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期货经纪公司的最优激励契约模型决策
引用本文:刘惠萍,张世英. 期货经纪公司的最优激励契约模型决策[J]. 工业工程, 2005, 8(3): 47-50
作者姓名:刘惠萍  张世英
作者单位:天津大学,管理学院,天津,300072;天津大学,管理学院,天津,300072
基金项目:国家自然科学基金(69874028)
摘    要:基于委托代理理论,建立了一个激励契约模型,解释了我国期货经纪公司传统的激励机制,并基于长期效用函数建立了一个新的激励契约模型。通过比较,指出现实中所用传统激励契约的不足,建议制定激励契约时既要考虑交易成交量又要考虑客户成长率。

关 键 词:最优激励契约  期货交易成交量  客户成长率  期货经纪公司  长期效用最大化
文章编号:1007-7375(2005)03-0047-04
修稿时间:2004-02-25

Models of Optimal Contract for Motivation for Futures Brokerage Companies
LIU Hui-ping,ZHANG Shi-ying. Models of Optimal Contract for Motivation for Futures Brokerage Companies[J]. Industrial Engineering Journal, 2005, 8(3): 47-50
Authors:LIU Hui-ping  ZHANG Shi-ying
Abstract:Principal-agent theory is employed to establish a model of contract for motivation to discuss traditional motivation mechanism of futures brokerage companies in China. A new model of contract for motivation is set up based on long-term utility function. This paper analyzes disadvantages of traditional contract for motivation. It is concluded that both quantity of futures dealings and growth rate of clients should be taken into consideration when futures brokerage companies drow up contracts for motivation.
Keywords:optimal contract for motivation  quantity of futures dealings  growth rate of clients  futures brokerage companies  maximum long-term utility
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