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公平偏好行为下考虑质量和营销努力的定价策略
引用本文:马鹏,王海燕. 公平偏好行为下考虑质量和营销努力的定价策略[J]. 控制与决策, 2017, 32(8): 1449-1456
作者姓名:马鹏  王海燕
作者单位:南京信息工程大学经济管理学院,南京210044,东南大学经济管理学院,南京210096
基金项目:国家自然科学基金重大项目(71390335);国家自然科学基金项目(71601099);江苏省自然科学基金项目(BK20160973);教育部人文社会科学研究青年基金项目(15YJC630091);江苏省高校自然科学研究面上项目(14KJB120005);南京信息工程大学人才启动基金项目(S8113085001).
摘    要:研究零售商公平偏好下考虑质量和营销努力的联合决策问题.首先考虑制造商Stackelberg的情形,研究发现, 零售价格、批发价格、质量努力水平、营销努力水平以及制造商利润均随零售商嫉妒偏好系数的增大而递减,但是零售商利润关于其嫉妒偏好系数的变化不大;然后,考虑零售商Stackelberg的情形,研究发现,批发价格、质量努力水平、营销努力水平以及制造商利润均随零售商的同情偏好系数的增大而递增,零售商利润则随其同情偏好系数的增大而递减;最后进行算例分析,并给出一些管理学的意义.

关 键 词:质量努力水平  营销努力水平  嫉妒偏好  同情偏好  定价策略

Pricing strategies with fairness preference by considering quality and marketing efforts
MA Peng and WANG Hai-yan. Pricing strategies with fairness preference by considering quality and marketing efforts[J]. Control and Decision, 2017, 32(8): 1449-1456
Authors:MA Peng and WANG Hai-yan
Affiliation:School of Economics and Management,Nanjing University of Information Science and Technology,Nanjing 210044,China and School of Economics and Management, Southeast University,Nanjing 210096,China
Abstract:This paper studies the joint decision problem with retailer''s fairness preference by considering the manufacturer''s quality efforts and retailer''s marketing efforts. In the manufacturer Stackelberg case, it is found that the retail price, the wholesale price, the quality efforts level, the marketing efforts level and the manufacturer''s profit will decrease with the retailer''s envy preference parameter, and the impact of the retailer''s envy preference parameter on the retailer''s profit is not constant. Then, in the retailer Stackelberg case, it is found that the wholesale price, the quality efforts level, the marketing efforts level, and the manufacturer''s profit will increase with the retailer''s sympathy preference parameter, and the retailer''s profit will decrease with its sympathy preference parameter. Finally, a numerical example is given, and some managerial implications are derived.
Keywords:
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