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最终控制人性质、两权分离度与机构投资者持股——兼论不同类型机构投资者的差异
引用本文:宋玉.最终控制人性质、两权分离度与机构投资者持股——兼论不同类型机构投资者的差异[J].南开管理评论,2009,12(5).
作者姓名:宋玉
作者单位:南京理工大学经济管理学院
基金项目:中国自然科学基金项目,中国博士后科学基金会课题,江苏省博士后科研资助计划项目,南京理工大学经济管理学院青年教师科研扶持基金课题 
摘    要:上市公司所有权与控制权的严重分离会影响其公司价值,进而会影响投资者的投资决策.本文以2004-2007年我国A股上市公司为研究样本,考察了上市公司两权分离状况对机构投资者总体和各类机构投资者持股决策的影响.研究发现,最终控制人所有权比例越高,两权分离度越小时,机构投资者(主要是证券投资基金)持股比例越高;而且两权分离度指标对机构投资者持股决策的影响在最终控制人为非国有性质的企业中表现更为明显.本文的研究结论表明.我国机构投资者总体上能够做到自我利益保护,在投资者保护方面发挥积极的作用,但是这种作用的发挥在各个类型机构投资者中存在显著差异.

关 键 词:最终控制人  所有权  控制权  机构投资者持股

Ultimate Owner Type, the Separation between Ownership and Control and Institutional Ownership: the Difference of Institutional Investors Types
Song Yu.Ultimate Owner Type, the Separation between Ownership and Control and Institutional Ownership: the Difference of Institutional Investors Types[J].Nankai Business Review,2009,12(5).
Authors:Song Yu
Abstract:Some researchers have argued, in large corporations of most countries, the fundamental agency problem is not the Berle and Means conflict between outside investors and managers, but rather that between outside investors and controlling shareholders who have nearly full control over the managers. Except in economies with very good shareholder protection, the controlling shareholders typically have power over firms significantly in excess of their flow rights, primarily through the use of pyramids and participation in management. If effective protection for the interests of minority shareholders is lacking, the separation between ownership and control will give controlling shareholders a great incentive to occupy for their private benefit. The significant separation between ownership and control will have an effect on companies' value, which may have an effect on investors' decisions. This paper empirically investigates the separation between ownership and control for listed companies in China and it's an effect on institutional ownership. It is found that high level of cash-flow rights and small separation between ownership and control has a positive effect on institutional ownership; mainly refer to security investment funds. State ownership mitigates this relation. Broker and QFII don't focus on companies' fundamental information and corporate governance, and their behavior isn't scientific and is short-sighted, even has speculation element. These results prove that the role and type of institutional investors is increasing with the development of capital market in transitional economy in China. Institutional investors have become the important force in the process of stock market construction and improvement of corporate governance, but the security investment funds play the most important role. The institutional investors play a positive role in investor protection as a whole, but there has a significant difference among different type of institutional investors.
Keywords:Ultimate Owner  Ownership Rights  Control Rights  Institutional Ownership
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