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城市应急管理的委托-代理博弈
引用本文:沈怡,王新颖,陈海群. 城市应急管理的委托-代理博弈[J]. 江苏石油化工学院学报, 2011, 0(2): 63-66
作者姓名:沈怡  王新颖  陈海群
作者单位:常州大学环境与安全工程学院,江苏常州213164
摘    要:随着社会的发展,城市发生突发公共事件的概率上升,完善应急管理系统的紧迫性越来越突出。通过制定合适的激励机制,建立城市应急管理的委托-代理博弈模型,将政府与社会团体及人群的应急管理工作量化,通过理论计算,得出效用期望集,政府根据期望集优化应急管理。博弈模型的应用不仅提高了政府的应急管理能力,还增加了社会团体及人群的工作积极性,实现了全民参与型的应急管理系统的建设。

关 键 词:应急管理  委托-代理  激励  博弈模型

Principal-Agency Game in City Emergency Management
SHEN Yi,WANG Xin-ying,CHEN Hai-qun. Principal-Agency Game in City Emergency Management[J]. Journal of Jiangsu Institute of Petrochemical Technology, 2011, 0(2): 63-66
Authors:SHEN Yi  WANG Xin-ying  CHEN Hai-qun
Affiliation:(School of Environmental and Safety Engineering,Changzhou University,Changzhou 213164,China)
Abstract:With the social development,the probability of emergency occurrence in city would increase,which would make the perfection of emergency management system more and more important.Through constituting incentive mechanism,building city emergency management system principal-agency game model,and quantifying the emergency management work of government,social groups and crowds,utility expectation set was obtained by theoretical calculation and was used to optimize the city emergency management.The application of Game model not only improved the ability of the emergency management,but also increased the work enthusiasm of social groups and crowds,which implemented the construction of public participation in the emergency management system.
Keywords:emergency management  principal-agency  incentive  game model
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