Social science in court

This article discusses the role of social science in legal proceedings with special attention to the ethical situation of the expert psychologist asked to testify about the reliability of an eyewitness identification. It argues that in this area as in others one cannot discuss the ethics of expert psychological testimony without attending to the quality of the research and theory on which the testimony is based. It also identifies as considerations that bear on the propriety of such testimony the information the fact finder is likely to receive in its absence and the factual guilt of the defendant. The paper goes on to discuss the relationship between law and social science more generally. It argues that ultimately courts do and should have the last word regarding the place of social science in legal proceedings.     

Psychologists and the judicial system

This article traces the rise, fall, and current ambivalence in the use of social science data and psychological experts by the legal system. Several reasons are discussed for the less than perfect marriage between psychology and the law: normative philosophy of constitutional adjudication; overriding principles of the rules of evidence; irrelevancy to the courts of much of social science research; seduction of psychologists by attorneys who persuade experts to testify as advocates for a particular position rather than as objective scientists. These problems are placed in legal and ethical frame-work and suggestions for remediation of these problems are offered.     

司法确定力的形成逻辑

司法确定力是与法院的宪法地位密切相关的,宪法对法院的独立地位以及解决纠纷、救济权利和发展法律的功能定位,是司法确定力的权威渊源;司法确定力来自于司法的管辖权威,法院在法律规定的范围内、在自己的能力范围内受理案件,运用法律知识、司法理性和司法经验,按照司法规律对案件事实和法律适用问题进行权威判断,为司法确定力提供了前提;司法确定力源于司法的整合权威,法院在审理案件过程中,通过对立法时的民意与法律适用时的民意、普遍正义与个别正义、法律正义与社会正义的有机结合建构了司法的整合权威,为司法确定力提供坚实的基础;司法确定力依赖于裁判的执行权威,当事人自觉履行生效判决的文化意识和国家强制执行生效判决的权威能量为司法确定力提供坚强的保障。     

Under the microscope: legal challenges to fingerprints and DNA as methods of forensic identification1

Suspects in legal cases can be identified by an ever‐growing list of novel methods. The most common techniques currently used include latent print and DNA analysis. Although standard fingerprinting entered the courtroom over a century ago, the admissibility of fingerprint evidence has undergone a period of intense scrutiny in the USA in recent years. In contrast, most challenges to DNA analysis as a science came during its inception in the late 1980s and early 1990s. Current challenges to fingerprint evidence attempt to discredit the science behind the theory whereas challenges to DNA evidence often bring into question the competency of the analyst. In either case, the lessons learned in various court systems give guidance for those implementing the newer emerging biometric identification technologies such as facial recognition systems, retinal scans and the like. The first section of this article deals with fingerprint analysis and recent challenges to fingerprint admissibility in US courts. The second section discusses the evolution of DNA analysis and relevant cases. The final section gives recommendations for emerging biometric technologies to follow to satisfy the standards set forth by the courts.     

Personal values and the value of expert testimony

Psychologists who routinely offer expert testimony to the courts about the problems of eyewitness testimony demonstrate an unwarranted degree of faith in experimental psychology. Although progress in the field ultimately depends on laboratory research, the extrapolation of laboratory research to the real world is fraught with difficulties. Among the difficulties are the following: Laboratory studies are typically not designed with ecological validity in mind, they involve fixed effects statistical designs, they do not tell us how individuals (as opposed to mean values) behave under various experimental conditions. Presentation of such studies as relevant to the specific conditions of a court case entails a significant misrepresentation of the results of the research.     

Argument from Expert Opinion as Legal Evidence: Critical Questions and Admissibility Criteria of Expert Testimony in the American Legal System*

Abstract. While courts depend on expert opinions in reaching sound judgments, the role of the expert witness in legal proceedings is associated with a litany of problems. Perhaps most prevalent is the question of under what circumstances should testimony be admitted as expert opinion. We review the changing policies adopted by American courts in an attempt to ensure the reliability and usefulness of the scientific and technical information admitted as evidence. We argue that these admissibility criteria are best seen in a dialectical context as a set of critical questions of the kind commonly used in models of argumentation.     

