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Implementing coordination contracts in a manufacturer Stackelberg dual-channel supply chain |
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| Authors: | Jing Chen Hui ZhangYing Sun |
| Affiliation: | a Faculty of Business and Economics, University of Winnipeg, 515 Portage Avenue, Canada R3B 2E9 b Faculty of Business Administration, Lakehead University, Canada P7B 5E1 c School of Economics and Management, University of Science and Technology, Beijing, China |
| Abstract: | We examine a manufacturer's pricing strategies in a dual-channel supply chain, in which the manufacturer is a Stackelberg leader and the retailer is a follower. We show the conditions under which the manufacturer and the retailer both prefer a dual-channel supply chain. We examine the coordination schemes for a dual-channel supply chain and find that a manufacturer's contract with a wholesale price and a price for the direct channel can coordinate the dual-channel supply channel, benefiting the retailer but not the manufacturer. We illustrate how such a contract with a complementary agreement, such as a two-part tariff or a profit-sharing agreement, can coordinate the dual-channel supply chain and enable both the manufacturer and the retailer to be a win-win. |
| Keywords: | Dual-channel Stackelberg game Supply chain coordination Channel competition Supply chain contract |
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