| 讨价还价过程与供应链的利润最大化均衡 |
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| 引用本文： | 杜义飞,李仕明,林光平.讨价还价过程与供应链的利润最大化均衡[J].中国管理科学,2006,14(1):37-42. |
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| 作者姓名： | 杜义飞 李仕明 林光平 |
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| 作者单位： | 电子科技大学管理学院, 成都, 610054 |
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| 摘 要： | 是否存在一组贴现因子使得轮流出价的讨价还价的完美子博弈均衡刚好实现供应链总体利润最大?本文研究表明当博弈双方的贴现率都趋近于1,各企业利润之和将收敛于供应链的总体利润最大化均衡.接着,证明了当双方的贴现率严格地小于1时,供应链的总体利润不可能达到利润最大化均衡.最后,通过具体的算例来说明所得到的结论.
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| 关 键 词： | 供应链 讨价还价 利润最大化均衡 |
| 文章编号： | 1003-207(2006)01-0037-06 |
| 收稿时间： | 2005-04-25; |
| 修稿时间： | 2005年4月25日 |
Bargaining Process and Equilibrium of Profit-Maximizing for Supply Chain |
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| DU Yi-fei,LI Shi-ming,LIN Guang-ping.Bargaining Process and Equilibrium of Profit-Maximizing for Supply Chain[J].Chinese Journal of Management Science,2006,14(1):37-42. |
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| Authors: | DU Yi-fei LI Shi-ming LIN Guang-ping |
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| Affiliation: | School of Management, University of Electronic Science and Technology of China, Chengdu, 610054, China |
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| Abstract: | Are there a set of discount rates making it possible that the sub-game-perfect equilibrium of alternating-offer bargaining just meet profit-maximizing of supply chain? In this paper,it is indicated that the sum for each firm's profit converges to equilibrium of profit-maximizing for supply chain as the discount rates of both game sides approach 1.Then,we prove that it is impossible to reach profit-maximizing of supply chain when the discount rates of both game sides are strictly less than 1.Finally,we explain our conclusion by an example. |
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| Keywords: | supply chain bargaining equilibrium of profit-maximizing |
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