证言真实性的审查与判断——陈述有效性评估技术

在证言研究中有一著名的理论假设:即来自于真实经历的证言与经他人教唆或自己幻想产生的证言是有区别的。现代的法庭科学与司法心理学也证实了"亲身经历过的事件记忆与想象记忆有着质的差异"。建立在上述差异基础上所形成的陈述有效性评估技术,专门用于检测言词的准确性,现已经在一些西方国家得以运用,在个别国家还甚至被运用于刑事领域。     

社会科学证据在美国的发展及其启示

我国的民事、行政法庭中已经出现了社会研究报告这种全新的证据形式,它实际上是社会科学证据的典型代表。社会科学证据已经在美国经历了超过百年的发展历史,最早可以追溯到上世纪初出现的"布兰代斯辩论摘要"。在经历了司法实践多年的考验之后,社会科学证据终于从上世纪70年代之后在美国获得了长足发展。如今,社会科学证据在美国的法庭中已得到了广泛的应用。我国可以学习美国的经验,将社会科学证据放在科学证据的框架之下进行研究和应用,这将成为我国证据法学理论的一个重要突破。基于当前的司法证明实践,应当对社会科学证据的证据属性、证据形式、公证问题、审查认定规则等重点问题加强研究。     

Is it unethical to offer predictions of future violence?

An examination of the nature, foundation, and consequences of predictive testimony about future violence does not support the assertion, sometimes heard, that such testimony is necessarily unethical. Certain types of predictive testimony about future violence may have adequate scientific support. Moreover, society does not require certainty about future violence in order to restrict various liberties. Proper performance of an evaluation related to certain types of predictive testimony can provide an adequate foundation for the testimony. Finally, a consideration of the consequences of legal proceedings that restrict liberty does not support the conclusion that predictive testimony is necessarily ethically improper merely because it uses probabilities that create the potential for a significant number of false-positive legal decisions. Therefore, we would not advise psychology, psychiatry, or the courts to conclude that predictions of dangerousness as a class are unethical.This paper was supported in part by funding from the John D. and Catherine T. MacArthur Foundation Research Network on Mental Health and the Law. The authors wish to thank Alexander Greer, John Monahan, Stephen Morse, and Ed Mulvey for their helpful comments on an earlier draft.     

我国环境审判专门化的探索与发展——基于环保法庭的法律分析

环境审判专门化在生态文明建设的大背景下具有正当性和必要性。我国设立的各种环保法庭是对环境审判专门化的有益探索。但是我国的环保法庭还存在审判模式不统一、管辖权缺少法律依据、组成人员不专业等问题。环境审判专门化的制度建构应该从合理确定环保法庭的管辖权和受案范围、放宽原告诉讼资格推进环境公益诉讼、实现环保法庭组成人员的多元化、促进环保法庭诉讼与非诉讼程序的衔接等方面进行。     

Hearsay Versus Children's Testimony: Effects of Truthful and Deceptive Statements on Jurors’ Decisions

Researchers and courts are focusing increasing attention on the reliability of children's out-of-court statements, especially in relation to trials of child sexual abuse. The main goal of this study was to investigate the effects of presentation of children's out-of-court statements (e.g., hearsay) on jurors' perceptions of witness credibility and defendant guilt, and on jurors' abilities to reach the truth. Child participants experienced either a mock crime or were coached to say they experienced the crime when in fact they had not. During elaborate mock trials involving community member jurors, children's testimony was presented either: (1) live, (2) on videotape, or (3) via a social worker. Analyses revealed that testimony format directly influenced jurors' perceptions of child and social worker credibility (e.g., children were perceived as less likely to provide false statements if they testified live) as well as jurors' sympathy toward the child, all of which then predicted jurors' confidence in defendant guilt. Jurors had difficulty discerning accurate from deceptive child statements regardless of testimony format. Implications for psychology and the legal system are discussed.     

