| 风险投资声誉激励机制下的相对业绩比较 |
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| 引用本文： | 艾耕云,徐晋,余祎.风险投资声誉激励机制下的相对业绩比较[J].上海交通大学学报,2007,41(7):1134-1137. |
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| 作者姓名： | 艾耕云 徐晋 余祎 |
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| 作者单位： | 1. 上海交通大学,安泰经济与管理学院,上海,200052
2. 浙江工业大学,化学工程与材料学院,杭州,310014 |
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| 摘 要： | 为了研究声誉激励机制下的相对业绩比较(RPE)对风险企业家行为的影响,改进了风险企业产出函数,并构造博弈模型,分别对存在与不存在相对业绩比较两种情形展开讨论,给出了相对业绩比较促使风险企业家的努力程度得到帕累托改进的基本条件.研究表明,声誉激励机制下,相对业绩比较有利于解决风险投资家与风险企业家之间的信息不对称问题,对完善投资契约具有积极的指导作用.
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| 关 键 词： | 风险投资 声誉激励 相对业绩比较 |
| 文章编号： | 1006-2467（2007）07-1134-04 |
| 修稿时间： | 2006-08-10 |
The Reputation Incentive Mechanism of Venture Capital Investment under Relative Performance Evaluation |
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| AI Geng-yun,XU Jin,YU Yi.The Reputation Incentive Mechanism of Venture Capital Investment under Relative Performance Evaluation[J].Journal of Shanghai Jiaotong University,2007,41(7):1134-1137. |
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| Authors: | AI Geng-yun XU Jin YU Yi |
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| Abstract: | In order to study the effect of relative performance evaluation on behavior of venture entrepreneur under reputation incentive mechanism of venture capital investment,the product function of venture firms was improved,and dynamic game models were constructed.By discussing the static and dynamic relative performance evaluation of venture entrepreneurs,the Pareto postulate of effort improving was given.The analysis shows that under reputation incentive mechanism,relative performance evaluation could(supervise) the problem solving of asymmetric information and contract implementation between venture(capitalists) and venture entrepreneurs. |
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| Keywords: | venture capital reputation incentive relative performance evaluation |
| 本文献已被 CNKI 维普 万方数据 等数据库收录！ |
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