| 公平偏好员工的锦标激励研究 |
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| 引用本文： | 李训,曹国华. 公平偏好员工的锦标激励研究[J]. 管理工程学报, 2009, 23(1): 143-144,153 |
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| 作者姓名： | 李训 曹国华 |
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| 作者单位： | 1. 四川外语学院国际商学院,重庆,400031
2. 重庆大学经济与工商管理学院,重庆,400030 |
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| 基金项目： | 重庆市教育委员会科学技术研究项目，教育部新世纪人才支持项目，重庆市科学技术委员会科技项目 |
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| 摘 要： | 传统锦标理论建立在员工是纯粹自利的假设上,而行为合约理论认为员工是具有公平偏好的.本文分析在完全竞争和不完全竞争的劳动力市场和产品市场中,针对具有公平偏好的员工的最优锦标机制设计及产出效率问题.以期为企业劳动舍约的设计提供一种更加接近现实的、可供借鉴的思路.
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| 关 键 词： | 公平偏好 锦标机制 工资差距 |
Research for Tournament Incentive on Employees with the Fairness Preference |
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| LI Xun,CAO Guo-hua. Research for Tournament Incentive on Employees with the Fairness Preference[J]. Journal of Industrial Engineering and Engineering Management, 2009, 23(1): 143-144,153 |
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| Authors: | LI Xun CAO Guo-hua |
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| Affiliation: | 1.School of International Business;Sichuan International Studies University;Chongqing China 400031;China;2.College of Economics and Business Administration;Chongqing University;Chongqing China 400030;China |
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| Abstract: | Traditional tournament theories are based on the hypothesis that employees are self-interest.However,the behavioral contract theory argues that many employees have strong feelings of fairness.In order to provide a realistic and exercisable way for labor contract designs,this paper analyzes optimal tournament schemes and output efficiency of employees with the fairness preference in perfect competition and in imperfect competition labor and product markets. |
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| Keywords: | fairness preference tournament schemes income gap |
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