首页 | 官方网站   微博 | 高级检索  
     

考虑横向公平的双渠道销售闭环供应链定价策略与协调研究
引用本文:王垒,曲晶,刘新民. 考虑横向公平的双渠道销售闭环供应链定价策略与协调研究[J]. 工业工程, 2018, 21(3): 21-31. DOI: 10.3969/j.issn.1007-7375.2018.03.003
作者姓名:王垒  曲晶  刘新民
作者单位:山东科技大学 经济管理学院, 山东 青岛 266590
基金项目:国家自然科学基金面上资助项目(71371111);山东科技大学科研创新团队资助项目(2015TDJH103);山东科技大学人才引进科研启动基金资助项目(2017RCJJ1019)
摘    要:考虑双渠道零售商和制造商组成的闭环供应链,分别构建了制造商直接回收、委托第三方回收模式下的动态博弈模型,以公平中性时的均衡策略为参照,对比分析了线下零售商的横向公平偏好对双渠道闭环供应链中各决策主体定价策略及利润的影响。研究表明,无论零售商是否存在横向公平关切行为,制造商直接回收模式都优于委托第三方回收。在直接回收模式下,线下零售商的横向公平偏好使得在正向供应链中的两零售商为提高市场占有率会竞相降低零售价格,制造商为鼓励竞争会降低批发价,并且价格均与横向公平关切系数负相关。在逆向供应链中,制造商会提高废旧产品的回收率;相比公平中性的情况,此定价策略使制造商和整个供应链系统效用增加,而两零售商收益递减。制造商作为渠道管理者为鼓励零售商之间竞相降价,可通过一个三方收益共享的契约实现协调,达到帕累托最优。

关 键 词:闭环供应链  双渠道  横向公平  契约协调  定价策略  
收稿时间:2017-11-20

Pricing Strategy and Coordination of Closed-loop Supply Chain Considering Horizontal Fairness under Dual Channel Sales
WANG Lei,QU Jing,LIU Xinmin. Pricing Strategy and Coordination of Closed-loop Supply Chain Considering Horizontal Fairness under Dual Channel Sales[J]. Industrial Engineering Journal, 2018, 21(3): 21-31. DOI: 10.3969/j.issn.1007-7375.2018.03.003
Authors:WANG Lei  QU Jing  LIU Xinmin
Affiliation:School of Economics and Management, Shandong University of Science and Technology, Qingdao 266590, China
Abstract:Considering the closed-loop supply chain composed of dual-channel retailers and manufacturers, the dynamic game models under the direct recovery mode of the manufacturer and the model of the third party recycling are established. Based on the fair and neutral balanced strategy, the influence of the horizontal fair preference of the offline retailer on the pricing strategies and the profit of the decision-making entities in the double-channel closed-loop supply chain are analyzed. The study shows that regardless of whether the retailer has horizontal fair concerns, the direct recovery model of the manufacturer is better than that of the third party. In the direct recycling model, the horizontal fairness preference of offline retailer makes two retailers in the forward supply chain compete to reduce their retail prices in order to increase their market share, manufacturers encourage competition to reduce the wholesale price, and prices are negatively correlated with the horizontal fair concern coefficient. While in the reverse supply chain, the manufacturer will improve the recovery rate of waste products. Compared with the fair and neutral situation, this pricing strategy increases the utility of the manufacturer and the entire supply chain system, while the two retailers are the opposite. The manufacturer, as a channel manager, can encourage retailers to compete in price reduction through tripartite revenue sharing contract to achieve the Pareto Optimally.
Keywords:closed-loop supply chain  double channel  horizontal fairness  contract coordination  pricing strategy  
本文献已被 CNKI 等数据库收录!
点击此处可从《工业工程》浏览原始摘要信息
点击此处可从《工业工程》下载全文
设为首页 | 免责声明 | 关于勤云 | 加入收藏

Copyright©北京勤云科技发展有限公司    京ICP备09084417号-23

京公网安备 11010802026262号