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社会资本、治理结构与家族企业代理问题
引用本文:周生春,范烨.社会资本、治理结构与家族企业代理问题[J].浙江社会科学,2008(12).
作者姓名:周生春  范烨
作者单位:浙江大学经济学院,杭州,310027
摘    要:传统委托代理理论对于家族企业代理问题的研究忽视了家族企业成长的动态性和代理目标的多元性,而且缺乏对家族企业外部代理问题和相关治理的关注。本文从治理范围和治理方式两个维度,将家族企业的委托代理关系分为四种类型,并提出了家族企业的社会资本治理模式。在社会资本治理模式下,家族企业应对企业内部和企业外部采取不同的委托代理安排:在企业内部,对于家族经理人员,用"价值观治理"来超越个体的"权威治理";对于非家族经理人员,通过泛家族化构建委托人与代理人之间的长期信任。在企业外部,应当通过扩展的家族企业网络来降低代理成本,提高组织的交易效率。

关 键 词:家族企业  社会资本  治理结构  委托代理关系  代理成本

Social Capital, Governance Structure and Agency Problem of Family Business
Zhou Shengchun,Fan Ye.Social Capital, Governance Structure and Agency Problem of Family Business[J].Zhejiang Social Sciences,2008(12).
Authors:Zhou Shengchun  Fan Ye
Abstract:Under the traditional principal-agent theory, most researches on agency of family business ignored for a long time the growth of family business, the diversity of agency objectives and issues of external agency and governance of family business. This paper divides the principal-agent relationships in family business into four categories in terms of governance range and governance style, and presents a model of social capital governance. In line with the model, family business should make different agency arrangements accordingly: within the business, managers of family members should be treated in a value-based manner instead of the authority-based governance, and for non-family ones in the business, pan-family measures should be used to construct long-term trust between the principal and agent. Outside the business, the family business network should be extended to reduce agency cost and improve transaction efficiency.
Keywords:Family Business  Social Capital  Governance Structure  Principal-Agent Relationship  Agency Cost
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