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工程项目采购供应链中的竞合博弈
引用本文:许婷.工程项目采购供应链中的竞合博弈[J].中国管理科学,2009,17(1):83-88.
作者姓名:许婷
作者单位:南京财经大学会计学院, 江苏 南京 210046
基金项目:国家自然科学基金,国家科技支撑计划项目子课题 
摘    要:供应商、承包商与业主构成了工程项目采购中的供应链,在长期的工程建设与采购中,业主与承包商具有合作的动机.文章基于演化博弈论的方法,研究了工程采购中业主与承包商合作的演化方向及影响因素,研究表明:在非契约条件下,双方合作的概率与合作的超额收益呈正向关系,与合作成本及背叛收益呈反向关系,而为合作超额收益制定合理的分配系数是双方持续合作的必要条件;在签订了联盟合同后,背叛将受到惩罚,此时双方演化的结果将是均选择合作策略.

关 键 词:工程采购  供应链  竞合  演化博弈  
收稿时间:2008-10-31
修稿时间:2009-1-7

Co-Opetition Game of Supply Chain in Engineering Procurement
XU Ting.Co-Opetition Game of Supply Chain in Engineering Procurement[J].Chinese Journal of Management Science,2009,17(1):83-88.
Authors:XU Ting
Affiliation:School of Accounting, Nanjing University of Finance and Economics, Nanjing 210046, China
Abstract:The supplier, contractor and client constitute a supply chain in engineering procurement.Through long-term construction and purchase, the client and the contractor have the motivation of cooperanon.Based on evolutionary game theory, the paper studies the evolutionary direction of co-opetition between client and contractor, and analyzes the influencing factors.The result shows that the probability of cooperation of both sides has a positive correlation with excess return and a negative correlation with cost of cooperation and betrayal income.Reasonable partition coefficient to distribute the excess return is a necessary condition for both sides' sustained cooperation.In the case of an alliance contract, betrayal will be punished, and cooperation of both sides will be the evolutionary direction.
Keywords:engineering procurement  supply chain  co-opetition  evolutionary game  
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