutional review qua ideal representation of the people and parliamentary legislation, the commitment of legal argumentation to both authoritative and non‐authoritative reasons, and the distinction between rules as expressing a real “ought” and principles as expressing its ideal counterpart. All of this underscores the point that the dual nature of law is the single most essential feature of law.     

公众意见在裁判结构中的地位

从裁判依据的类型分析,公众意见只能作为一种事实依据,参与个案裁判。在常规案件中,公众意见作为一种准用的辅助性依据,可以通过弱的裁量成为合理化判决结论的说明性事实。在遇有法律漏洞的疑难案件中,与社会性主张相一致的公众意见,如果耦合法律体系中的法律原则或基本权利规范,可以籍由强的裁量充当个案推理的运作性依据,成为非常情形中正当化个案规则创制的立法性事实。在日趋多元化和复杂化的转型中国,法律系统必须在稳定性和灵活性、普遍正义和个案正义之间寻求一种平衡;判断公众意见的个案裁判地位,同样需在辅助性依据或运作性依据、说明性事实或立法性事实之间寻求一种平衡。     

法律推理的客观性及其实现条件

20世纪西方法理学经历了从法律确定性向法律不确定性的转向，以“唯一正确答案”为核心的法律确定性难以成立。然而，这并不会影响法律确定性所追求的限制权力这一政治目标的实现，恰当阐释的法律客观性观念可以作为法治的基石。共同的社会文化背景、适当的法律推理思维方法、成熟的法律职业共同体三者的共同作用将为法律推理的客观性的实现提供保障。     

一个结合时态的法律规范推理系统TDWL’0

义务冲突问题的存在，使法律规范推理的应用功能受到限制，让其成为规范逻辑研究中必需解决的问题。通过对义务的具体语境进行分析，提出结合义务的时态因素建立法律规范推理系统TDWL’0的新主张，这不但可以有效处理义务冲突问题，并且有利于增强规范逻辑在法律实践领域中的应用价值。     

Alexy's Thesis of the Necessary Connection between Law and Morality

This paper criticizes Alexy's argument on the necessary connection between law and morality. First of all, the author discusses some aspects of the notion of the claim to correctness. Basically, it is highly doubtful that all legal authorities share the same idea of moral correctness. Secondly, the author argues that the claim to correctness is not a defining characteristic of the concepts of “legal norm” and “legal system”. Hence, the thesis of a necessary connection between law and morality based on such claim cannot be accepted. 1 Abstract by Antonino Rotolo.
     

法律认知和法律原则：情感、效率与公平

情感、效率、公平是人们认知活动中惯常的三个进程。对应这三个进程,人们对法律的认知有一些基本的原则。这些认知互动既可能形成社会自发秩序,也可能为法学提供一个基于认知背景的分析框架,有助于法学应对实践问题。“公平主导”的一个简单回答是,面对不同场合,情感、效率、公平三种进程被激活的程度不同。大体上,家庭场合激活情感,工程场合激活效率,市场和法律则更激活公平。在实践中,公平主导的法律原则由于比较接近主流社会认知,所以法律规范在社会中往往可能“自执行”,无需全靠外界监督或者激励。公平原则也有其自身的局限。虽然规范和原则很重要,是社会秩序的母体。但是,公平原则并不能解决所有问题。缺乏制度上的法治,光靠情理法是不足的。所以现代社会形成了规则化解决纠纷的机制,这就是二阶意义上的法律。     

Positivism,Legal Validity,and the Separation of Law and Morals

The essay discusses the import of the separability thesis both for legal positivism and for contemporary legal practice. First, the place of the separability thesis in legal positivism will be explored, distinguishing between “standard positivism” and “post‐Hartian positivism.” Then I will consider various kinds of relations between law and morality that are worthy of jurisprudential interest, and explore, from a positivist point of view, what kind of relations between law and morality must be rejected, what kind of such relations should be taken into account, and what kind of such relations are indeed of no import at all. The upshot of this analysis consists in highlighting the distinction between two different dimensions of legal validity (formal validity and material validity respectively), and in pointing out that the positivist separability thesis can apply to formal validity only. On the other hand, when the ascertainment of material validity is at stake, some form of moral reasoning may well be involved (here and now, it is necessarily involved). The essay concludes with some brief remarks on the persisting importance of the positivist jurisprudential project.     

Protecting Supremacy from External Influences: A Precondition for a European Constitutional Legal Order?

The number of international law obligations that have binding force on the Union and/or its Member States is sharply increasing. This paper argues that in this light the well‐functioning of the European Union ultimately depends on the protection of the principle of supremacy from law originating outside of the EU legal order. The supremacy of EU law is essential to ensuring that Member States cannot use national rules to justify derogation from EU law. As a matter of principle, international treaties concluded by the Member States rank at the level of ordinary national law within the European legal order and below all forms of European law (both primary and secondary). Article 351 TFEU exceptionally allows Member States to derogate from primary EU law in order to comply with obligations under anterior international agreements. It does not however allow a departure from the principle of supremacy that underlies the European legal order. In Kadi I, the Court of Justice of the European Union stated that Article 351 TFEU, while it permits derogation from primary law, may under no circumstances permit circumvention of the “very foundations” of the EU legal order. This introduces an additional condition that all acts within the sphere of EU law need to comply with a form of “super‐supreme law”. It also strengthened the principle of supremacy and gave the Court of Justice the role of the guardian of the Union's “foundations”. The Court of Justice acted on the necessity of defending the Union as a distinct legal order, retaining the autonomous interpretation of its own law, and ultimately ensuring that the Union can act as an independent actor on the international plane.     

徜徉于哲学与法学之间-“事实与证据：哲学与法学的对话”国际研讨会综述

近年来,中国证据法学的研究取得了长足的发展。但随着讨论主题范围的日渐扩展以及程度的不断加深,证据法学研究中的许多问题越来越难以通过法学这一单一学科予以解决,急需与其他学科的学者进行对话,在这一背景之下,“事实与证据：哲学与法学的对话”国际研讨会在华东师范大学顺利召开。围绕“如何运用证据认定事实”这一问题,本次研讨会从“证据”和“事实”的基本含义及其相互关系、“司法认识论”、“事实认定的规则与方法”、“司法证明的标准”、“概率与证明”等五个方面进行了精彩的观点交换与交锋,在讨论中各位学者既达成了一些基本共识,也引出了许多有待深入研讨的话题。     

Detachment and Deontic Language in Law

Some legal philosophers regard the use of deontic language to describe the law as philosophically significant. Joseph Raz argues that it gives rise to ‘the problem of normativity of law’. He develops an account of what he calls ‘detached’ legal statements to resolve the problem. Unfortunately, Raz’s account is difficult to reconcile with the orthodox semantics of deontic language. The article offers a revised account of the distinction between committed and detached legal statements. It argues that deontic statements carry a Gricean generalized conversational implicature to the effect that the rules in question reflect the speaker’s own commitments. Detached legal statements are made when this implicature is either explicitly cancelled or when the conversational context is sufficient to defeat the implicature. I conclude by offering some tentative reflections on the theoretical significance of deontic language in the law.