| 基于随机演化博弈的企业研发操纵多重监管路径研究 |
| |
| 引用本文： | 李军强,任浩,甄杰. 基于随机演化博弈的企业研发操纵多重监管路径研究[J]. 中国管理科学, 2021, 29(10): 191-201. DOI: 10.16381/j.cnki.issn1003-207x.2019.1884 |
| |
| 作者姓名： | 李军强 任浩 甄杰 |
| |
| 作者单位： | 1.同济大学经济与管理学院，上海200092； 2.华东政法大学商学院，上海201620 |
| |
| 基金项目： | 国家自然科学基金资助项目(71272048)；国家社会科学基金资助项目(17BGL099)；上海市社科规划资助项目(2015JG009-BGL307) |
| |
| 摘 要： | 围绕高新技术企业申报中存在的研发操纵现象，构建了地方政府、申报企业和中介机构的三方随机演化博弈模型，借鉴It随机微分方程理论分析了博弈主体行为稳定性的条件，并运用计算机仿真，分析了各关键变量对博弈主体策略选择的方向性及程度性影响。研究表明，不同变量对主体策略选择的影响存在差异性，从影响主体策略选择的变化程度、改变主体策略选择的收敛速度、主体策略选择变化更具稳定性三种不同的监管路径出发，给出了相关变量调整的优先级及调控方向，为上级主管部门对研发操纵行为进行有效监管提供思路借鉴。
|
| 关 键 词： | 研发操纵 随机环境 多方博弈 有效监管 |
| 收稿时间： | 2019-11-19 |
| 修稿时间： | 2020-04-24 |
Stochastic Evolutionary Game Analysis of Multiple Supervision Paths of Enterprise R&D Manipulation |
| |
| LI Junqiang,REN Hao,ZHEN Jie. Stochastic Evolutionary Game Analysis of Multiple Supervision Paths of Enterprise R&D Manipulation[J]. Chinese Journal of Management Science, 2021, 29(10): 191-201. DOI: 10.16381/j.cnki.issn1003-207x.2019.1884 |
| |
| Authors: | LI Junqiang REN Hao ZHEN Jie |
| |
| Affiliation: | 1.School of Economics and Management, Tongji University,Shanghai 200092, China;2. Business School, East China University of Political Science and law, Shanghai 201620, China |
| |
| Abstract: | Based on the R&D manipulation phenomenon existing in the high-tech enterprise declaration, a three-party stochastic evolutionary game model of local government, applicant enterprise and intermediary institution is constructed. Stochastic differential equation theory is considered in the replicator dynamics equation of classical evolutionary game in order to simulate the external random interference between multi-players. The boundary conditions of the stable solution of the equation are solved. Variable effects on cooperation strategy of three parties including the influence of direction and degree is given through MATLAB simulation. |
| |
| Keywords: | R&D manipulation random environment multi-party game effective regulation |
|
| 点击此处可从《中国管理科学》浏览原始摘要信息 |
|
点击此处可从《中国管理科学》下载全文 |
