竣工验收阶段寻租博弈分析

通过对寻租的成本-收益分析和政府官员寻租的理性分析,建立了竣工验收环节集体腐败的博弈模型。由博弈结果可知:腐败的收入大于被查处受罚的损失时,决策者才会实施腐败行为,而合伙人从合伙腐败中获得的“分红”大于被查处受到惩罚的损失,合伙人才会参与腐败。由监督寻租的博弈模型可知:监督机构实施监督的概率越大,寻租的可能性就越小,而惩罚力度足够大时,行为的预期收益会小于预期成本出现得不偿失,寻租的概率也会越小。由此可知:减少工程质量事故的有力措施就是事前监督机制和事后惩罚机制,这些具有威慑力的机制会影响建设主体的行为选择。只要建筑市场拥有健全的监督机制和足够的惩罚机制,工程质量形成过程中建设主体的投机行为将会得到有效抑制。

Game Analysis of Rent-seeking in Tests on Completion

The group corrupt game model in tests on completion was established based on the cost-effectiveness analysis and government official rational analysis.The results show that when the corrupt income exceeds the penalty,the leader and the partner will participate the group corruption.According to another game model it can be seen that the possibility of rent-seeking is lower with supervision increasing frequently,or if the punishment is enough,the loss will be more than the gain when the expect cost exceed the expect profit,it can also lower the possibility of rent-seeking.That proves supervision mechanism and punishment mechanism are the efficient measure which can reduce the work damage and influence the choice of construction bodies.When the supervision mechanism and punishment mechanism are strengthening in construction market,the construction bodies' opportunistic action will be controlled in construction stage.