考虑政府补贴和公平关切的双渠道绿色供应链决策研究

基于一个制造商和一个零售商组成的双渠道绿色供应链，建立Stackelberg博弈模型，对比分析政府不补贴和政府补贴两种情形下零售商公平关切对供应链最优定价、绿色度决策及供应链成员利润的影响。结果表明：政府不补贴时，零售商公平关切增强会降低产品批发价格、销售价格和绿色度，减少制造商利润；零售商利润则随着其公平关切增强既存在增加也存在减少的情况，具体与产品绿色化效率有关。相比之下，政府补贴时，产品绿色度更高，制造商和零售商的利润更大；零售商公平关切增强可以增加制造商和零售商的利润，但并不影响产品销售价格、绿色度和社会福利。基于此，政府补贴不仅能够增加供应链利润，还能协调零售商公平关切对产品定价与绿色度决策的影响。

Research on Dual-channel Green Supply Chain Decision Making Considering the Government Subsidy and Fairness Concerns

Faced with the increasingly prominent ecological and environmental problems, all sectors of society actively promote the development of green supply chain. However, high R&D costs often lead to high sales prices of green products, which in turn hinder the expansion of the green product market. At the same time, in dual-channel green supply chain, channel competition and the decision-making behavior of supply chain members make pricing and green degree decision-making of green products more complex. Therefore, the dual-channel green supply chain composed of one manufacturer and one retailer is taken as the research object, and the retailer’s fairness concerns behavior is considered. A two-stage Stackelberg game model with one manufacturer and one retailer as the main body and a three-stage Stackelberg game model with the government, one manufacturer and one retailer as the main body is established and solved respectively in the two cases of government non-subsidy and government subsidy. Then the effects of the retailer’s fairness concerns on optimal pricing, green degree decision and profits of supply chain members are analyzed. The results show that: when the government does not subsidize, the retailer’s fairness concerns will reduce the wholesale price, sales price and greenness of the product, and reduce the manufacturer’s profit; The profit of the retailer increases and decreases with the increase of its fairness concerns, which is related to the green efficiency of the product. By contrast, when government subsidy is given, the product is greener and the manufacturer and the retailer are more profitable. The enhancement of the retailer’s fairness concerns can increase the profits of the manufacturer and the retailer, but it does not affect the selling price, greenness of the product and social welfare. Based on this, the government subsidy can not only increase the profit of the supply chain, but also coordinate the influence of retailer’s fairness concerns about product pricing and green degree decision-making, and further improve the efficiency of dual-channel green supply chain.