THE CUSTOMER IS SOMETIMES RIGHT: THE ROLE OF CUSTOMER VIEWS IN MERGER INVESTIGATIONS

Antitrust enforcement officials and practitioners generallyagree that customers should have a prominent role in the mergerreview process. The question of the appropriate level of reliancethat competition authorities and courts should give to customertestimony has been the subject of considerable debate sincethe Arch Coal and Oracle decisions. This paper contains a comprehensivediscussion of the use of customer testimony throughout the U.S.merger review process, from the initial merger notificationfiling to injunction proceedings in federal court. We discussthe benefits from and problems with the use of customer testimony,including how these problems have led to litigation losses forthe U.S. antitrust authorities. What is the appropriate roleof customer testimony and when is it most probative? We contendthat customers can provide investigators and judges with informationregarding several relevant issues in an acquisition, includingindustry structure, geographic and product demand substitution,and acceptance of potential market entrants. In contrast, customerswill have considerably less information relevant to the likelihoodof entry, the extent of any merger-specific efficiencies, andthe validity of a failing firm defense. They will almost neverbe qualified to offer legal conclusions, such as the propermarket definition or likely competitive effects of a proposedmerger. We conclude that courts have generally remained consistentin their reliance on customer testimony, including in the ArchCoal and Oracle cases, and that customer testimony, despiteits limitations, should and will continue to be important ateach stage of the merger review process.     

Employment Discrimination Law and Industrial Psychology: Social Science as Social Authority and the Co‐Production of Law and Science

This article combines Monahan and Walker's classification of social facts, social authority, and social frameworks with political‐institutionalism's view of law and science as competing institutional logics to explain how, and with what consequences, employment discrimination law and industrial‐organizational (I‐O) psychology became co‐produced. When social science is incorporated into enforcement of legislative law as social authority—rationale for judicial rule making—law's institutional logic of relying on precedent and reasoning by analogy ensures that social science will have ongoing influence on law's development. By helping set research agendas and providing new professional opportunities, institutionalized legal doctrine shapes social science knowledge. But because of differences in institutional logic, wherein legal cumulation is backward looking whereas scientific cumulation is forward looking, co‐production of law and science may produce institutional mismatch between legal doctrine and scientific knowledge.     

Assessing Testimonial Evidence in Asylum Proceedings: Guiding Standards from the International Criminal Tribunals

Although credibility determinations rest at the core of refugeeprotection, international refugee law has failed to developa body of evidentiary principles that is tailored to the uniquedimensions of the testimony of those seeking asylum. This articleexamines recent developments in assessing oral testimony ininternational criminal law. International criminal law judges,like national asylum adjudicators, must transcend geographic,linguistic, cultural, educational and psychological barriersin order to assess the credibility of testimony. As a result,these new international courts have developed a body of principlesof international evidence law for assessing the testimony ofalleged victims of, and witnesses to, human rights abuses. Currentsocial science research on the asylum procedures in severaljurisdictions reveals that asylum decision makers often failto adapt the determination process to account for the realitiesof refugees presenting their cases in legal fora, directingproceedings with a ‘presumptive skepticism’ of claims.It is argued that the nuanced and rigourous model for the assessmentof the testimonial evidence of alleged victims and witnessesof human rights abuses in war crimes trials introduces effectiveinternational norms for the assessment of credibility in asylumproceedings.     

