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两人进化博弈策略的决定机制与应用研究
引用本文:潘峰,王琳.两人进化博弈策略的决定机制与应用研究[J].运筹与管理,2018,27(5):22-30.
作者姓名:潘峰  王琳
作者单位:1.大连海事大学 公共管理与人文学院,辽宁 大连 116026;2.大连大学 经济管理学院,辽宁 大连 116622
基金项目:中央高校基本科研业务费专项资金资助(3132017037,3132018268);辽宁省教育科学“十三五”规划立项课题(JG17DB060);大连大学博士启动专项基金(2017QL014);辽宁省博士科研启动基金(20170520205);辽宁省社科规划基金项目CL17(GL011,L17CGL015)
摘    要:通过建立一般情况下的两人进化博弈模型,给出了系统均衡点对应的矩阵行列式和迹表达式的经济含义,分析了16种典型情形下的进化稳定策略,详细讨论了均衡点稳定性分析结果所对应的博弈双方决策过程,从策略权衡的视角揭示了策略选择的内在机制。研究结果表明:不同策略前提下的相对净支付决定了系统的进化稳定策略,对方的策略选择以及自身可选策略的支付比较是影响博弈主体策略选择的两个基本要素,博弈主体会趋向于选择在对方策略既定下能够带来更大支付的策略。最后以环境治理中地方政府与企业以及地方政府之间的博弈关系为例,从对称博弈和非对称博弈两方面阐明了本文所构建模型在政策设计中的应用价值:针对不同案例,只要明确了两人博弈的支付矩阵,就可以通过计算相对净支付确定博弈双方的行为演化规律和稳定策略,从而简化计算过程,更加直接和更为便捷地为政策设计提供理论参考。

关 键 词:进化博弈  进化稳定策略  策略选择  相对净支付  
收稿时间:2017-09-16

Research on Determination Mechanism of Two-Person Evolutionary Game Strategy
PAN Feng,WANG Lin.Research on Determination Mechanism of Two-Person Evolutionary Game Strategy[J].Operations Research and Management Science,2018,27(5):22-30.
Authors:PAN Feng  WANG Lin
Affiliation:1.School of Public Administration and Humanities, Dalian Maritime University, Dalian 116026, China;2.School of Economics and Management, Dalian University, Dalian 116622, China
Abstract:A two-person evolutionary game model is established in the condition of bounded rationality. Based on the implication of equilibrium point determinant and trace, the evolutionarily stable strategy under 16 situations is analyzed, the decision process from stability analysis of equilibrium point is discussed, and the mechanism of strategy selection is revealed from the strategy comparing perspective. The results show that the evolutionarily stable strategy of game system is determined by the relative net payoff under different strategies. The basic influencing factors of one’s decision include adverse strategy choice and his payoff comparing of strategy. The game participant tends to choose the greater payoff strategy in the condition of adverse strategy fixed. Finally, we take the game between local governments and between local government and enterprise in pollution treatment for example. The application value in policy design of model is illustrated. For different cases, as long as the payoff matrix of the two person game is cleared, the behavior evolution rule and stable strategy will be determined by calculating relative net pay, so as to simplify the calculation process, and provide theoretical reference for policy design more directly and more easily.
Keywords:evolutionary game  evolutionarily stable strategy  strategy selection  relative net payoff  
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