基于前景理论的建筑行业合谋监管博弈分析

建筑行业已经成为我国政企合谋与腐败的重灾区之一。为研究建筑行业合谋行为的防范机制，基于前景理论构建国家、行政主管部门及建筑企业的三方收益感知矩阵，从而进行合谋监管的博弈分析，探寻合谋的条件及影响因素，并对影响因素进行敏感性分析。结果表明若不考虑心理因素尤其是损失规避的影响会对合谋监管策略产生较大偏差。合谋监管应从两方面进行:一是保证最佳的打击合谋事件的力度；二是通过制度设计降低合谋方策略均衡的监管概率，其具体的影响参数包括名誉损失率、惩罚与收益的比值、成本与收益之比以及合谋方心理因素。针对识别出的关键变量，对抑制合谋行为提出相关的对策建议。

Game Analysis of Collusion Supervision in Construction IndustryBased on Prospect Theory

Corruptions and collusions in construction industry happen a lot in China. In order to study on collusion- proofmechanism for the construction industry，profit sensing matrix of the state，the administrative department and the constructionenterprise based on Prospect Theory is constructed，the game analysis is applied to collusion supervision，the conditions andinfluencing factors of collusion is explored，and then the influencing factors is discussed with sensitivity analysis. It shows that theinfluence of psychological factors，especially the loss aversion，will have a large deviation to the best collusion supervision strategy.Collusion supervision should be carried out in two aspects:one is ensure the strength of the state to blow collusion behavior；anotheris to reduce the probability of collusion party supervision of strategy equilibrium through the design of the institution，the concreteparameters include the rate of reputational losses，the ratio of punishment and benefits，the ratio of costs and benefits，and collusionparty psychological factors. Finally，according to the key variables of supervision which have been identified，relevantcountermeasures and suggestions to suppress the collusion behavior are put forward.