Qualifying the psychiatrist as a lay witness: a reaction to the American Psychiatric Association petition in Barefoot v. Estelle

Organized psychiatry has recently begun to define limits to expert testimony. The American Psychiatric Association filed an amicus brief in the case of Barefoot v. Estelle urging legal curtailment of psychiatric testimony as to future dangerousness and prohibition on Constitutional grounds of expert psychiatric testimony solely based on hypothetical data. The Supreme Court refused relief on both questions. Psychiatric testimony to ultimate questions at law is limited by the inherent contextual variables of psychiatric clinical and experimental knowledge and practice. A forensic science model for psychiatric participation with explicit psychiatrically defined limitations is proposed using competence to stand trial as an example.     

Two conjectures about the issue of expert testimony

This article responds to concerns about expert testimony in experimental psychology by conjectur that disagreements about the propriety of the testimony are camouflaged arguments about the strength of psychological knowledge. Differences between proponents and opponents of expert testimony are about the state of psychological knowledge and certainty, rather than about the proper standard for psychologists to use when deciding whether to testify. A second conjecture is stimulated by the assumption that laypersons generally overvalue eyewitness testimony and that expert psychological testimony is a required corrective. The truth of this assumption rests on the debatable assertions that eyewitness identifications, without more, are potent sole determinants of trial outcome, and that lay juries need instruction from experimental psychologists about aspects of human behavior of which the jurors are definitive producers and consumers. One need not resolve these debates in order to understand that psychologists should not rely on the legal community to set the psychologists' standards for expert testimony. And psychologists, in considering their role as courtroom experts, should guard against a self-serving critique of the acumen of lay juries.     

The experimental psychologist in court

This special issue comprises articles by psychologists, legal scholars, and ethicists on the ethics of expert testimony by experimental psychologists. In it the major ethical questions facing the prospective expert witness are clarified, and alternative positions on these issues are defined and debated. Fundamentals of moral reasoning are discussed, and the realities of interaction with a judicial system that subjects the psychologist to a variety of pressures and limitations are made apparent. The aim is not to offer final answers to complex ethical questions, but rather to provide a framework within which the questions can be considered by the individual psychologist.The conference on ethics of expert testimony by experimental psychologists was supported by National Science Foundation grant No. ISP-8209940. We thank Rachelle Hollander of the Ethics and Values in Science and Technology Program, Joe Young of the Memory and Cognitive Processes Program, and Eric Juengst of the National Endowment for the Humanities for their help in bringing about the conference.     

DNA evidence in South Africa: Lessons learned to date

A trend was noted over the past 15 years in the South African courts. This trend has a multi-factorial origin and highlights the problems faced in the use of forensic science evidence in court. Although there have been improvements on how DNA evidence is gathered and presented in court, due to the fact that certain cases have been contested at the DNA evidence level, multiple issues remain that have not yet been addressed when DNA evidence is submitted to court. These issues include: accreditation, regulation of the forensic science profession, continued education, training of court officials, quality assurance, biased testimony, lack of transparency with regard to processes and procedures followed in the forensic community, incorrect interpretation of DNA evidence, lack of scientific knowledge (including the scientific method) by DNA experts, awareness by the legal profession and an over emphasis on the prosecuting perspective. These same aspects continue to plague current cases. Despite the above, the window of opportunity to address the above has not yet passed. However, it will take continuous and concerted efforts from the scientific and legal professions to bring about the appropriate change to facilitate justice for all in South Africa.     

The Social Movement Turn in Law

The rise of social movements in US legal scholarship is a current response to an age‐old problem in progressive legal thought: harnessing law for social change while maintaining a distinction between law and politics. This problem erupted in controversy around the civil rights–era concept of legal liberalism defined by activist courts and lawyers pursuing political reform through law. Contemporary legal scholars have responded by building on social science to develop a new concept—movement liberalism—that assigns leadership of transformative change to social movements to preserve conventional roles for courts and lawyers. Movement liberalism aims to achieve the lost promise of progressive reform, while avoiding critiques of legal activism that have divided scholars for a half‐century. Yet rather than resolving the law‐politics problem, movement liberalism reproduces long‐standing debates, carrying forward critical visions of law that it seeks to transcend.