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农户与农村合作组织在农业投资中的博弈分析
引用本文:刘慧,尹海东. 农户与农村合作组织在农业投资中的博弈分析[J]. 农机化研究, 2010, 32(4)
作者姓名:刘慧  尹海东
作者单位:东北农业大学,理学院,哈尔滨,150030
摘    要:针对我国农业投资不足的现状,建立两阶段动态博弈模型,并就农村合作组织在农业投资中发挥的作用展开分析。模型分析结果表明:在农村合作组织和农户都是理性的前提下,各农户的投资份额与其资本产出弹性系数和劳动力产出弹性系数成反比;最佳资本投入量与其资本产出弹性系数成正比,与资本价格成反比。通过对模型结果分析可知,农村合作组织的存在,使得各农户在保证了农业投资总量的前提下,实现了农业剩余最大。因此,农村合作组织对于农业投资中投资份额的比例分配具有重要的意义。

关 键 词:农村合作组织  农业投资  动态博弈  

Rural Cooperative Organization and Peasants in Agricultural Investment in Game Theory
Liu Hui,Yin Haidong. Rural Cooperative Organization and Peasants in Agricultural Investment in Game Theory[J]. Journal of Agricultural Mechanization Research, 2010, 32(4)
Authors:Liu Hui  Yin Haidong
Affiliation:Science College of Northeast Agricultural University/a>;Harbin 150030/a>;China
Abstract:In this paper, we build the game playing model with two phases dynamic in allusion to the status of China agricultural investment lack, and analyze the effect that the cooperative organization exerts in the agricultural investment. The results of the model show: the investment lot of every farmer is inverse proportion to the spring coefficients of their principal output and labor force output in the preconditions of the cooperative organization and farmers logos. The best principal input quantity is direct ...
Keywords:rural cooperative organization  agricultural investment  dynamic game  
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