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煤炭企业安全生产监管效能的博弈分析
引用本文:周敏,肖忠海.煤炭企业安全生产监管效能的博弈分析[J].中国矿业大学学报,2006,35(1):54-60.
作者姓名:周敏  肖忠海
作者单位:中国矿业大学,管理学院,江苏,徐州,221008
基金项目:高等学校博士学科点专项科研项目
摘    要:针对目前煤炭企业安全生产监管效率低下情况,应用经济博弈论构建了两阶段博弈模型,探讨了安全监管制度层面的内在机理,对煤矿业主与安全监管部门之间动态博弈关系及安全监管部门与一线操作员工严格竞争博弈关系的策略集进行了深入分析,指出了实现上策均衡的条件;在此基础上求出了三方合作博弈的安全收益分配的可行解集及形成有效合作的公平解;结果表明:对监管者与操作者的处罚与安全收益公平分配相结合能够实现违章作业零概率,彻底杜绝违章行为.

关 键 词:安全监管机制  纳什均衡  制度安排  合作博弈
文章编号:1000-1964(2006)01-0054-07
收稿时间:04 20 2005 12:00AM
修稿时间:2005年4月20日

Analysis of Safety Supervision Effect on Coal Mine Using Game Theory
ZHOU Min,XIAO Zhong-hai.Analysis of Safety Supervision Effect on Coal Mine Using Game Theory[J].Journal of China University of Mining & Technology,2006,35(1):54-60.
Authors:ZHOU Min  XIAO Zhong-hai
Abstract:A two-phase game model was constructed based on economic game theory to improve the inefficient supervision conditions of coalmining enterprises' safety production.The inner mechanism of safety supervision system was carefully studied.The strategy set of the dynamic game-theory relations between colliery proprietor and safety supervision department and the strict competitive game-theory relations between safety supervision department and workers at the production line was analyzed.The conditions of achieving the dominant-strategy equilibrium were revealed.Upon this basis,the possible solution set of safety benefit distribution for the cooperative game-theory of triple party was obtained and the effective and cooperative fair solution was formed.Finally,conclusions are drawn as follows: the combination of necessary penalty to supervisors and operators with the fair distribution of safety benefits can realize the zero-defect of operational violation,so that the violation behavior can be completely avoided.
Keywords:safety supervision mechanism  Nash Equilibrium  system arrangement  cooperative game
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