双渠道零售商和传统零售商的定价策略

在单制造商和两个具有竞争行为零售商的供应链系统中,本文研究了双渠道零售商和传统零售商的定价决策问题。首先,在零售商间进行Stackelberg博弈假设前提下,分别针对双渠道零售商和传统零售商作为领导者的情况,构建了两种模式下的零售商定价决策模型,给出了零售商的最优定价策略;其次,分析了零售商在特定情形下的定价策略;最后,用数值算例分析了模型参数对最优结果的影响。通过对比研究和数值算例分析发现:对于零售商来说,作为Stackelberg的领导者时的总利润要比作为追随者时的总利润大;对于供应商而言,传统渠道的零售商做主导者时的总利润要比双渠道零售商做主导者时的总利润大。

Pricing Strategy for Dual Channel Retailer and Traditional Retailer

There is price competition between dual-channel retailers and traditional retailers. It is important to decide optiamal price for dual-channel retailers and traditional retailers. Under this background, the pricing decisions of a system with a manufacturer and two competitive retailers, one of the retailers only operates tradition channel and the other operates dual-channel are studied. Firstly, a Stackelberg structure is assumed between the two retailers, for two different modes that dual-channel retailer and traditional retailer act as a leader, two pricing decision models are constructed respectively, futhermore the optiaml price strategies are obtained. Secondly, the retailers' pricing strategies are analyzed under specific circumstances. Finally, numerical examples are provided to analyze the effect of the parameters on the optimal results. According to comparative analysis and numerical analysis, it is found that the total profit of a retailer who acts as a leader is larger than that who acts as a follower. The total profit of the supplier is larger when traditional channel retailer acts as a leader. When the mareket demand of traditional retaler is the same as the dual-channel retaliers' online and offline market demand, the optimal price of traditional retailers acts as a leader is larger than that who acts as a follower. The optimal wholesale prices of the supplier are equal. The conclusion of this study can help to reasonable decision on how to choose the supply chain mode and pricing strategy for manufacturing and retail enterprises.