终极控股股东超额控制与现金持有量价值的实证研究

文章以我国资本市场2002年非金融类A股公司为样本,实证研究了终极控股股东控制权与现金流权分离对公司现金持有量水平及其市场价值的影响.研究结果发现:(1)当终极控股股东为国有股东时,控制权/现金流权系数与现金持有量水平显著正相关;而当终极控股股东为非国有股东时,控制权/现金流权系数与现金持有量水平虽然正相关,但不能通过显著性检验.表明在两权分离的情况下,国有终极控股股东对高现金持有量水平具有较高的偏好;(2)当终极控股股东为国有股东,且其控制权与现金流权存在分离时,现金持有量的价值为0.769元;而当终极控股股东控制权与现金流权不存在分离或虽存在分离但终极控股股东为非国有股东时,现金持有量的价值为1.206元.从而表明在两权分离的情况下,国有终极控股股东对高现金持有量水平的偏好是一种控股股东利益侵占动机.

The Impact of Excess Control of Ultimate Controlling Shareholders on the Value of Cash Holdings

In this paper, we investigate the impact of the separa- tion of control rights from cash flow rights of ultimate control- ling shareholders on firm value under the settings of concentrated ownership structure by focusing on the effect of the separation of the two rights on the market value of corporate cash holdings. We first construct an index of the separation of control rights from cash rights of ultimate controlling shareholders using the 2002-year-end data from A-share listed companies in China; we then empirically examine the effects of the separation of control rights from cash flow rights of ultimate controlling shareholders on the level and value of corporate cash holdings. The empirical results show: (1) after controlling the effects of other factors that influence the level of corporate cash holdings, the ratio of control rights to cash flow rights is positively related to the level of corporate cash holdings when the ultimate shareholders are state shareholders; however, the ratio of control rights to cash flow rights is not significantly related to the level of corporate cash holdings when the ultimate controlling shareholders are non-state shareholders. These results show that state ultimate controlling shareholders show higher preference for large corporate cash holdings; (2) The value of corporate cash hold- ings is about 0.769 when the ratio of control rights to cash flow rights is above 1 and the ultimate controlling shareholders are state shareholders; but it is about 1.206 when the ratio of control rights to cash flow rights is equal to 1 or above 1 but the ultimate control- ling shareholders are non-state shareholders. These results show that the higher preference for large cash holdings of state ultimate controlling shareholders is a kind of motive for expropriation under the context of the separation of control rights from cash flow rights. These results are consistent with the "grabbing hand" hypothesis advanced by Shleifer and Vishny.