产品服务化供应链信息共享激励的博弈分析

产品服务化供应链信息共享能够减少企业之间的信息不对称所造成的不良影响。但是，企业参与供应链信息共享是需要付出成本的，可能会出现收益和投入不成比例的情况，造成部分企业不愿意参与供应链信息共享，这就需要建立一种激励机制来促使企业主动参与供应链信息共享。分析了产品服务化供应链信息不共享的原因，建立了产品服务集成商主导的产品服务化供应链两级合作的信息共享激励的博弈模型，并作均衡分析。然后，给出一些产品服务化供应链信息共享的激励策略。最后，通过实例说明了该模型的可行性。

Game Analysis about Incentive of Information Sharing in Product Servitization Supply Chain

Information sharing in product servitization supply chain can reduce the adverse effects caused by asymmetric information among enterprises.However, the enterprises involved in the supply chain information sharing needed to pay the cost.The revenue and investment might be disproportionate to the situation,which resulted in that some enterprises would not willing to participate in the information sharing in the supply chain,which required the establishment of an incentive mechanism to encourage the enterprises to actively participate in the supply chain information sharing.The cause of information's no-sharing in product servitization supply chain was analyzed.The information sharing incentive game model was established,which was two-stage cooperation of product servitization supply chain led by product service integrator, and the equilibrium was analyzed.Then,some incentive countermeasures were given to share information in product servitization supply chain.Finally,the specific case was given out to illustrate the feasibility of the model.