混合碳政策下两产品供应链的协同研究

本文在碳税-碳交易并行的混合碳政策下，面对存在低碳偏好的市场，以单一制造商和零售商组成的二级供应链为研究对像，考虑其生产和销售存在一定竞争关系或替代关系的两种不同产品时，供应链企业的最优定价和减排决策，并改进收益共享契约，提出通过构造同解方程进行契约设计的新思路。研究发现，制造商和零售商采用改进的收益共享契约可以使得自身利益实现帕累托改进，并确保供应链的整体利润达到帕累托最优，而契约中的收益共享金额主要取决于双方的溢价能力和其在供应链中的地位，只要它在特定范围内波动，供应链就可以实现协同。最后，利用数值例子验证了上述结论。

Research on Coordination of Supply Chain with Two Products Based on Mix Carbon Policy

The emergence of the mixed carbon policy of both carbon tax and cap-and-tradehas made supply chain enterprises pay more attention to investment in emission reduction technologies and implement low-carbon production. Additionally,in the face of increasingly diversified and personalized market demand, increasing numbers of enterprises have acquired competitive advantages by adopting product diversification strategies. These diverse products are often not independent, but have a certain substitution or complementary relationship with other products. This causes the sales volume of a product to be affected not only by its own price and level of carbon emission reduction, but also by the price of its substitutes or complements. Based on the above background, this paper studies a make-to-order supply chain consisting of a single manufacture and a single retailer. In this supply chain, there are two different products with a certain substitution or complementary relationship. First, the optimal operational decisions of themanufacturer andthe retailer under decentralized and centralized decision-making are calculated and the optimal profits of the supply chain under different scenarios are compared. It can be concluded that the optimal profit of the supply chain in the centralized decision-making scenario is significantly higher than that in the decentralized decision-making scenario. Then, a revenue-sharing contract is improved. This paper comes up with new design with constructing equivalent equations. It is found that the profits of the manufacturer and the retailer can achieve Pareto improvement, and the profit of the supply chain can reach Pareto optimality. Under the revenue-sharing contract, the specific amount of the benefit distribution depends on the bargaining power of both parties and their status in the supply chain. However, as long as profit sharing fluctuates within the specified range, the supply chain can achieve coordination. Finally, numerical examples are provided to verify the above conclusions.