突发危机事件网络舆情治理的多情景演化博弈分析

互联网时代,网络媒体已经成为谣言传播的重要载体,严重威胁到我国的网络空间安全和社会和谐稳定,因此加强和创新对网络媒体的监管,妥善治理突发危机事件网络舆情是各级政府面临的重大挑战。针对突发危机事件网络舆情治理的研究,本文运用演化博弈理论构建了网络媒体与地方政府双方演化博弈模型,在引入中央政府惩罚机制基础上,对比分析了网络媒体与地方政府双方行为策略选择的演化稳定均衡,同时采取多案例进行实证研究,并通过数值仿真分析对模型进行多情景推演模拟。研究结果表明:突发危机事件网络舆情传播热度与网络媒体和地方政府双方的策略选择有着直接关系;若地方政府承受突发危机事件网络舆情恶性演化造成的经济损失与信誉损失持续增大,双方演化系统都会出现周期性波动现象;引入中央政府惩罚机制后,其惩罚力度若高于网络媒体消极应对网络舆情所受到的惩罚和地方政府的监管投入成本时,最终系统会演化至良性状态,研究结论为政府部门在面对突发危机事件网络舆情治理方面提供了新思路。

Multi-scenario Evolutionary Game Analysis of Network Public Opinion Governance in Sudden Crisis

In the internet era, online media has become an important carrier of rumors spreading, which seriously threatens the safety and social harmony and stability of China’s network space. Compared with traditional media, online media has become an important force for informational dissemination in emergencies, with its characteristics of large users, fast informational dissemination, and strong interactive function. Facing the complex network environment, what is the evolutionary equilibrium strategy of the local government and online media after repeated games? What are the key factors affecting the choice of local government and online media to respond to online public opinion strategies? How to realize the co-ordination of local governments and online media to cope with sudden crisis events by adjusting the central government punishment mechanism? These new problems are worth studying.In this paper, considering the bounded rationality and information asymmetry of game subject, the evolutionary game theory is used to construct the evolutionary game model between the network media and the local government supervision department. Based on the introduction of the central government punishment mechanism, discussing the governance model of online public opinion,which is dominated by local government regulatory authorities and actively responded by online media.Firstly, constructing an evolutionary game model of local government and online media in response to the behavioral strategy of sudden crisis events, and solving the evolutionary conditions of the network’s public opinion heat propagation system to the local stable equilibrium state. Secondly, in order to make the system evolve to a rational state, the central government punishment mechanism is included in the above evolutionary game model. Establishing an extended evolutionary game model in which local governments and online media collaborate to manage network sentiment in sudden crisis events and derive the optimal evolution strategy of behavioral strategy choices between local governments and online media. Finally, the different types of sudden crisis are selected as research cases, and multiple scenarios are derived from the behavioral strategies of online media and local governments. The evolution and stability of the behavior strategies of the two parties under different scenarios are compared and analyzed.The results of the study show that the public sentimental heat of sudden crisis events has a direct relationship with the choice of online media and local regulatory authorities. When the local government regulatory authorities are exposed to sudden crisis events, the economic losses and reputation losses caused by the vicious evolution of the network are constantly increasing, and the evolutionary systems of both sides will experience cyclical fluctuations. After the introduction of the central government punishment mechanism, if the punishment is higher than the punishment of the online media negatively responding to the Internet public opinion and the supervision input cost of the local government supervision department, and the system will ultimately evolve to a balance state.The conclusion of the study is providing a new idea for government departments to solve the network public opinion in sudden crisis.