基于博弈论的专车与出租车协同定价机制

为了平衡专车与出租车之间的竞争关系,促使二者通过协同定价稳定客流比例,以斯坦科尔伯格模型和动态博弈理论为基础,通过建立乘客出行效用竞争模型,确定了2种出行方式的分担率;并采用双层规划博弈模型,结合专车和出租车的运营利润和乘客总体效用等参数分别建立二者的定价优化模型;采用灵敏度分析的方法求解协同定价多层规划模型,得到专车和出租车协同定价的最优解.最后以天津市为例,通过出租车和专车发展情况及对乘客进行意向偏好(stated preference,SP)调查,将实际数据代入模型计算,分别得到使客流比例较为稳定时的出租车和专车可接受的定价区间及分担比例,从而避免了专车与出租车之间的恶性竞争,促进二者的协调发展,使二者互相补充,为用户提供更加多元化的出行方式.

Car-on-demand and Taxi Cooperative Pricing Mechanism Based on Game Theory

To balance the competitive relationship between the taxi and car-on-demand, a collaborative pricing mechanism of the two was developed. The sharing proportion of the two modes was determined by establishing the passenger competition utility model based on the Stackelberg model and dynamic game theory. And with a bi-level programming game model, parameters such as operating profit and user utility were used to establish the optimized pricing model of taxi and car-on-demand. Then the optimal solution of the multi-level programming model was obtained by using the sensitivity analysis method. Finally, taking Tianjin as an example, passenger' s SP was investigated combined with the development status of taxi and car-on-demand. The acceptable pricing range and sharing proportion of the two modes were obtained by putting the actual data into the model when the passenger ratio was relatively stable. The research provides reference for avoiding the vicious competition between the taxi and the car-on-demand, and for promoting the coordinated development of the two, so that the two complement each other to provide users with more diversified way of travel.