浅议工程监理制度下委托代理的博弈

运用博弈论中的“委托-代理”理论，对工程监理制度下的业主与工程师之间的委托代理关系进行了分析，论述了两博弈方（业主和工程师）的选择和行为，通过设计合理的监理合同（激励合同），利用内外部约束机制和市场声誉能有效抑制在不对称信息环境下的道德风险，以促进我国监理制度的健康发展。

On the game analysis of principal-agentrelationship under the engineering supervision institution

By using the principal-agent relationship in the game theory, the paper analyzes the relationship between the owner and the engineers under the engineering supervision institution, illustrates the selection and behaviors between the two sides the owner and the engineers in the game. According to the supervision contract or incentive contract, the paper points out that the internal and exterior restricted mechanism and the market fame can have a better limitation on the moral risks in the asymmetric environment, so as to enhance the supervision system to develop healthily in our country.