基于不完全信息博弈的PROT 项目融资模型研究

以中小水电项目为代表的经营性公共基础设施项目，在采用PROT 项目融资模式经营运行过程中，由于涉及的利益相关方之间存在信息不对称的情况，致使各方在博弈过程中存在“道德风险”，从而损害PROT 项目的整体利益。将不完全信息博弈和熵理论引入PROT 项目融资模式当中，分析社会投资者、政府以及公众三方的支付函数、期望收益以及项目融资系统熵的大小，建立了基于不完全信息博弈的PROT 项目融资模型，通过该模型可以深入了解各利益相关方博弈的内在机理，并通过项目融资系统熵的变化来有效防范和监控产生的“道德风险”。经实例验证表明该模型具有较好的适用性。

PROT Project Financing Model Based on Incomplete Information Game

Because of the existence of information asymmetry between the stakeholders，small and medium hydropower project will result "moral hazard"，which may damage the whole benefit of PROT project in the operation process of PROT project. This paper introduces game theory and entropy theory into PROT project financing model. Firstly，through the analysis of payoff function，expected revenue of three parties and project financing system entropy，the paper established the PROT project financing model based on incomplete information game. The model can understand the intrinsic mechanism of the stakeholders’ game and effectively prevent and control the moral hazard through the changes of project financing system entropy. Finally，through the examples，it has better effect.