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竞争回收下制造商的回收定价与合作策略
引用本文:王勇,蒋琼,刘名武,刘永.竞争回收下制造商的回收定价与合作策略[J].控制与决策,2023,38(9):2681-2690.
作者姓名:王勇  蒋琼  刘名武  刘永
作者单位:重庆交通大学 经济与管理学院,重庆 400074
基金项目:国家自然科学基金项目(71871035);重庆市教委人文社科基金重点项目(20SKGH079);重庆市教委科学技术研究重点项目(KJZD-K202000702);重庆市留学创新项目(cx2021038);重庆市研究生导师团队建设项目(JDDSTD2019008);巴渝学者项目(YS2021058);重庆交通大学研究生科研创新项目(2020B0007).
摘    要:针对传统人工回收和智能回收在回收方式上的差异,考虑消费者对智能回收渠道的选择偏好,分别构建单一传统回收、单一智能回收、双回收渠道下分散决策和集中决策模型,以及制造商分别与传统回收商和智能回收商合作的决策模型,分析了竞争回收下制造商的回收定价与回收合作策略.研究表明:相对于单一回收渠道,双回收渠道竞争会促使传统回收商和智能回收商提高回收价,但会降低回收商的利润;与单一回收渠道相比,双回收渠道下制造商、零售商和供应链的利润会增加,而制造商与回收商合作可进一步提高制造商、零售商和供应链的利润;以双回收渠道分散决策为参照,制造商与传统回收商和智能回收商之间均有合作动机,且制造商与传统回收商合作后的增量利润较大,制造商与智能回收商合作后的增量利润较小.

关 键 词:制造商  传统人工回收  智能回收  消费者回收偏好  回收定价  回收合作策略

Manufacturer's recycling pricing and cooperation strategies under competitive recycling
WANG Yong,JIANG Qiong,LIU Ming-wu,LIU Yong.Manufacturer's recycling pricing and cooperation strategies under competitive recycling[J].Control and Decision,2023,38(9):2681-2690.
Authors:WANG Yong  JIANG Qiong  LIU Ming-wu  LIU Yong
Affiliation:School of Economics & Management,Chongqing Jiaotong University,Chongqing 400074,China
Abstract:As the difference in recycling methods between traditional manual recycling and smart recycling, considering consumers'' preference for smart recycling channels, this study establishes a single traditional recycling model, a single smart recycling model, the centralized and the decentralized decision models under dual recycling channels, as well as the decision-making models of the manufacturer cooperating with the traditional recycler and the smart recycler respectively, and analyzes the recycling pricing and cooperation strategies of the manufacturer in competitive recycling. The results show that: compared with a single recycling channel, the recycling prices of the traditional recycler and the smart recycler are increased in dual recycling channels, while the profits of the traditional recycler and the smart recycler are reduced. Besides, the total profits of the manufacturer, the retailer, and the supply chain are increased under dual recycling channels. The overall profits of the manufacturer, the retailer, and the supply chain can be further improved with the manufacturer''s cooperation strategy. The manufacturer has incentives to cooperate with the traditional recycler and the smart recycler. Moreover, the incremental profit after the manufacturer cooperates with the traditional recycler is larger, and the incremental profit after the manufacturer cooperates with the smart recycler is smaller.
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