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基于演化博弈的危化品安全监管情景推演研究
引用本文:王循庆1,李勇建2,孙晓羽1. 基于演化博弈的危化品安全监管情景推演研究[J]. 中国安全生产科学技术, 2017, 13(1): 115-121. DOI: 10.11731/j.issn.1673-193x.2017.01.019
作者姓名:王循庆1  李勇建2  孙晓羽1
作者单位:1.山东工商学院 公共管理学院,山东 烟台 264005; 2.南开大学 商学院,天津 300071
摘    要:针对危化品安全生产监管问题,基于演化博弈理论构建危化品安全监管演化博弈模型,并将危化品事故发生率引入模型,对比分析危化品企业与地方政府监管部门行为策略的演化稳定均衡。在此基础上进行情景推演模拟仿真,研究表明:危化品事故发生率,对危化品企业和地方政府监管部门的策略选择有显著影响,当危化品事故发生概率低于某一临界值时,危化品企业和监管部门都会疏忽安全投入和监管;地方政府承受危化品事故经济损失和信誉损失增大时,危化品安全监管系统演化呈现出周期性波动;引入上级政府惩罚机制情景下,当上级政府惩罚力度高于危化品企业未投入安全生产受到的处罚和地方政府安全监管成本时,其最终都选择安全投入和严格监管策略。研究结论为政府监管危化品安全生产提供新的思路和对策建议。

关 键 词:危险化学品  演化博弈  情景推演  演化稳定策略  稳定性

Study on scenario inference of hazardous chemicals safety supervision based on evolutionary game
WANG Xunqing1,LI Yongjian2,SUN Xiaoyu1. Study on scenario inference of hazardous chemicals safety supervision based on evolutionary game[J]. Journal of Safety Science and Technology, 2017, 13(1): 115-121. DOI: 10.11731/j.issn.1673-193x.2017.01.019
Authors:WANG Xunqing1  LI Yongjian2  SUN Xiaoyu1
Affiliation:1. School of Public Administration, Shandong Technology and Business University, Yantai Shandong 264005, China; 2.Business School, Nankai University, Tianjin 300071, China
Abstract:Aiming at the problems in work safety supervision of hazardous chemicals, an evolutionary game model of hazardous chemicals safety supervision was established based on the evolutionary game theory. The accident rate of hazardous chemicals was introduced into the model, and the evolutionary stable equilibrium about the behavior strategies of hazardous chemical enterprises and local government supervision department was compared and analyzed. On this basis, the scenario inference simulation was carried out. The results showed that the accident rate of hazardous chemicals has significant influence on the strategy selection of hazardous chemical enterprises and local government supervision department. When the accident rate of hazardous chemicals is lower than a certain critical value, the hazardous chemical enterprises and local government supervision department will ignore the safety investment and the supervision. When the suffered economic loss and reputation loss of local government by hazardous chemical accidents increase, the evolution of hazardous chemicals safety supervision system presents a cyclical fluctuation. Under the scenario with introducing into the punishment mechanism of government at a higher level, when the punishment intensity of government at a higher level is greater than the safety penalties of chemical enterprises without putting into the safety investment and the safety supervision costs of local government, they will ultimately choose safety investment and severe supervision strategies. It provides new ideas and countermeasures for the work safety supervision on hazardous chemicals of government.
Keywords:hazardous chemicals  evolutionary game  scenario inference  evolution stable strategy  stability
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