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| 水电施工企业创新行为市场演化博弈分析 | |
| 引用本文： | 姜国辉,周雪梅,李玉清,李雷,陈昕.水电施工企业创新行为市场演化博弈分析[J].数学的实践与认识,2011,41(2). |
| 作者姓名： | 姜国辉 周雪梅 李玉清 李雷 陈昕 |
| 作者单位： | 1. 沈阳农业大学水利学院,辽宁,沈阳,110161 2. 辽宁水利土木工程咨询有限公司,辽宁,沈阳,110003 3. 中铁隧道股份有限公司,河南,郑州,450003 |
| 摘 要： | 针对水电施工企业如何选择创新战略,政府如何引导企业进行创新,运用演化博弈理论分析了创新行为与市场结构的演化规律.研究表明,市场中企业采取自主创新或模仿创新的行为战略最终演化稳定均衡,即市场中总有一定比例的企业进行自主创新,其余的企业采取模仿创新,并且企业自主创新投资的概率与企业的规模成正比,与创新风险成正比,与创新成本成反比.由此我们得出,若企业个体规模小、自主创新成本高、创新所获收益小,则可采取模仿创新战略,反之,采取自主创新战略;对于政府若想维护市场稳定,提高行业技术水平和国际竞争力,对自主创新成本高、创新所获收益小的可采取补贴、减税等优惠政策,以鼓励企业采取自主创新. |
| 关 键 词： | 演化博弈 自主创新 模仿创新 水电施工企业 |
Analysis of Market Evolutionary Game for the Innovation Behavior of Water and Electricity Construction Enterprises |
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| JIANG Guo-hui,ZHOU Xue-mei,LI Yu-qing,LI Lei,CHEN Xin.Analysis of Market Evolutionary Game for the Innovation Behavior of Water and Electricity Construction Enterprises[J].Mathematics in Practice and Theory,2011,41(2). | |
| Authors: | JIANG Guo-hui ZHOU Xue-mei LI Yu-qing LI Lei CHEN Xin |
| Affiliation: | JIANG Guo-hui~1,ZHOU Xue-mei ~1,LI Yu-qing~1,LI Lei~2,CHEN Xin ~3 (1.Institute of Water Resources,Shenyang Agricultural University,Shenyang 110161,China) (2.Liaoning Water Resourses and Civil Engineering Consulting,Co.,Ltd.,Shengyang 110003,China) (3.China Railway Tunnel Stock Co.,Zhengzhou 450003,China) |
| Abstract: | The evolutionary rules of enterprises' innovation behavior and market structure are analyzed based on the evolutionary game theory in this paper,which aims at helping water and electricity construction enterprises to select suitable innovation strategies and helping government to implement effective guidance on enterprises' innovation behavior.This study indicates that it will finally stabilize at equilibrium for adopting both the independent innovation strategy and imitational innovation strategy.Namely,un... |
| Keywords: | evolutionary game independent innovation imitational innovation water and electricity construction enterprises |
| 本文献已被 CNKI 万方数据 等数据库收录！ | |
