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生产规模不经济性条件下考虑消费者偏好的智慧供应链扶贫模型研究
引用本文:万骁乐,王茜,孟庆春,杜元伟.生产规模不经济性条件下考虑消费者偏好的智慧供应链扶贫模型研究[J].中国管理科学,2020,28(2):153-165.
作者姓名:万骁乐  王茜  孟庆春  杜元伟
作者单位:1. 中国海洋大学管理学院, 山东 青岛 266100;2. 山东大学管理学院, 山东 济南 250100
基金项目:国家社科基金重大项目(18ZDA055);国家自然科学基金资助项目(71901199,71874167,71804170);泰山学者工程专项经费资助项目(tsqn20171205);山东省社会科学规划研究项目(19CHYJ10);中央高校基本科研业务费专项(201913015);2019年度青岛市博士后应用研究项目;教育部人文社会科学研究项目(17YJC790120);中国博士后科学基金面上项目(2019M660170);山东省博士后创新项目(201902019)
摘    要:落后的生产技术和管理水平均会导致企业面临生产规模不经济问题,在扶贫背景下,农户的生产同样具有生产规模不经济性。本文分别构建"农户+智慧供应链平台"、"农户+批发商+智慧供应链平台"、"农户+合作社+智慧供应链平台"三种扶贫模式,并比较不同模式下供应链的分散式决策及政府的补贴策略。研究表明:三种模式下,消费者扶贫偏好系数对贫困农户、批发商及合作社均有正向影响。随着农户贫困程度的增大,消费者需求也会增加,进而使得供应链各主体及供应链整体的利润均有所增加。"农户+智慧平台"合作模式下农户、平台及供应链整体均获得最高利润,但是其规模不经济情况无法得到改善,且现阶段在贫困地区实施该模式难度较大;"农户+批发商+智慧供应链平台"合作模式下,农户的利润高于批发商和智慧平台的利润,但是供应链整体利润有所减少,规模不经济状况也未得到改善;"农户+合作社+智慧供应链平台"模式下,合作社为农户分担一定的规模不经济成本,农户及供应链整体利润均有所增加。除此之外,政府一方面需继续加大对智慧平台建设及运行的补贴,增加目标激励,以维持供应链各主体的利益均衡。另一方面应通过激励合作社的建立帮助农户提高知识技术水平,并使其逐步实现与智慧平台的自主合作。

关 键 词:智慧供应链  扶贫偏好  生产规模不经济性  决策  协调  
收稿时间:2018-12-21
修稿时间:2019-04-12

Smart Supply Chain Decision and Coordination Strategy Considering Poverty Alleviation Concern Based on Manufacture Diseconomies of Scale
WAN Xiao-le,WANG Qian,MENG Qing-chun,DU Yan-wei.Smart Supply Chain Decision and Coordination Strategy Considering Poverty Alleviation Concern Based on Manufacture Diseconomies of Scale[J].Chinese Journal of Management Science,2020,28(2):153-165.
Authors:WAN Xiao-le  WANG Qian  MENG Qing-chun  DU Yan-wei
Affiliation:1. School of Management, Ocean University of China, Qingdao 266100, China;2. School of Management, Shandong University, Jinan 250100, China
Abstract:With backward production technology and management, enterprises are likely to face the problem of manufacture diseconomies of scale. Farmers' production also has manufacture diseconomies of scale. In this paper, three poverty alleviation models, namely, "famers + smart supply chain platform", "farmers + wholesalers + smart supply chain platform" and "farmers +cooperatives+ smart supply chain platform", are established. Moreover, the supply chain decentralized decisions and the governmental subsidy strategies in different modes are compared. The results demonstrate that wisdom elasticity coefficient of smart supply chain platform can positively influence poor farmers, wholesalers and cooperatives. Under the direct cooperation between farmers and smart supply chain, with the increase of the intelligence cost elasticity coefficient, the profit of smart supply chain platform will decrease. However, the profit will first increase and then decrease after the entrance of cooperative. The overall profit of the supply chain will increase because of consumers' higher poverty alleviation preference. Although both farmers and platforms can get the highest profits in the cooperative mode of "famers + smart supply chain platform", their diseconomies of scale cannot be improved. The model can hardly be implemented in poor areas. In the cooperation model of "farmers+ wholesalers + smart supply chain platform", farmers can get higher profits than wholesalers and smart platforms. However, the overall supply chain profit decreases, and the problem of diseconomies of scale cannot be solved. In the model of "farmers + cooperatives + smart supply chain platform", cooperatives share the scale uneconomical cost with farmers, and the overall profit of supply chain is the optimal in a certain range. The government should continuously increase the subsidies for the construction and operation of the smart platform, and enhance the target incentives to maintain the benefit balance of all main parts of the supply chain. Also, it is necessary to help farmers improve their knowledge and technology level by encouraging the establishment of cooperatives, so that the independent cooperation with smart platforms can be realized.
Keywords:Smart supply chain  Poverty alleviation concern  Manufacture diseconomies of scale  Decision  Coordination  
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