经理管理防御对企业资本投向影响的实证研究

基于经理人固守职位和获取控制权私利双重动机与资本投向的理论分析,选取2007—2012年中国沪深两市A股上市公司作为研究样本,构建经理管理防御指数,用实证方法分析经理管理防御对企业资本投向的影响。研究发现:经理管理防御与企业固定资产投资呈正相关关系,与无形资产投资呈负相关关系;经理管理防御与长期股权投资呈正相关关系,但没有通过变量的显著性检验,说明经理人在防御动机和控制权私利的驱动下,更倾向于增加固定资产投资以增加企业投资规模、减少研发投资和其他技术性资产的无形资产投资。在经理人决策视角下,研究了经理管理防御对资本投向影响机理和经验证据,也为进一步改善企业资本投向和提高投资质量提供理论依据。

An Empirical Analysis of Managerial Entrenchment Effect on the Firm Capital Allocation

Based on the theoretically analyzes firm capital allocation, this paper build managerial about entrenchment and self-interest motivation with entrenchment index and study the relationship between managerial entrenchment and firm capital allocation, using the date of Chinese A-share listed companies from 2007-2012. The results show that： managerial entrenchment raise the investment in fixed assets and cut intangible assets, the suppose that managerial entrenchment have a positive correlation with long-term equity not pass the significance test of the variable. The result means that the managers are more likely to increase the scale of investment by arising investment in fixed assets, reducing intangible investment in R＆D investment and other technical assets. The results have an important value to understanding of the causes of inefficient investment in the perspective of managers, providing a theoretical basis to optimize capital allocation and improve the quality of investment.