考虑双均衡的港航供应链可持续投资研究

针对港航联合可持续投资问题，构建了静态Stackelberg均衡与动态演化博弈双均衡联动模型，在政府碳排放规制和碳交易市场双重因素下，研究考虑可持续发展的港航供应链减排技术投资策略。研究表明：随着投资成本分担比例的增大，在静态Stackelberg均衡下，航运公司投资意愿逐渐降低，而港口却始终偏好自身投资，此时系统均衡策略由航运企业投资的囚徒困境转变为港口投资的帕累托最优；在动态演化博弈下，稳定结果是航运企业投资转变为港口投资。并从政府-市场-企业三方视角发现：(1)企业长期低碳投资策略与政府碳排放限额无关；(2)企业需要关注碳交易市场价格、托运人对可持续水平敏感度以及价格敏感度，这些参数值增高会降低碳排放量；(3)随着航运企业分担比例的增大，碳排放量呈现上升趋势。最后结合静态与动态投资策略，为政府、港口和航运企业可持续投资提供建议。

Research on Sustainable Investment of Maritime Supply Chain Considering Double Equilibrium

As an indispensable part of the international trade logistics system, maritime supply chain playsa positive role in promoting trade globalization. Under the background of global energy shortage, environmental capacity decline, carbon tax policy and customers green preference,the development of maritime supply chain is facing the challenges of energy and environment.Port and shipping companies will inevitably follow the principle of sustainable development to seek benign development. Aiming at the problem of joint carbon emission reduction between ports and shipping companies, a linkage model of static Stackelberg equilibrium and dynamic evolutionary game is constructed. Under the influence of government carbon emission regulation and carbon trading market, the research considers sustainable development of low-carbon technology investment strategies in the maritime supply chain. It shows that with the increase in the proportion of investment cost sharing, under the static Stackelberg equilibrium, the willingness of shipping companies to invest gradually decreases, but the port always prefers to invest by itself. In this condition, the system equilibrium strategy changes from the prisoner’s dilemma of shipping companies’ investment to the pareto optimum of port investment.Under the dynamic evolutionary game, the stable result is that the investment is transform from shipping companies to port. In addition, from the perspective of the government-market-enterprise tripartite, it is found that: (1) There is no relation between the low-carbon investment of companies and the government carbon emission quota; (2) Companies need to pay attention to carbon trading market prices, shippers’ sensitivity to sustainability levels, and price sensitivity, whose increase will result in carbon emissions’ reduction; (3) With the increase in the share ratio, carbon emissions will show an upward trend. Finally, combining static and dynamic investment strategies, it can be seen that the dynamic game strategy of maritime supply chain is consistent with the static equilibrium strategy. Because in long-term investment, maritime supply chain companies consider the strategies that are beneficial to both parties, rather than for themselves. On this basis, suggestions on sustainable investment are put forward from three angles of government, port and shipping companies.