| 整治非法煤矿的博弈论分析 |
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| 引用本文： | 吴静静.整治非法煤矿的博弈论分析[J].宁波大学学报(理工版),2006,19(1):74-76. |
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| 作者姓名： | 吴静静 |
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| 作者单位： | 宁波大学,商学院,浙江,宁波,315211 |
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| 摘 要： | 通过建立博弈模型，分析事故频发的原因，并提出相应对策．指出设立举报奖金，消除矿工举报的后顾之忧，降低监督成本从而增加监督频率，加大惩罚力度是减少事故的关键．
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| 关 键 词： | 博弈 非法煤矿 事故 监督 举报 |
| 文章编号： | 1001-5132(2006)01-0074-03 |
| 收稿时间： | 2005-09-22 |
| 修稿时间： | 2005年9月22日 |
Game Theory Based Analysis on Penalizing Illegal Coal Mines |
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| WU Jing-jing.Game Theory Based Analysis on Penalizing Illegal Coal Mines[J].Journal of Ningbo University(Natural Science and Engineering Edition),2006,19(1):74-76. |
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| Authors: | WU Jing-jing |
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| Affiliation: | Faculty of Business, Ningbo University, Ningbo 315211, China |
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| Abstract: | Coal mine accidents frequently happen in China in recent years, and there are a large variety of causes behind these accidents, one of major causes is the existing illegal coal mines. Through constructing a Game Model, efforts are made to analyze the causes of the frequently happened accidents, and put forward corresponding countermeasures. The author believes that the key to reduce coal mine accidents is to set up a rewarding system to encourage people to report illegal coal mines and eliminate their fears and worries, lower supervision cost and increase supervision frequency, and harsher punishment toward violators. |
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| Keywords: | game illegal coal mines accidents supervision report |
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