| 论股东和经营者的冲突与协调 |
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| 引用本文： | 张春颖,黄晓红,于春莉. 论股东和经营者的冲突与协调[J]. 长春大学学报, 2012, 0(7): 787-789,805 |
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| 作者姓名： | 张春颖 黄晓红 于春莉 |
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| 作者单位： | 长春大学管理学院;中国建设银行吉林省分行财务会计部 |
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| 基金项目： | 吉林省教育厅项目(吉教科文合字[2011]第197号) |
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| 摘 要： | 目前在公司制企业中代理问题已经成为一项难题。在所有代理问题中,股东和经营者之间的代理问题最为严重。文章分析了股东和经营者之间代理问题产生的理论根源及其表现,提出了监督和激励等防止经营者背离股东目标行为的具体措施。
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| 关 键 词： | 股东 经营者 代理问题 道德风险 逆向选择 监督 激励 |
On the Conflicts and Coordination between Shareholders and Managers |
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| ZHANG Chun-ying,HUANG Xiao-hong,YU Chun-li. On the Conflicts and Coordination between Shareholders and Managers[J]. Journal of Changchun University, 2012, 0(7): 787-789,805 |
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| Authors: | ZHANG Chun-ying HUANG Xiao-hong YU Chun-li |
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| Affiliation: | 1.Management College,Changchun University,Changchun 130022,China; 2.Department of Financial Accounting,Jilin Branch of China Courstruction Bank,Changchun 130061,China) |
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| Abstract: | Currently,agency problem has become a difficult issue in company system enterprises,in which the most serious is the agency problem between shareholders and managers.This paper analyzes the theory roots and appearance features,and puts forward some effective measures for supervision and motivation to prevent managers depart from shareholders’ target. |
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| Keywords: | shareholder manager agent problem moral risk adverse selection supervision motivation |
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