当量电价自动抑制厂商不良持留行为的自律新机制

持留发电容量(囤积居奇)获利是发电厂商行使市场力的最常用手段,由于极具隐蔽性,其危害也最大.在统一出清和两部制电价下,发电厂商从自身利益出发会采取持留容量策略;在PAB电价下,发电厂商可先持留容量造成供应紧张,然后通过报高价获利.在上述传统定价机制下,只能采用外置的补救性措施来抑制市场力,无法从根本上解决问题.实用当量电价为抑制市场力提供了全新的机制,使抑制市场力措施在定价机制中内部自律化.作者首次分析了实用当量电价下,发电厂商拥有多个发电单元的持留容量行为(发电厂商勾结的情况与此类似);结果表明,即使在这种情况下发电厂商仍没有持留容量的利益驱动,体现了当量电价抑制市场力的内在自律新机制.

ELECTRICITY VALUE EQUIVALENT PRICING METHOD'S INTERNAL AUTONOMY MECHANISM TO RESTRAIN MARKET POWER

Generation capacity withholding is the mostusual approach for a power supplier to exercise his marketpower. It is more dangerous to the market because it is hiddenfrom view of the market regulation. Under either uniformclearing or two-part tariffs pricing methods, suppliers oftenwithhold generation capacity to maximize their profits. UnderPAB (pay as bid) pricing method, power suppliers withholdgeneration capacity to result in power shortage in the market,and then make profits by bidding high price. So the exteriorremedial methods have always to be used in the market torestrain power suppliers' market power under those traditionalpricing methods. However, all these exterior mitigationmethods cannot solve the problem thoroughly. Electricity ValueEquivalellt (EVE) pricing method is proved to present aninternal autonomy mechanism to restrain market power. In thispaper the action of capacity withholding by the power supplierwith several units is analyzed, which is similar to the collusionof power suppliers. It is proved that there is no incentive forpower suppliers to withhold capacity, implying that EVEpricing method has internal autonomy mechanism to restrainmarket power.