双重补贴下考虑低碳商誉的供应链决策和协调

考虑低碳和回收补贴政策,对供应链中上游制造商碳减排和再制造,下游零售商低碳宣传共同提高产品低碳商誉的现实问题展开分析.将低碳商誉水平作为状态变量,构建非协同和协同情形下的微分博弈模型.通过对比分析,设计利润共享-低碳宣传成本共担的协调机制.研究表明:各情形下的低碳商誉水平均会随着时间逐渐达到稳定状态;双重补贴不仅能够激励制造商的低碳行为,还能有效提高产品低碳商誉和成员绩效,但是不会影响零售商的低碳宣传水平;非协同情形导致供应链效率的损失,协调时保持低碳宣传成本分担比例高于利润分享比例可有效改善低碳商誉水平.此外,制造商适当提高其成本分担比例有利于成员利润的改善.

Decisions and coordination of supply chain considering low-carbon reputation and dual subsidy policies

Under the context of low-carbon, upstream manufacturers and downstream retailers work together to improve the low-carbon reputation. Considering low-carbon and recycling subsidies, differential game models are constructed under decentralized and centralized cases by taking the level of low-carbon reputation as a state variable. Through comparison analysis, a profit-expense sharing contract is designed to improve the efficiency of the supply chain. The result shows that, 1) In each case, the level of low-carbon reputation increases with time and gradually reaches a stable state. 2) Dual subsidy policies not only encourage the manufacturer''s low-carbon behaviors, but also contribute to the low-carbon reputation and member''s profit. However, the retailer''s low carbon publicity level will not be affected. 3) The decentralized case leads to the loss of supply chain efficiency, and keeping the manufacturer''s profit-sharing ratio lower than the cost-sharing ratio can improve low-carbon reputation after coordination. In addition, the manufacturer sharing more low-carbon publicity costs can improve the profits of supply chain members when meeting conditions.