Judging Unreasonable Litigation Behavior at the Interface of Mediation in the English Jurisdiction

Civil procedure rules (CPRs) in the English jurisdiction were introduced to restrain the adversarial and expensive litigation activities of the legal profession. Judges use case management to fix timetables for preaction meetings, disclosure, and trial dates. Under CPR both the judiciary and the parties have a duty to consider ADR alternatives such as mediation. Costs sanctions were implemented to keep in check unreasonable litigation practices and prevent the parties and their lawyers from creating delay and unwarranted expense. Evidence exists that construction parties are beginning to utilize mediation tactically both in the settlement phases activated by CPR and during the mediation process itself and some lawyers are reported to adopt an adversarial approach in mediation. This paper examines case law from the English jurisdiction on the application of the principle of “unreasonable behavior” in litigation to analyze how effective the specialist Technology and Construction Courts (TCCs) are in countermanding the strategic interplay of mediation within CPR and to determine the developing legal rules on mediation. Case law indicates that judges in the TCC are using costs sanctions to control abuse of the preaction protocols where there is a “substantial” lack of compliance but the Halsey criteria demonstrates an uncertainty in the application of the guidelines for delay and the timing of mediation, which can impact on the expense of litigation and may result in abuse or costs injustices. Further case analysis shows that negotiations in mediation are protected by the privileged status of “without prejudice statements” but unreasonable conduct in mediation will be examined by the court if both parties waive privilege or the abuse is such that it reaches the bar set for “unambiguous impropriety.” Further protection is provided through a developing principle of confidentiality but judges are likely to use their discretion in the “interests of justice,” for example, where there are allegations of economic duress. Neither unambiguous impropriety nor economic duress is likely to encompass uncooperative or adversarial approaches within the process or hard negotiations.