| 非对称信息条件下建筑企业市场声誉博弈分析 |
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| 引用本文： | 王学通.非对称信息条件下建筑企业市场声誉博弈分析[J].广州大学学报(自然科学版),2006,5(4):78-82. |
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| 作者姓名： | 王学通 |
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| 作者单位： | 广州大学,经济与管理学院,广东,广州,510006 |
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| 摘 要： | 分析了不对称信息条件下建筑企业市场声誉与监管间的关系,建立了中国建筑企业的市场声誉博弈模型,指出不完全信息下建筑企业市场声誉机制可以减少建筑企业的违规动机.文章提出设置建筑企业声誉登记制度、改进监管人员激励约束机制提高监管水平以及加大企业声誉成本,建立严格的惩罚机制等措施以进一步规范建筑市场.
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| 关 键 词： | 建筑市场 非对称信息 声誉 博弈 |
| 文章编号： | 1671-4229(2006)04-0078-05 |
| 收稿时间： | 2006-01-10 |
| 修稿时间： | 2006年1月10日 |
Game analysis for construction enterprise reputation under restriction of asymmetric information |
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| WANG Xue-tong.Game analysis for construction enterprise reputation under restriction of asymmetric information[J].Journal og Guangzhou University:Natural Science Edition,2006,5(4):78-82. |
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| Authors: | WANG Xue-tong |
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| Abstract: | The relation is analyzed in this paper between the construction enterprise reputation and the supervision under the condition of asymmetric information.A reputation game model is setup for the Chinese construction enterprise.The study shows that in China,the reputation system for the construction enterprise can reduce the motivation of regulations contravention in despite of the asymmetric information.Besides,construction market order will be standardized by setting up reputation recording system for construction enterprise,improving the inspiring and compatible institutional arrangement for regulating mechanism,establishing the rigid punishment mechanism to increase the cost of reputation maintenance. |
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| Keywords: | construction market asymmetric information reputation game theory |
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